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This study describes the relationship between the concept of
intentional action and the grammatical organization of the clause in
Kathmandu Newari, a Tibeto-Burman language spoken primarily in the
Kathmandu valley of Nepal. In particular, the study focuses on the
conceptual structure of "intentional action" along with the lexical,
morphological, and syntactic reflexes of this notion in situated speech.
The construal of intentional action consists of two distinct notions:
one involving the concept of self-initiated force and the other
involving mental representation or awareness. The distribution of finite
inflectional forms for verbs results from the interaction of these two
notions with a set of evidential/discourse principles which constrain
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Consider what is entailed by our ability to talk about
"events" in the world. First, it entails an ability to
partition the world into events. In addition, it entails an
ability to recognize and categorize the types of events and the
types of roles participants play in events. Finally, it entails
the ability to map these conceptual categories onto language
specific lexical and grammatical categories. One goal of
linguistic theory is to understand this relationship between
conceptual and grammatical organization.
Grammar and Cognitive/Perceptual Categories 
Spatial orientation is one fundamental property of an
event description. Typically, an event will involve a change of
state or location. In event descriptions, things are located
"here" or "there," "in" or "out," "to" or "from," in relation to
the speech situation and the event. Thus, when we refer to the
spatial and directional orientation of participants in events,
we typically identify original states or locations (Source),
paths of change (Trajectories), and end states or end locations
(Goals). These concepts are basic components of semantic/
syntactic mappings (Anderson 1971; Croft 1991; DeLancey 1981a;
1981b; Gruber 1976; Jackendoff 1972; 1983; 1990; Lakoff 1987;
Langacker 1987; Talmy 1975).
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Also, when talking about an event, we characterize the
force dynamics of the event. We distinguish among types of
direct and mediated causations as well as various concepts of
interpersonal causation such as forcing, allowing, preventing,
and trying. Cognitive/functional grammarians have shown that
these conceptual categories, which organize our common sense
notions of force and causation, are also organized around a
basic source>goal schema. These categories also underlie the
creation and interpretation of linguistic forms (Clark &
Carpenter 1989; Croft 1991; Delancey 1990; GivOn 1975; Lakoff
1987; Jackendoff 1972; 1983; 1990; Langacker 1987; Shibatani
1976; TaJ.my 1976; 1988).
Finally, when relating events, we also express different
construals of the temporal dynamics. We characterize the
aspectual qualities of punctuality or durativity, the degrees of
stativity or activity, the relations of completedness or
resultant state (Dowty 1979, Nedjalkoff 1988; Timberlake and
Chung 1985; Vendler 1967).
It seems clear that spatial, causal, and temporal cate-
gories underlie our categorization of event types; hence, these
categories underlie, in part, the grammatical organization of
clauses and discourses. Exactly how conceptual categories and
grammatical organization are related is less clear.
Grammar and Social/Cognitive Categories 
As we talk about events, we are also performing a social
action. Alternating as speaker and addressee, we are inter-
actants in a situated speech event: referring, asserting,
3
questioning, commanding, promising, joking, flattering, lying,
and entertaining. As participants, we have communicative plans
and goals which contribute to the micropolitics of situated
interaction. When we interact with others, our linguistic
behavior simultaneously describes and constitutes our social
world (Goffman 1974; Silverstein 1976a; 1987; Volosinov
1929/1973).
In creating discourse, our identities are constructed, in
part, by the authority we assume or are attributed by other
interactants. This authority can be based on a variety of
interpersonal, kinship, class, race, and gender relationships.
Discursive authority assumes normative standards of credibility
or truthfulness and seeks to define concepts such as
"necessary," "definite," "possible," or "doubtful" based on
normative values of evidence, perspective, inference, and truth
(Chafe & Nichols 1986; Giv6n 1982; Gumpertz 1990; Kuroda 1973;
Lyons 1982; Palmer 1985).
As with the spatial, temporal, and causal domains, there
are categories which organize our social knowledge about speech
acts, speech event roles, identities, authority, and evidence.
For example, in conversations, we make assumptions about other
interactants and their beliefs; these models of "other minds"
allow us to make appropriate decisions about various conversa-
tional strategies and conventions: greeting, turn-taking,
referring, correcting, leave-taking. At issue is how the use of
this social knowledge is related to grammatical organization
(cf. Goody 1978; Gordon & Lakoff 1971; Grice 1975; Sachs,
Schegloff, & Jefferson 1974; Sperber & Wilson 1988).
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To understand the functioning of a grammatical system,
then, is to understand the mappings between perceptual/
cognitive, social/cognitive, and linguistic categories as they
occur in real time, social interaction.
The Concept of Intentionality
In one way or another, it is usually the world of
human beings that we are concerned with when we talk with
others. When we describe events with human participants, we
identify the causes, motivations, consequences, and responsi-
bilities of our own and other people's behavior. Ascribing
reasons, motivations, and moral responsibility for human
behavior entails a distinction between voluntary or intentional
behaviors, and other types of non-voluntary or non-intentional
occurrences. It has been the foundation of moral philosophy as
far back as Aristotle's Ethics. Thus, in categorizing the roles
that individuals play within an event, one of the primary
distinctions we make is between individuals who initiate action
and individuals or entities who merely participate without
initiating action.
While it is clear that our construal of intentional and
non-intentional events is an important part of how we understand
events and human actions, it is less clear how this concept maps
onto grammatical organization. For example, while the concepts
of "source" or "agent" have clear functional roles at a basic
level of semantic/syntactic organization, the functional role of
a concept like "intentional action" is less clear. This study
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examines how the concept "intentional action" is realized in the
grammatical organization of Kathmandu Newari.
Agency and Transitivity
Although we may assume that our categorization of events
underlies, in part, the way clauses are organized, there remains
the fundamental question of how conceptual structures and
clausal grammar are related. That is, we must ask about the
essential relationship between semantics and morphosyntax.
As Lakoff (1977), Hopper & Thompson (1980), Silverstein
(1983), Foley and Van Valin (1984), Givan (1984), and others
have argued, the salient distinction between "doers" and "non-
doers" appears most clearly when two referentially distinct
participants appear in a finite, active, declarative, transitive
clause. This approach to grammatical categories argues that
underlying basic clause structure is a transitive action schema.
In the canonical transitive schema, an animate individual
intentionally initiates a behavior. The purposeful behavior
involves direct physical contact with another individual. This
intentional action by the "agent" is the direct causal ante-
cedent for a physical change of state by the "patient."
GivOn (1984) summarizes the three essential components of
the canonical schema:
1. Agent properties: The agent is a conscious human
acting purposefully with force to bring about direct physical
contact with the patient.
2. Event/Action properties: The temporal dynamics of the
event are punctual and completed with a salient resultant state.
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3. Patient properties: The patient is a unique, refer-
entially individuated person or thing which undergoes some
salient change of state subsequent to receiving the force
exerted by the agent.
The argument for canonical semantic/morphosyntactic
mappings runs roughly as follows: The most salient distinctions
and communicatively relevant categories of conceptual structure
are preserved in the mapping onto linguistic structure.
Functional principles of clarity and economy in acquisition,
contact, and language change favor isomorphism or structure
preservation in mappings between conceptual structures and
grammatical structures (Giv6n 1989; Haiman 1980; 1983; Slobin
1985).
For example, the Source>Trajector>Goal schema is a highly
salient component of the transitive schema (Clark and Carpenter
1989). The schematic properties of the schema are preserved in
spatial, temporal, and causal domains of the grammar (Anderson
1971; Lakoff 1987; Langacker 1987; Talmy 1975). In particular,
as the locus for the spatial, temporal, and causal origins of a
transitive event, the agent exhibits exemplary properties of the
Source category (Delancey 1981; 1984b). Following the structure
preservation principle, the prominent position of the agent in
the event schema maps onto the most prominent position in
grammatical structure: the subject.
Functional typological studies confirm that the distinc-
tion between agent and non-agent can be partially isomorphic
with an opposition between subject and non-subject grammatical
relations (Giv6n 1979; Foley and Van Valin 1984; Merlan 1984;
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Van valin 1990). Although government & binding, relational
grammar, and lexical-functional approaches differ from
cognitive-functional theories (and one another) in crucial
assumptions about the architecture of cognitive/linguistic
systems, they also assume some version of a thematic hierarchy
to account for the canonical mapping relations between semantic
roles and grammatical relations (cf. Chomsky 1981; 1982; Bresnan
& Moshi 1990; Grimshaw 1990; Hale & Keyser 1986; Jackendoff
1972; 1990; Marantz 1984; Perlmutter 1978; 1982; Rosen 1984;
Wilkins 1988).
In short, there is no disagreement that the agent role is
the most prominent thematic role on the hierarchy. In fact,
while cognitive-functional approaches have long argued for
canonical mapping relations between event representations and
clausal morphosyntax, as Grimshaw's (1990) comments below
suggest, current assumptions in "formal/generative" approaches
are now actually quite similar in this respect.
In the strongest possible theory, the a-structure [argu-
ment structure or lexical-syntactic structure DH] of a
lexical item is predictable from its meaning, and the
d-structure [deep structure or clausal projection DR] the
item appears in is predictable from its a-structure and
the independent parametric characteristics of the
language.	 (1990:1)
Baker (1988) makes a similar iconicity or structure-
preservation principle the foundation of his theory of incor-
poration. He calls it the Uniformity of Theta Assignment
Hypothesis:
Identical thematic relations between items are represented
by identical structural relationships between those items
at the level of D-structure (1988:46).
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The structure preservation principle makes sense as long
as we know what thematic relations or conceptual structures are.
But, what are "thematic relations" and what is the conceptual
structure of "intentional action," and how are the two concepts
related to one another?
The Functional Autonomy of the Concept
"Intentional Action"
The concept of "intention" or "volition" has been identi-
fied as one of several conceptual parameters which may be
attributed to the agent thematic role and, by implication, the
transitivity prototype. However, there is abundant cross
linguistic evidence suggesting that the concept of "intentional
action" can have functional realizations independent of other
transitivity parameters.
In case marking typology, for example, there is a semantic
distinction between event types reflected in "active/non-active"
case marking systems (DeLancey 1981; Hale 1973; Klimov 1979;
Sapir 1917). Only animate entities have the potential for
active (or subject) case marking; the "active" or "subject" case
typically correlates with NPs referring to intentional actors.
In other words, the morphosyntactic process which assigns case
marking to noun phrases distinguishes between two event types
without regard to the valency of the clause. Instead, the
system distinguishes between prototypical intentional actions
and non-intentional actions or events.
Grammatical oppositions distinguishing intentional and
non-intentional actions occur in a variety of languages
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including Acehnese (Durie 1985), Eastern Pomo, (Mclendon 1978),
Choctaw (Davies 1986), Cupeno (Hill 1973), and Lhasa Tibetan
(DeLancey 1985b). Underlying the opposition is the grammatical-
ization of a distinction between active/non-active event types.
The active/non-active distinction is prototypically a distinc-
tion between events which can be self-initiated (or intentional)
and events which can not be self-initiated.
Significantly, this grammaticalization occurs independ-
ently of the affectedness of the patient, or whether there is a
patient in the clause at all. That is, in these languages, the
concept of self-initiated vs. non-initiated actions is realized
in grammatical contrasts independently of other transitivity
parameters such as valency or patient affectedness. This shows
that the concept of intentional action can be mapped directly
into morphosyntactic organization and can be functionally
independent of other transitivity parameters. In other words,
while the transitivity schema may help account for why distinc-
tive semantic properties can become conflated with one another
when they are mapped onto grammatical organization, the notion
of a transitive prototype does not address the issue of how
components of the schema can have distinctive or independent
realizations.
In some languages, the contrastive syntactic properties of
actor and non-actor intransitive subjects can be grammaticalized
as an opposition in initial grammatical relations, or argument
structures: this is the Unaccusative Hypothesis (Burzio 1986;
Perlmutter 1978; 1982). These syntactic accounts do not
directly appeal to the semantic distinction between intentional
1 0
and non-intentional action types; for example, Rosen (1984)
specifically argues that since specific languages grammaticalize
predicates somewhat differently, split-intransitive argument
structures cannot be reduced to pure semantic distinctions. In
contrast, Van Valin (1990) argues that split intransitivity is
motivated by the semantic parameters of inherent aspect and
volitionality. At issue are the mapping relations between
conceptual structures and the grammar.
Although the theoretical status of the distinction between
initial grammatical relations (or lexical-syntactic structure)
and conceptual structures may be unresolved, the typological
distributions reveal a stable pattern of grammaticalization.
For those languages that encode split intransitivity, intransi-
tives of self-initiated action assume subject properties and
intransitives of non-initiated events do not; the converse is
never the case.
The point is that the opposition between self-initiated
and non-initiated actions can be formally realized in case
systems, or deeper lexical-grammatical properties, or both. In
these cases, the distinction between self-initiated and non-
initiated events appears as the primary semantic opposition
which maps onto a core morphosyntactic opposition. This
distinction is mapped into the morphosyntax independent of other
conceptual properties of the agency/transitivity prototype.
This point is significant: If a distinction between
intentional and non-intentional events can be the sole opposi-
tion which determines the distribution of core grammatical
relations or case, then a semantic based account must analyze
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the distinction independent of other agency and transitivity
parameters. This, in turn, raises two fundamental questions
about the relationship between the concept of intentional action
and grammar:
1. What are the parameters by which the concept of
intentional action can be related to grammatical organization.
2. What are the parameters by which the concept of
intentional action interacts, or does not interact, with other
conceptual features of the agency and transitivity prototype?
In other words, we interested in the mappings between
conceptual and linguistic structure and the parameters by which
related transitivity concepts such as intentionality, agency,
and causation can have independent realizations in the grammar.
The Other Intentionality
There is another important dimension to the mapping of
intentional action onto the grammar, independent of other
transitivity parameters. While studies of grammatical organiza-
tion have focused primarily on "intention" or "volition" as
agent thematic role properties, the concept of intention has
been living another life. To see the issue involved consider
the case of Oedipus and the two syllogisms below, one of which
only a Freudian could love.
Oedipus married Jocasta.
Jocasta was his mother.
Therefore, Oedipus married his mother.
Oedipus intentionally married Jocasta.
Jocasta was his mother.
Therefore, Oedipus intentionally married his mother.
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At issue, of course, is the referential opacity which
arises in a belief context introduced by intentionality (Quine
1956). Although our concern is not with referential opacity per
se, there is an important connection. With the adverb "inten-
tionally," t he truth of the proposition can only be judged
relative to the beliefs of the person to whom intention is being
attributed. The semantic interpretation must capture the fact
that the linguistic expression "x intentionally did y" can be
evaluated only via access to, or inference about, the mental
representation of the action by the actor. That is, it is
necessary to know or assume the actor's goals before one can
make an assertion about intentionality. Furthermore, an
assertion that "x intentionally did y" which does not involve
direct access to actor's plans or goals can only be an inference
based on assumptions about the etiology of human action. As we
shall see, unlike English, Newari grammar distinguishes between
direct and indirect attributions of intentional action.
Apart from the issue of thematic roles, the concept of
intentional action in Newari grammar engenders several related
issues in the semantic representation of events and proposi-
tional attitudes (cf. Anderson and Owens 1990; Davidson 1980;
Gunderson 1990; Jackendoff 1985; Quine 1956; Searle 1983; 1990),
mental spaces or discourse representations (Fauconnier 1984;
Kamp 1984; Sells 1987), and evidentiality (Chafe & Nichols, eds.
1986; Jacobson 1957; GivOn 1982; Kuroda 1973; Woodbury 1986).
With only a few exceptions to be discussed in Chapter IV, there
has been almost no discussion in the linguistic literature
connecting "intentionality" or "volitionality" as an agent
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property with "intentionality" as a propositional attitude in
which the actor has a particular mental state with respect to a
self-initiated action.
To conclude, the concept of intentional action has two
distinct dimensions, traditionally studied independently of one
another. On the one hand, the concept of self-initiated action
is subsumed within a larger conceptual domain of agency,
causation and the transitivity prototype. Our interest is in
the mapping between conceptual structures and linguistic
subsystems such as grammatical relations, case, verb agreement,
or inflection. The cross-linguistic evidence shows that the
concept of intentionality may or may not have direct mappings
with grammatical organization independent of other transitivity
parameters. Thus, while the transitivity prototype accounts for
some of the canonical mappings between semantics and the
morphosyntax, there remains the important task of:
1. Describing how the concepts of intentionality, agency,
and causation in conceptual structure may be mapped onto the
grammar.
2. Describing the interaction or non-interaction among
these systems when they are mapped onto the grammar.
On the other hand, the concept of intentional action is
subsumed within the larger conceptual domain of modality,
evidentiality, and discourse representations. The Newari data
will suggest that we examine more closely the evidential and
discourse functions by which intentional actions, and belief
states in general, may be attributed to individuals in contexts
of situated speech. Also, the data will require that we
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consider how to characterize the notion "x mentally represents
y" so that we may describe its functional role in the grammar.
As we shall see, both dimensions of intentional action are
fundamental for describing the grammar of Kathmandu Newari.
Goals of This Study
This study is a descriptive account of the relationship
between the concept of intentional action, the grammatical
organization of the clause, and the dynamics of evidentiality in
Kathmandu Newari, a Tibeto-Burman language spoken primarily in
the Kathmandu valley of Nepal.' In particular, the study
focuses on the conceptual structure of "intentional action"
along with the lexical, morphological, and syntactic reflexes of
this notion in situated speech. Fundamental to the discussion
is the system of finite verb inflection.
The distribution of inflectional forms in finite clauses
reveals three lexical-semantic classes of verbs: (a) verbs
describing events which typically involve self-initiated
behavior, or Control verbs, (b) verbs describing events which
are incompatible with the concept of self-initiated behavior, or
Non-Control verbs, and (c) verbs describing events which admit
alternative interpretations of self-initiated or non self-
initiated behavior, or Fluid verbs.
This implicit categorization of events as self-initiated
or non-initiated is fundamental to Newari verb semantics.
In addition to these lexical semantic properties, Newari
grammar incorporates the propositional attitude properties of
intentional action. For example, the distribution of
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inflectional forms indexes two speech act participant categories
distinct from the more familiar categories of speaker and
addressee. More specifically, the opposition between two sets
of inflectional forms (called SET1 and SET2) distinguishes
between: (a) participants to whom intentional action may be
directly attributed in situated interaction, and (b) partici-
pants to whom intentional action may not be directly attributed
in situated interaction.
In other words, the grammar recognizes that, in addition
to self-initiated behavior, intentional action involves a mental
state which can only be attributed to individuals under certain
evidential and discourse conditions.
This study will show that the construal of intentional
action involving two distinct dimensions is fundamental to
Newari grammar. The evidence shows that underlying the
distribution of finite inflectional forms for verbs is both a
conceptual model of intentional action and a set of evidential/
discourse principles which constrain the attribution of
intentional action to individuals in situated interaction.
Outline of This Study
The primary goal of the study is to describe how the
concept of intentional action is realized in Newari grammar. In
addition, the study examines the functional organization by
which conceptual structure is mapped onto grammatical systems in
discourse contexts.
The fundamental issue to be addressed in Chapter II is the
following:
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How do the lexical semantic and the discourse pragmatic
domains interact to determine the distribution of
inflectional forms and express the distinction between
intentional and non-intentional actions?
Chapter II outlines the distribution of finite inflec-
tional forms and the distributional criteria for verb classes:
Control, Non-control, and Fluid. It then goes on to show that
the selection of an inflectional form can be described relative
to two functional domains: (a) verb semantics, and (b) the
speech act participant role of the individual of whom the
action/event is being predicated. Chapter II concludes that the
distribution of inflectional forms must be described in terms of
the interaction between lexical semantic and discourse pragmatic
principles.
The distributional properties of the Newari inflectional
system have been outlined in several important works on the
semantics and morphosyntax of Newari verbs (Bendix 1974; Hale
1980). The distribution can be described essentially as
follows:
There is a set of verbal inflections (SET1) that only
occur with those verbs that can plausibly be interpreted as
involving an intentional action. Furthermore, they only occur
when the attribution of intention to an individual is licensed
by certain evidential and interactional principles. More
specifically, in simple clauses, the SET1 inflectional form
occurs whenever;
1. The verb describes an action type involving inten-
tional action or control by an actor.
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2. the speech act is either: (a) declarative and the
actor is first-person, or (b) interrogative and the actor is
second-person, or (c) reported speech and the main and
subordinate clause actors are coreferential.
The default or SET2 form is used in all other finite
environments. We consider the details in Chapters II and III.
In a series of articles, Bendix (1974; 1983; to appear)
insightfully analyzes the Newari inflectional system and its
semantic and pragmatic functions. His analysis identifies three
classes of verbs relative to the feature of "Control" and the
evidential principles that correspond to the speech event roles.
Bendix's study focuses on the pragmatic and evidential functions
of the inflectional system and leaves open two important
questions on the semantic/morphosyntax mappings underlying the
inflection system. Bendix himself states:
I will not here argue the relative merits of considering
[the Control/Non-Control distinction DR] a semantic one
for these verbs, i.e., to be included in their defini-
tions, [or derive] it pragmatically from beliefs about the
kinds of actions and states they represent. I will also
not digress to give consideration to arguments for and
against the alternative analysis of [SET1 inflection DH]
as signaling +CONTROL rather than +INTENTION (to
appear:9).
Bendix is interested in the strategic functions of the
inflectional contrasts and demonstrates the basic principles
which underlie the distributions; however, as he himself states,
he is not interested in the functional organization per se. His
discussion leaves two important questions unanswered. Chapters
III and IV address these two questions:
What properties or features of the concept "intentional
action," such as the distinction between "control" and
"intention," are functionally relevant in Newari
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morphosyntax? More generally, what is the conceptual
structure by which intentional action is construed in the
grammar of Kathmandu Newari?
When an utterance in discourse indexes an opposition
between intentional and non-intentional action, what are
the contributions of the lexical (i.e., verb), morpho-
logical (i.e., inflection), and pragmatic (i.e.,
discourse/evidential) information. In other words, what
parts of the conceptual structure are mapped onto what
parts of the grammar and how do they interact?
Chapter III is a more detailed examination of the semantic
and morphosyntactic distinctions among verb classes. Through a
variety of semantic tests, it shows that the construal of
intentional action consists of two distinct, but related,
notions: one involving the concept of self-initiated force and
the other involving a unique mental state or plan. In short,
underlying the lexical semantic and discourse praymatic domains
is a conceptual structure for intentional action consisting of
two related domains: self-initiated force and mental plan.
Chapter IV draws on important insights from studies of
agency and intentional action in philosophy, language acquisi-
tion, and cognitive linguistics to argue for a conceptual
structure of intentional action consisting of two domains:
(a) the mental representation of a plan, and (b) the self-
initiation of a force in accordance with the mental plan.
It argues that although the two domains together make up
the construal of intentional action, the two domains have a
different status in morphosyntactic processes. More
specifically, the notion of self-initiated force is part of the
inherent lexical structure of verbs; its presence or absence
underlies the classification of verb types: Control, Non-
Control, and Fluid. In contrast, the representational domain
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underlies the indexical function of the SET1/SET2 inflectional
opposition in finite predication.
In Newari scholarship, the opposition between inflectional
forms is often referred to as the "conjunct/disjunct" opposi-
tion, terms used in the seminal work on verbal inflection by
Austin Hale (1980). The terms "conjunct" and "disjunct" follow
from the coreference or logophoric properties of the "conjunct"
forms in contexts of reported speech. Highlighting the
logophoric aspects, Joshi (1985; 1988a) introduces the per-
spicacious terms atma 'self' and para 'other' to characterize
the opposition. Since the goal of this paper is to examine,
rather than presuppose, the conceptual structures and discourse
principles which underlie the distribution of inflectional
forms, I will use the neutral terms (SET1/SET2).
As with Bendix's work, Hale (1980) identifies the two
important variables which underlie the distribution of inflec-
tional form: The clause must contain an intentional actor and
the speech act and person roles constrain the occurrence of
inflections which indicate intentional action. Again, however,
the conceptual structure of intentional action is left implicit
and the semantics/morphosyntax mappings are not specified.
Waver (1976) and Hale & Manandhar (1980) provide compre-
hensive, seminal studies of the relationship between valency,
semantic roles and morphological case in Newari. In a similar
vein, Shresthacharya (1981) investigates the inflectional and
derivational classes of Newari verbs and identifies semantic
classes of verbs. GivOn (1985) argues that transitivity
parameters underlie case marking alternations in infinitive
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complements. Tuladhar (1990) provides a comprehensive study of
negation and the structure of Newari clauses. Genetti (1988)
quantifies the referential distance between noun phrases in
clause chains and argues that differences in the topicality of
NPs underlies an Ergative/Absolutive alternation in case
marking.
Common to all of these studies is the focus on how
semantic or pragmatic roles are reflected in clausal morpho-
syntax, particularly case marking. However, none of the studies
directly addresses the fundamental question: What is the
relationship between the concept of intentional action, as it is
realized in the inflectional system, and the thematic role
categories which underlie lexical structures and the case
system. Chapter V focuses on this question:
If intentionality and control are prototypical actor/agent
properties central to the hierarchical assignment of
thematic roles to argument positions, what is the rela-
tionship between the concept of intentional action
realized by the inflectional opposition and the concepts
of actor or agent as thematic role concepts? Alterna-
tively, how does the system of inflectional oppositions
correlate with other morphosyntactic reflections of
argument structure, e.g., case assignment.
Chapters V and VI examine in more detail the relationship
between the conceptual structure of events/actions, lexical
structure, and the morphosyntax. In contrast to Chapters III
and IV, which are only concerned with the concept of intentional
action, Chapter V examines the lexical semantic properties which
underlie the argument structure of verbs and their case
assigning properties. Chapter V argues that case assignment is
a mapping between an underlying Source>Goal schema and argument
structure, independent of the opposition between intentional and
21
non-intentional action. When mapping conceptual structure onto
morphosyntactic structure, the thematic role concept of "agent/
source" is independent of the concept of "intentional action."
As Talmy's (1976; 1988) work in cognitive grammar has
argued, the concepts of intentional action and agency can be
subsumed within the larger conceptual domain of causality and
force dynamics. In Newari, Malla (1984) shows that there are
two primary categories of causatives, one productive, one non-
productive. Recently, Kanskar (1990) has argued that the
behavior of Newari causatives with certain verbs can be
attributed to unnaccusative lexical structures.
As noted above, it has been argued that unaccusative
lexical structures correlate with a semantic opposition between
actor and non-actor subjects (cf. Foley 1990 and Rosen 1984 for
conflicting viewpoints). Thus, Kanskar's observations about
causatives raises another important question, addressed in
Chapter VI:
What is the relationship in Newari between the syntax and
semantics of causatives and the morphosyntactic reflexes
of intentional action. More specifically, if causatives
do indeed provide evidence for unaccusative lexical struc-
tures in Newari, then what is the relationship between the
concept of intentional action and unaccusative syntax in
Newari?
Chapter VI analyzes the morphosyntax of causative
constructions and argues for a more detailed lexical-semantic
organization for verbs. More specifcally, the behavior of
causatives shows the grammaticalization of unaccusative lexical
structures. This results in two causative types: a canonical
causative and a middle voice causative expressing causative/
intentional oppositions such as "remember" vs. "recall."
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However, this grammaticalization is not a function of the same
opposition between intentional and non-intentional actions
manifested in the inflectional opposition Instead, it is
restricted to a class of experiencer/cognition verbs, where
causativization, not inflection, expresses the distinction
between self-initiated and non-initiated mental events. In
short, the same functional distinction (intentional/non-
intentional) is expressed in two distinct grammatical domains
which function independently of one another; again, this
provides evidence that the concept "intentional action" relevant
for inflection can not be simply subsumed in a causation or
transitivity mapping schema.
Finally, as several studies have shown, there is an
important relationship between the construal of aspect/modality
dynamics in the clause and the construal of event types,
including the action vs. non-action distinction (DeLancey 1981;
Dowty 1979; Grimshaw 1990; Foley and Van Valin 1984; Van Valin
1990; Vendler 1967). In Newari, the inflectional paradigm marks
a distinction between the SET1/SET2 opposition on the one hand
and tense/aspect oppositions on the other hand. More impor-
tantly, there are aspect/modality verbs taking infinitive
complements which interact with the inflectional opposition.
Significantly, each of the verbs exhibits its own unique
distributional asymmetry which is functionally identical to the
SET1/SET2 distributional asymmetry. This raises important
questions about the relationship between the functional domain
which underlies the asymmetries. That is, if the same
functional assymetries are found in grammatical domains other
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than inflection, then how are we to understand the relationship
between the functional domains and the grammatical domains?
Chapter VII focuses on this question:
What is the relationship between the concept of inten-
tional action and the expression of aspect/modality
distinctions in the clause? More specifically, what is
the functional organization which underlies the same
distributional asymmetries for the inflectional contrast
and a set of aspect/modality verbs?
Chapter VII turns to the domain of aspect/modality,
evidentiality, and discourse roles. The distribution of a set
of aspect/modality verbs shows that the functional principles
underlying the distribution of inflection forms have reali-
zations in grammatical contexts other than the SET1/SET2
inflectional contrast itself. More specifically, it shows that
these asymmetries exactly parallel the distribution of SET1/SET2
inflection. The existence of the same distributional asym-
metries in more than one morphosyntactic system constitutes
strong evidence for the existence of the underlying conceptual
schemata and functional domains.




1 The data for this study were collected in Kathmandu
during two field trips: September 1984-September 1985 and June
1988-June 1989. The examples come from three elicitation
methods which I used when working:
1) direct elicitations
2) narrative and conversational texts
3) elicitations based on examples taken from narrative and
conversations texts.
The scale of judgements is as follows:
1) starred (*) examples were judged entirely unacceptable
by all of the native speakers I consulted.
2) double question marks ?? indicate that the example was
initially judged unacceptable by all or most of the speakers.
However, some speakers showed equivocation, indicating that it
sounded "non-standard" or "never-used" rather than "entirely
unacceptable."
3) a single question mark ? indicates that there was
considerable variation as to the acceptablility of the example:
some found it acceptable, some found it odd, some found it
unacceptable.
4) examples which are not marked are those which were
acceptable to all of the native speakers consulted.
To all of the speakers who helped me with the elicitations,
transciptions, and interpretations of examples, my deepest
thanks: Manoj Kaaskar, Sunil Nepali, Syam Mahajan, Gita
Manandhar, JayaSri Shakya, Suresh Shakya, and Rajendra Shrestha.
The final text examples and judgements were checked by Mr. Daya
Ratna Shakya to whom I am deeply grateful. Any errors or
misinterpretations of the data are due to my own incomplete
understanding of colloquial Kathmandu Newari.
CHAPTER II
THE DISTRIBUTION OF INFLECTIONAL FORMS
This chapter introduces the morphosyntactic pattern which
is the focus of the study. Broadly speaking, at issue are the
principles which underlie the distribution of inflectional forms
in finite environments, where inflection covaries relative to
two functional domains, one lexical semantic and the other
discourse pragmatic.
The first domain is lexical semantic. That is, the
inflectional opposition covaries relative to the inherent
semantics of the verb and the construal of intentionality for
the action being described. More specifically, the distribution
of forms suggests three classes of verb:
1. Those that describe prototypical self-initiated
behaviors, Control verbs.
2. Those that describe events incompatible with self-
initiated behavior, Non-Control verbs.
3. Those that describe events/actions which admit
alternate interpretations of intentionality, or Fluid verbs.'
The second domain is discourse pragmatic. That is,
inflectional forms also covary relative to the roles of partici-
pants in the speech situation, in particular, the role of
epistemic authority in the speech event. The distribution shows
that first persons in declarative clauses and second persons in
interrogative clauses share a discourse role--the epistemic
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authority for the proposition in the clause. I will call this
role the Epistemic Source.
After outlining the basic distribution of inflectional
forms in simple finite clauses, we then consider how finite
inflection is realized in the environments of attributive
(relative) clauses, nominalizations, and two types of complex
clauses. The goal here is simply to illustrate the range of
environments in which the finite inflectional forms realize the
functional oppositions.
The chapter concludes with a hypothesis which accounts for
the interaction between the lexical semantic and discourse
pragmatic domains, and the distribution of inflectional forms.
The hypothesis will serve to guide the subsequent discussion.
Verb Inflection 
The inflectional opposition is manifested via two sets of
obligatory suffixes (termed SET1 and SET2) in finite clauses.
Informally, the system can be characterized as follows: SET1
suffixes index a clausal actor whenever the actor has the
epistemic authority attributed to one of the speech event
participants (the speaker in statements or the addressee in
questions). More specifically, a clause will have a SET1 form
whenever:
1. The clause is finite.
2. The event being described is interpreted as involving
a self-initiated behavior by the actor.
3. The speech act is: (a) declarative and the actor is
first person, or, (b) interrogative and the actor is second
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person, or, (c) reported speech and the source of the direct
speech and the subject in the reported clause are coreferential
(Bendix 1974; to appear; Hale 1980; Hargreaves 1990; to appear).
SET2 suffixes occur in all other finite environments
except those outlined above. For reasons that will become clear
later on, SET2 is designated as the default category for finite









Inflection in Simple Finite Clauses 
Declarative Clauses
In declarative clauses, SET1/SET2 inflection covaries
along two dimensions:
1. A semantic distinction between self-initiated and non-
initiated event types.
2. A referential distinction between 1st and non-1st
person subjects. With one class of verbs (Control), the
SET1/SET2 inflection distinguishes first and non-first person.
SET1 forms occur with first person subjects; SET2 forms occur
with 2nd and 3rd person subjects. Semantically, verbs which
exhibit a first/non-first opposition in declarative clauses
describe intentional, or self-initiated behaviors and hence will
be called CONTROL verbs.
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In the first set of examples, won- 'go' is a Control verb
with an Absolutive subject. The SET1 suffix -a occurs with











In this second set of examples, va(t)- 'do' is a Control
verb with an Ergative subject. Again, inflection covaries with
the opposition between first and non-first person subjects.3
(4) ji:	 jya yan-a
1/ERG	 work do-PST/SET1
"I did the work."
(5) chO:	 jya yat-O
2/ERG	 work do-PERF/SET2
"You did the work."
(6) 146:	 jya yat-O
3/ERG	 work do-PERF/SET2
"S/he did the work."
In contrast, with a second class of verbs, termed NON-
CONTROL (-Control) verbs, the first/non-first person distinction
is neutralized and only SET2 forms occur. The verb then-
'arrive' takes an Absolutive subject and belongs to the class of
Non-Control verbs.




(8) chO	 mhigO	 then-0
2/ABS	 yesterday arrive-PERF/SET2
"You arrived."
(9) wo	 mhigO	 then-0
3/ABS	 yesterday arrive-PERF/SET2
"He/she/it arrived yesterday."
The verb bu(t)- 'lose (in a contest)' is also a Non-
Control verb and exhibits the same distribution.
(10) ji	 but-0
1/ABS	 lose-PERF/SET2
"I lost (in the game)."
chO	 but-0
2/ABS	 lose-PERF/SET2
"You lost (in the game)."
(12) wo	 but-0
3/ABS	 lose-PERF/SET2
"He/she lost (in the game)."
Similarly, the verb thu(1)- 'understand' is a Non-Control











In short, the distribution of SET1 and SET2 forms with
first person reveals a covert distinction between two classes of
verbs. In conceptual terms, the distinction between verb
classes corresponds to a distinction between events whose
description entails a self-initiated behavior and those which do
not.
30
Finally, there is a class of Fluid verbs allowing either
SET1 or SET2 inflection in first person clauses, depending on
the attribution of intention. The occurrence of a SET1 form
indicates a self-initiated event; in contrast, the occurence of
a SET2 form indicates a non-initiated event.
(16) ji	 10kh0-e	 dun-0
1/ABS	 water-LOC submerge-PERF/SET2
"I sank into the water." (non-intentional)
(17) ji	 lOkhO-e	 dun-a
1/ABS	 water-LOC submerge-PST/SET1
"I dipped into the water." (intentional)
Fluid marking is not limited to intransitive verbs. With
the verb napO=la- 'meet/run into', both intentional and non-
intentional interpretations are equally plausible and commonly
attested in discourse. Note that case marking does not co-vary
with verb inflection. We take up this issue in Chapters V
and VI.
(18) ji: laksmi	 nap0=lan-a
I/ERG Laksmi	 with-meet-PST/SET1
"I met Laksmi." (intentional)
(19) laksmi	 napa=lat-0
1/ERG Laksmi	 with=meet-PERF/SET2
"I met/ran into Laksmi." (non-intentional)
Again, the distinction is not manifested for non-first












In declarative clauses, the inflectional paradigm covertly
distinguishes two classes of verbs, Control and Non-Control, and
admits an intermediate class of Fluid verbs. In addition, the
distribution of SETT/SET2 inflection relative to person shows a
first/non-first person distinction.
In contrast to the oppositions in declarative clauses, in
interrogative clauses with Control verbs, SET1/SET2 inflection
distinguishes second person from non-second person. Consider
the pairs below: The verb ton- 'to drink, smoke' is a Control
verb.
(22) ji:	 O:pwO	 ton-a
1/ERG alot	 drink-PST/SETT
"I drank too much."
(23) j1:	 O:pwo	 ton-0	 la
1/ERG alot	 drink-PERF/SET2 Q
"Did I drink too much?"
The context for the declarative clause in (22) is the
morning after a feast; the speaker is merely narrating the
activities of the previous night. The context for the inter-
rogative clause in (23) is the morning after a feast where the
speaker cannot clearly recall all of the previous night's
events. The speaker is asking an addressee, who also attended
the feast, about what happened.
In contrast, an interrogative clause with second person
requires SET1 inflection. The declarative clause requires SET2
inflection.
(24) ch0: O:pwO	 ton-a	 la
2/ERG alot	 drink-PST/SET1	 Q
"Did you drink too much?"
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(25) chO: O:pwO	 ton-0
2/ERG alot	 drink-PERF/SET2
"You drank too much."
The distinction is neutralized with third persons as in (26) and
(27) below.
(26) w6:	 O:pwO	 ton-0	 la
3/ERG alot	 drink-PERF/SET2 Q
"Did s/he drink too much?"
(27) 146:	 O:pwO	 ton-0
3/ERG alot	 drink-PERF/SET2
"S/he drank too much."
Similarly, the distinction is neutralized with Non-Control
verbs. Thus, in (28) and (29), the Non-Control verb crva- 'be
afraid' takes SET2 inflection, as it does in ail contexts.
(28) chO	 gyat-O	 la
2/ABS	 afraid-PERF/SET2 Q
"Did you become afraid?"
(29) ch0	 gyat-O	 the
2/ABS	 afraid-PERF/SET2 like
"You looked scared."
In short, in interrogative clauses, SET1 forms occur when-
ever the verb is a Control verb and the actor is second person.
Why should this be the case?
In a declarative speech act, the speaker (or first person)
is assumed to be the epistemic authority for the proposition
being asserted; otherwise, the declarative clause is likely to
be indexed with evidential or modality disclaimers (Gordon &
Lakoff 1971; Grice 1975).
In contrast, in an interrogative speech act, the addressee
is assummed to be the epistemic authority for the proposition.
In other words, in asking a question, the speaker is attributing
the knowledge to the addressee and seeking access to it,
implying that the speaker does not have access to the knowledge.
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The attribution of epistemic authority to the address is
constitutive of the interrogative speech act.
SET1 forms occur in interrogative clauses when the actor
in the clause is coreferential with the addressee, who is
identified as the epistemic authority in interrogative contexts.
As noted above, we will use the term "Epistemic Source" for the
discourse role which assumes the epistemic authority.
The distribution of SET1 and SET2 forms in interrogative
clauses is not confined to yes/no questions with the inter-
rogative particle la. Since the selection of the SET1 form is a
function of the verb class (Control) and the discourse role
which is assigned epistemic authority, any interrogative clause
will exhibit the same properties. Thus, all of the second
person interrogative clauses below take SET1 forms, whereas the
third person interrogative clauses take SET2 forms.
(30) ch0: chu	 yan-a
2/ERG what	 do-PST/SET1
"What did you do?"
(31) wo:	 chu	 yat-O
3/ERG what	 do-PERF/SET2
"What did s/he do?"
(32) ch0	 gOnO:	 woy-a
2/ABS where/ABL come-PST/SET1
"Where have you come from?"
(33) wo	 gOnO:	 wo1-0
3/ABS where/ABL come-PERF/SET2
"Where did s/he come from?"
(34) chO: mOmO-ca gwo-g0:	 nOy-a
2/ERG momo-DIM how.many-CL eat-PST/SET1
"How many momos did you eat?"
(35) wc:	 mOmO-ca gwo-g0:	 n01-0
3/ERG momo-DIM how.many-CL eat-PERF/SET2
"How many momos did s/he eat?"
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The discourse role which is assigned the epistemic
authority in the speech event will be referred to as the
Epistemic Source. That is, first persons in declarative clauses
assume the role of Epistemic Source. Conversely, second persons
in interrogative clauses are assigned the role of Epistemic
Source by the speaker by engaging in an interrogative speech
act. Thus, the distribution of SET1 and SET2 inflectional forms
covaries, in part, with the discourse role of Epistemic Source.
Reported Speech
SET1 forms can occur with 3rd persons in reported speech
when the original speaker or Epistemic Source (not the speaker
reporting the speech) and the actor in the reported clause are
co-referential. That is, SET1 forms function logophorically.
SET2 forms occur in all other environments.
In (36) below, the situation again reflects the morning
after a feast. Clause final h0 is an evidential particle
marking reported speech. Although the clause is a declarative
first person clause, it takes SET2 inflection in the reported
speech environment. The source for the hearsay evidence





"It's said that I drank too much."
In reported speech, SET1 inflection functions logo-
phorically. It is used when the source for original speech
event (Epistemic Source) is coreferential with the clausal
actor. The SET2 form is used when the Epistemic Source is non-
coreferential with the clausal actor, or when the action itself
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is interpreted as non-controlled. The contrast is illustrated
below.
(37) syam-0	 0:pw0	 ton-0	 110
Syam-ERG alot	 drink-PERF/SET2 EVD
"It's said that Syam drank too much."
(38) syam-O	 O:pwO	 ton-a	 hO
Syam-ERG alot	 drink-PST/SET1 EVD
"Syamt said that he t drank too much."
Recall that the verb thu(1)- 'understand, realize' is a
Non-Control verb; hence, SET1 is impossible. The logophoric
interpretation is neutralized.
(39) khO	 thul-O	 hO
3/ERG matter understand-PERF/SET2 EVD
S/he t said that s/he lfj understood."
The discourse notion of Epistemic Source has three con-
texts for realization. First, the speaker in a declarative
clauses assume the role of Epistemic Source, unless s/he indi-
cates otherwise via evidential operators. Second, the addressee
in an interrogative clause is attributed the role of Epistemic
Source by virtue of being asked a question by the speaker.
Third, the original speaker in a reported speech utterance is
attributed the role of Epistemic Source for the proposition in
the reported speech clause.
Attributive Clauses and Nominalizations 
Thus far, the distribution of SET1 and SET2 forms has been
observed in simple finite clauses and reported speech. The
opposition also occurs in attributive clauses and nominaliza-
tions. In these constructions, the aspectual opposition between
SET2 Perfective and SET2 Imperfective is neutralized. Only the
SET2 Imperfective form occurs. The inflectional paradig m is
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thus reduced to a two-way opposition between SET1/SET2 on the
one hand, and Past/Non-Past on the other. The inflectional






Attributive clauses are preposed as modifiers to a head
noun and are marked with one of three nominalizer/attributive
suffixes depending on the animacy and number of the head noun
(Hale 1985; KOlver 1978). The choice of SET1 or SET2 inflection
is determined via the interaction of verb type and Epistemic
Source.
For example, the suffix -qu occurs with inanimate head
nouns. In the first set of examples, con- 'stay, remain' is a
Control verb. Hence, in a simple declarative clause SET1 occurs
when the epistemic source and the actor/subject are corefer-
ential; SET2 occurs elsewhere.
(40) ji	 con-a-gu	 the
1/ABS	 stay-PST/SET1-NOM house
"The house where I stayed..,"
(41) eh()	 c5:-gu	 che-
2/ABS	 stay-IMPERF/SET2-NOM house
"The house where you stayed..."
(42) laxmi	 05:-gu	 the
Laxmi/ABS stay-IMPERF/SET2-NOM house
"The house where Laxmi stayed..."
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In contrast, when the verb is a Non-Control verb, the
SET1/SET2 opposition is neutralized and only SET2 is possible.
Recall that then- 'arrive' is a Non-Control verb.
(43) ji	 thyO:-gu	 thae
I/ABS	 arrive/IMPERF/SET2-NOM place
"The place where I arrived..."
(44) ch0	 thy0:-gu	 thae
2/ABS	 arrive/IMPERF/SET2-NOM place
"The place where you arrived..."
(45) laxmi thy0:-gu thae
Laxmi/ABS arrive/IMPERF/SET2-NOM place
"The place where Laxmi arrived..."
The suffix -mho occurs with singular animate head nouns.
Again, the choice of inflection is determined by the interaction
of Control and Epistemic Source.
(46) ji: wo-yatO biy-a-gu dheba
1/ERG 3-DAT give-PST/SET1-NOM money
"The money which I gave to him/her..."
(47) jl: dheba biy-a-mho pasa
1/ERG money give-PST/SET1-NOM pasa
"The friend to whom I gave the money..."
(48) chO: dheba byu:-mho pasa
2/ERG money give/IMPERF/SET2-NOM pasa
"The friend to whom you gave the money..."
(49) ji-t0 dheba byu:-mho pasa
1-DAT money give/IMPERF/SET2-NOM pasa
"The friend who gave me the money..."
The suffix :pi: occurs with plural animate head nouns.
Again, the choice of inflection is determined by the interaction
of Control and Epistemic Source.
(50) jI:	 dheba biy-a-pi:	 mijan-tO
1/ERG money give-PST/SET1-NOM 	 man-PLUR
"The men to whom I gave the money..."
(51) chO: dheba byu:-pi: mijan-t0
2/ERG money give/IMPERF/SET2-NOM man-PLUR
"The men to whom you gave the money..."
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(52) ji-t0 dheba byu:-pl: mijan-t0
1-DAT money give/IMPERF/SET2-NOM man-PLUR
"The men who gave me the money..."
Nominalizations
Nominalized clauses occur as complements of copula-like
verbs (e.g., kh0(t)- 'be/be.true', d0(t)- 'be/be.at'), percep-
tion verbs (e.g khOn- 'see', swo(1)- 'watch', ta(l}- 'hear'),
and in subordinate/adverbial constructions. In addition,
nominalized clauses may occur in certain discourse environments
as "non-embedded" nominalizations. As with attributive clauses,
the aspectual contrast in SET2 is neutralized. The suffix -qu 
marks the nominalization.
For example, nominalization occurs with complements of the
verb dO_St)- 'be/be.at' to indicate a kind of "perfect" or
"current relevance" tense/aspect. In the complement clauses,
the SETT/SET2 opposition occurs as a function of the interaction
of Control and Epistemic Source.
(53) ji	 ch: con-a-gu	 du
1/ABS house stay-PST/SET1-NOM be/IMPERF/SET2
"I've stayed home."
(54) ch0	 ch'e: c45:-gu	 du
2/ABS house stay-IMPERF/SET2-NOM be/IMPERF/SET2
"You've stayed home."
(55) laxmi che: c5:-gu	 du
Laxmi house stay-IMPERF/SET2-NOM be/IMPERF/SET2
"Laxmi has stayed home."
Again, when the verb is a Non-Control verb, the SET1/SET2
opposition is neutralized and only SET2 is possible.




(57) ch0	 thyO:-gu	 du
2/ABS	 arrive-IMPERF/SET2-NOM be/IMPERF/SET2
"You have arrived."
(58) Laxmi	 thy0:-gu	 du
Laxmi/ABS arrive/IMPERF/SET2-NOM be/IMPERF/SET2
"Laxmi has arrived..."
More interestingly, these nominalized clauses may occur in
"non-embedded" environments, typically in questions or as "back-
ground" or "presupposed" information.' The same opposition
between SET1 and SET2 applies. In the first set of examples,
the actor and the Epistemic Source are coreferential; hence,
SET1 occurs.
(59) ch0	 gOnO:	 woy-a-gu
2/ABS where-ABL come-PST/SET1-NOM
"Where have you come from?"
(60) athe"	 yan-a-gu
1/ERG just do-PST/SET1-NOM
"1 just did it (for no apparent reason)."
When the actor and the Epistemic Source are not
coreferential, SET2 is required.
(61) laxmi chae	 pih5. w6:-gu
Laxmi why	 out go/IMPERF/SET2-NOM
"Why has Laxmi gone out?"
In concluding this section it is important to note the
following:
1. In simple finite clauses the SET1/SET2 distribution
exhibits the full range of paradigmatic oppositions.
2. In attributive clauses and nominalizations the
aspectual contrast between the SET2 Perfective and Imperfective
is neutralized.
3. Despite this neutraliztion of the aspectual contrast,
the opposition between SET1 and SET2 is maintained. The choice
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of inflectional form is determined via the interaction of (+/-)
Control and (+/-) Epistemic Source.
Verb-Auxiliary Constructions 
The SET1/SET2 opposition occurs in simple clauses, in
attributive clauses and nominalizations, and a complex clause
construction which I will term the Verb-Auxiliary Construction.5
Verb-Aux constructions are essentially verb concatenations
in which an otherwise independent verb takes on an auxiliary
function indicating directional, aspectual, and other auxiliary
concepts whenever it occurs second in a verb concatenation with
a VERB-a form (Hargreaves 1986a; Malla 1985). The first verb in
the concatenation is the semantic head, subcategorizes the core
arguments in the clause, and occurs in the invariant VERB-a 
form. The final (auxiliary) verb in the concatenation may
introduce oblique arguments (such as benefactives) or simply
elaborate the directional and aspectual properties of the main
verb. As the final verb in the clause, it realizes the inflec-
tion for the clause. Thus, while it is the lexical category of
the main verb as Control or Non-Control which determines the
potential for SET1/SET2 inflection forms, the forms are realized
on the final, auxiliary verb.6
For example, the verb con- 'stay, remain' is a Control
verb.
(62) ji	 yOlO-e	 con-a
1/ABS	 Yala-LOC stay-PST/SETT
"I stayed in Yala (Patan)."
(63) wo	 y010-e	 con-0
3/ABS	 Yala-LOC stay-PERF/SET2
"S/he stayed in Yala (Patan)."
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However, the verb con- 'stay' functions as a progressive
aspect auxiliary in Verb-Aux constructions. In the first set of
examples below, the first verb appears as the invariant form
won-a 'go'. The gloss CM indicates the functional role as the
Concatenation Marker in the Verb-Aux construction. The auxil-
iary verb con- 'stay, remain' realizes the finite inflection.
(64) ji	 y010-e	 won-a	 con-a
1/ABS Yala-LOC go-CM stay-PST/SET1
"I was/am going to Yala (Patan)."
(65) wo	 y010-e	 won-a	 con-0
3/ABS Yala-LOC go-CM stay-PERF/SET2
"He was/is going to Yala (Patan)."
It is important to note that, althoguh the auxiliary verb
carries the finite inflection for the clause, it is the status
of the first verb (Control/Non-Control) which triggers inflec-
tion on the auxiliary verb; for this reason, we may refer to the
first verb as the "main" verb. In the example below, the Fluid
verb lu(1)- 'become' and the Non-Control verb tvanu(1)- 
'be.tired' are given Non-Control interpretations. ? Conse-
quently, in the Verb-Aux constructions the auxiliary verb takes
SET2 inflection.
(66) ji	 birami jul-0
1/ABS	 ill	 become-PERF/SET2
"1 became sick."
(67) ji	 birami juy-a	 con-0
1/ABS	 ill	 become-CM stay-PERF/SET2




(69) ji	 tyanuy-a	 con-0
1/ABS be.tired-CM stay-PERF/SET2
"I am/was feeling tired."
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In contrast, Control main verbs trigger SET1/SET2 alterna-
tions depending on the assignment (+/-) Epistemic Source. Note
also that case assignment is subject to pragmatic variables
here. Ergative case, assigned by the main verb va(t)- 'do',
marks agent focus; Absolutive case, assigned by the auxiliary




ji(j1:)	 jya yan-a con-a
1/ABS(ERG)	 work do-CM stay-PST/SET1
'I was doing some work.'
chO:	 chu yan-a
2/ERG what do-PST/SET1
'What did you do?'
(73) chO(ch5:)	 chu yan-a con-a
2/ABS(ERG)	 what do-CM stay-PST/SET1
'What are you doing?'
(74) wrp:	 chu yat-O
3/ERG what do-PERF/SET2
'What did he do?'
(75) wo(w5:)	 chu yan-a con-0
3/ABS(ERG)	 what do-CM stay-PERF/SET2
'What's s/he doing?.
The politeness auxiliary di- is another example of a verb
which occurs in Verb-Aux constructions. In its auxiliary usage,
it marks a respect form in questions, typically occuring as a
"nonembedded" norninalization. The verb bon- 'to read' is a
Control verb.
(76) ji:	 sOphu:	 bon-a
1/ERG book	 read-PST/SET1
"I read a book."
(77) ji(jI:)	 sOphu:	 bon-a	 con-a
1/ABS(ERG) book	 read-CM stay-PST/SET1
"I am/was reading a book."
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(78) chi:	 chu bon-a	 diy-a-gu	 le
2/RSP/ERG what read-CM sit-PST/SET]--NOM RESP
"What did you read?" (or "What are you reading?")
(79) woek0:-n0 chu bon-a	 diu:-gu	 le
3/RESP-ERG what read-CM sit/IMPERF/SET2-NOM RESP
"What did he read?" (or "What is he reading?")
Inflection on the auxiliary verb also indexes logophoric
reference in reported speech. In the examples below, mhit(01)- 
'play' is a Control verb.
(80) ta:s	 mhit-a con-a	 110
3/ERG cards	 play-CM stay-PST/SET1 EVD
"Be l said that he i is playing cards."
(81) wa:	 ta:s	 mhit-a con-0	 110
3/ERG cards	 play-CM stay-PERF/SET2 EVD
"It's said that s/he is playing cards."
The distribution of SET1/SET2 forms in Verb-Aux
constructions is summarized as follows:
First, finite inflection is marked on the clause final
auxiliary verb. The semantic head verb is marked with an
invariant form, VERB-a. Second, the semantic head carries the
features Control or Non-Control. With Non-Control verbs, SET2
is obligatory. Third, inflection with Control verbs exhibits
the same distribution as in simple clauses.
Infinitive Constructions 
ten- 'get ready/be ready'
SET1/SET2 inflection in complex clauses is not confined to
Verb-Aux constructions. For example, the aspectual verb ten-
'get ready/be ready' takes clausal complements marked with the
invariant form VERB-e. 8 As the final verb in the clause, it
manifests the SET1/SET2 opposition.9
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(82) ji	 won-e	 ten-a-bOlOe
1/ABS	 go-INF	 ready-PST/SET1-when
"As I was getting ready to go..."
(83) ch0	 won--e 	 ten-a-gu	 la
2/ABS	 go-INF ready-PST/SET1-NOM Q
"Are you getting ready to go?"
(84) ch0	 won-e	 ty0:-b010e
2/ABS go-INF ready/IMPERF/SET2-when
"When you were getting ready to go..."
(85) laxmi	 won-e	 ty0:-b010e
Laxmi/ABS go-INF ready/IMPERF/SET2-when
"When Laxsmi was getting ready to go.,."
Verbs which are Non-Control can only take SET2 inflection.




"I lost (in the game),"
(87) ji	 bu-e	 ten-0
1/ABS	 lose-INF ready-PERF/SET2
"I was about to lose."
Again logophoric reference is marked on the final,verb.
(88) :46:	 nO-e	 ten-a	 210
3/ERG	 eat-INF ready-PST/SET1 EVD
"S/hel said that s/hex is about to eat."
(89) wO:	 nO-e	 ten-0	 h0
3/ERG	 eat-INF	 ready-PERF/SET2 EVD
"It's said that s/he's is about to eat."
The distribution of inflectional forms with the verb ten-
'get.ready/be.ready' is as follows. We return to infinitive
complements of aspect/modality verbs in Chapter VII:
1. Inflection is marked on the final main verb;
complement verbs are marked with an invariant infinitive form,
VERB-e.
2. With Non-Control complement verbs, ten- requires SET2
inflection.
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3. With Control verbs, the distribution of inflectional
forms is the same as simple finite clauses.
Finally, note that the majority of the verbs which take
infinitive complements are Non-Control verbs and thus require
SET2 inflection regardless of the semantic class of the comple-
ment verb or the discourse role (+/-) Epistemic Source. In the
set of examples below, the verb phO(t)- 'be.able' is a Non-
Control verb which takes infinitive complements. Althoguh won-
'go' is a Control verb, SET2 is obligatory.
(90) ji	 won-e	 phu:
1/ABS	 go-INF	 able/IMPERF/SET2
"I am able to go."
(91) chO	 won-e	 phu:
2/ABS	 go-INF	 able/IMPERF/SET2
"You are able to go."
(92) laxmi	 won-e	 phu:
Laxmi/ABS go-INF	 able/IMPERF/SET2
"Laxmi was able to go."
Summary: The Distribution of Inflectional Forms
First, there are two major lexical classes of verbs,
Control and Non-Control. In addition, there is a class of Fluid
verbs which allow both intentional and non-intentional
interpretations.
Second, with Non-Control verbs, SET2 is obligatory. With
Control verbs, SET1 inflection occurs in first person declara-
tive clauses, second person interrogative clauses, and third
person logophoric environments. In other words, SETT occurs
with Control verbs whenever the Epistemic Source and the actor
of a Control verb are co-referential.
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Third, the SETT/SET2 contrast is not confined to simple
clauses. It occurs in attributive clauses and nominalizations,
where the SET2 Perfective/Imperfective opposition is neutral-
ized. Also, it occurs with Verb-Aux constructions and certain
verbs taking Infinitive complements.
Intentional Action and Epistemic Source
As part of their inherent semantics, verbs can be classi-
fied as either Control, Non-Control or Fluid. Although there is
an intermediate Fluid class which allows for either intentional
or non-intentional intepretation, since the inflectional opposi-
tion is binary, any finite first person declarative clause
indicates either an intentional or non-intentional action.
The speech participant roles for speaker and addressee in
Declarative and Interrogative clauses are characterized in
binary terms as (+/-) Epistemic Source. In declarative con-
texts, the Epistemic Source (ES) in the speech event is assumed
by the speaker, unless otherwise annotated via evidential
operators such as the reported speech 110. In interrogative
contexts, the Epistemic Source is attributed to the addressee.
As a discourse role, (+1) Epistemic Source is typically associ-




In reported speech, Epistemic Source is assigned by the
reported speech evidential represented below by the gloss 'EVD'
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for Evidential. SET1 occurs when the Epistemic Source and the
actor are coreferential.
[ NP, [ VERB--SETT ] ] (ESilEVD
SET2 occurs when the Epistemic Source and the actor/
subject are not coreferential.
[ NP i [ VERB-SET2 ] ] {ESOEVD
The values for the two domains, Control, Non-Control,
Fluid and (+/-) Epistemic Source, are assigned independently.
By themselves neither domain accounts for the distributions in
the inflectional paradigm. Instead, the interaction of the two
domains determines the distribution of inflectional forms, In
the diagram below, (+/-) CV stands for (+/-)Control and (+/-) ES
stands for (+/-) Epistemic Source. Person is indicated in the
left most column. The two domains of Control and Epistemic
Source interact as follows:
+Control	 -Control
Declarative Interrogative Declarative Interrogative
1 +CV +ES +CV -ES -CV +ES -CV -ES
2 +CV -ES +CV +ES -CV -ES -CV +ES
3 +CV -ES +CV -ES -CV -ES -CV -ES
The co-occurence of positive values (underlined) parallels
exactly the observed distribution of SET1 forms and represents
the non-default value. However, it is important to emphasize
that verb semantics and epistemic source are independent of one
another. The categorization of verb types is semantically based
on concepts rooted in an understanding and categorization of
events and action types in the world. On the other hand,
episternic source is a function of the speech event roles and
discourse authority, independent of the verbal semantics and
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action/event types. It is based on the interactionally
determined relationship between the participants, speaker and
addressee, and the information.
Since the two domains are distinct, there is no inherent
motivation for why the two domains should interact such that the
co-occurence of positive values is indexed by SET1 forms,
whereas all other combinations correlate with SET2 distribution.
It is possible, of course, to simply stipulate that these marked
distributions occur just in case the (+)Control and (+)Epistemic
Source co-occur, but a more intuitively appealing account can be
proposed.
As the previous works on Newari inflection have shown,
SET1 forms index an intentional action whenever there is no
evidential constraint on the attribution of intention (Hale
1980; Bendix 1973; to appear). In this study, I will argue that
the conceptual structure for intentional action has two parts:
1. The actor has a unique internal state or mental plan.
2. The actor initiates force or movement in accordance
with this internal state or plan.
Thus, SETS is felicitious only when the person to whom the
internal state or awareness is being attributed is also the
Epistemic Source. In other words, there is a basic evidential
restriction on the attribution of the internal state of inten-
tion. It can only be attributed to the person who is in the
discourse role of Epistemic Source.
Epistemic Source is a property of discourse pragmatics and
the roles of speaker and addressee. It is determined within an
interactional setting, emerging as the discourse role which
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assumes the epistemic authority for some proposition. The
discourse roles are indexed via the oppositions in pronominal
reference (person) and speech act modality (statement/question).
Control, on the other hand, is a semantic property associ-
ated with the lexical properties of verbs and the notion of
self-initiated action. The next chapter, Chapter III, begins to
examine the issue of intentional action in more detail, in order
to understand what exactly it means to attribute intentional
action to an individual in situated interaction.
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Notes 
1Following usages in Foley and Van Valin (1984) and Merlan
(1985), I am using the term "Fluid" for the class of verbs which
admit an inflectional opposition marking the presence or absence
of "intention" or "volitionality" for the action being
described.
2The morphophonemics of Newari verb inflection are
described in several works (Hale 1973; Joshi 1985; 1988a;
Kanskar 1982; Malla 1985; Shrestacarya 1981). The contrast
between SET1/PST -a and SET2/PERF -0 is accompanied by
morphophonemic changes in the stern final consonant. There are
four major inflectional classes:
SET1/PST SET2/PERF INFinitive
Class 1 CVn-a CVn-O CVn-e
Class 2 CVn-a CVt-O CV-e
Class 3 CVy-a CV1-O CV-e
Class 4 CV1-a CV1-O CV1-e
As a citation form, I will use the infinitive stem with brackets
CV(t)- or CV(1)- to distinguish class 2 from class 3 verbs. In
this study the grapheme 0 stands for the low back, "open o"
vowel.
Note also that the SET2 Imperfective suffix -u appears
simply as stem vowel lengthening in all environments except when
it follows the high front vowel /i/ (see Genetti 1990). Follow-
ing conventional formats such as Malla (1985), I will not
segment the Imperfective verb forms, but simply indicate the
long vowel. However, I depart from conventional terminology by
glossing the verb form as VERB/IMPERF/SET2. The Imperfective
form is usually called the Stative or Habitual form.
3Absolutive forms are zero forms. I will not mark or gloss
them in the examples except when it is important for the
discussion.
4The exact characterization of the discourse environment is
complex and beyond the scope of our discussion here (cf Hale
(1985).
5There have been a number of terms used to refer to the
morphological forms and grammatical functions of both the finite
and non-finite verbs.
Hale's (1973) seminal work on Newari verbal morphology
refers to the A: form as having a (finite) past tense and a
gerundive function. Hale (1980) and Shresthacharya (1981) use
the terms "past conjunct" for the finite function. Kanskar
(1982) refers to the "past conjunct form" as a cover term for
the morphophonemic classification. Malla (1985) uses the term
"gerundive" for the non-finite environment and "past conjunct"
for the finite environment.
KiiIver (1976), with characteristic clarity, distinguishes
the function/form mapping "preterite absolutive in -a" from the
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function/form mapping "preterite conjunct in -a" , referring to
both environments as manfesting the -A form.
Hargreaves (1986a; 1986b), refers to the non-finite
formation as a "multi-verb construction" and refers to the
finite -a form as the "past conjunct" form and the non-finite
form -a as a "concatenation marker." Genetti (1988) uses the
term "participle" for the non-finite -a form.
The variation in terminology arises for several reasons.
First, at the morphophonemic level, there is no distinction
between the verb form realizing the finite (SET1) past function
and the non-finite function in the Verb-Auxiliary construction.
In both environments, the suffix -a is affixed to the verbal
stem, with stem alternations occurring relative to the
morphological class of the verb. Thus, there is the need to
identify a single morphological form of the verb. When
referring to morphological shapes, independent of function, I
will simply use the label: VERB-a.
The second source of confusion is the formal similarity
between two non-finite functions: Verb-Auxiliary function and
clause chaining (or non-final) function (cf. Hale 1985;
Hargreaves 1986; Genetti 1988). Verb forms in clause chaining
constructions are VERB-a forms plus a lengthened final vowel
i.e., VERB-a > VERB-a:. Malla (1984) uses the terms "gerundive"
for the short form and "participle" for the lengthened form;
Hargreaves (1986b) uses the terms CM "Concatenation Marker" for
the short form and NF "Non Final" for the long form. Genetti
(1988) uses the term "participle" for the short form and NE'
"Non-Final" for the long form.
As already noted, in this study, I will use the terms
SET1/SET2 for the contrastive distribution of forms in finite
environments; the glossing SET1/SET2 is combined with the
Tense/Aspect gloss for that form. Although I will not argue it
here, the Newari non-finite functions bear little resemblance to
the Latin or English grammatical concepts of "gerundive" and
"participle"; thus, it seems inappropriate to invoke the
Latinate categories "gerundive" and "participle" for the non-
finite functions which can be more descriptively referred to as
the "Verb-Auxiliary construction" and the "Clause chaining
construction." Consequently, I will continue to gloss the non-
finite VERB-a form as CM for "Verb-Auxiliary Concatenation
Marker" and the long form VERB-a: in chaining constructions as
NF for "Non-Final in Clause Chain."
6Nothing crucial to this study depends on the analysis of
main and auxiliary status for the two verbs in the Verb-Aux
construction. They are used simply as convenient labels.
7tvanu(1)- 'be.tired' and other adjective-like predicates,
including the color predicates, admit all Non-Control inflec-
tional possibilites. Hence, I will refer to them as verbs (cf.
Shrestacarya 1981).
8The infinitive form -e is homophonous with the SET1 Non-
Past form.
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9The temporal subordinating suffix -bOlOe 'when' triggers
the same inflectional distribution as the nominalizer -cu. That
is, the SET2 Perfective/Imperfective opposition is neutralized.
CHAPTER III
GRAMMATICAL REFLEXES OF THE CONCEPT
"INTENTIONAL ACTION"
This chapter considers in more detail the semantic condi-
tions underlying the distinction between intentional and non-
intentional actions. More specifically, it examines the lexical
properties of the three verb classes--Control, Non-Control, and
Fluid—in relation to a range of lexical and morphosyntactic
environments which condition the opposition between SET1/SET2
forms. Since the goal here is to isolate the conceptual struc-
ture of intentional action apart from its interaction with
discourse roles and Epistemic Source, the data will be primarily
restricted to first person declarative clauses.
The data examined in this chapter suggest the following:
The conceptual structure of intentional action in Newari can be
seen as involving two distinct, but related, domains. First,
for the action described in the clause, the actor has a unique
mental state or plan associated with the action. Second, the
actor initiates a force or motion in accordance with the mental
state or plan. The plan and the force together serve as the
proximate causal antecedent of the intentional action described
in the clause. To anticipate Chapter IV, the two domains will




Chapter II showed the distinction between Control, Non-
Control, and Fluid verb types. The verb classes were defined
relative to the distribution of SET1 and SET2 inflectional forms
in first person declarative clauses. In notional terms, the
opposition (+/-) Control was identified as essentially a
distinction between self-initiated and non-initiated events. In
this chapter, we look at the verb classes in more detail and
make explicit the criteria for identifying the relevant lexical
properties of verbs.
After looking in some detail at the verb classes, we then
turn to three other areas of the grammar in which an apparent
opposition between "intentional" and "non-intentional" action
has grammatical reflexes.
In the first construction, we consider the use of two
verbs, va(t)- 'do' and lu(1)- 'become, happen', functioning as
verbal proforms. In this case, the choice of which verb is used
as the proform corresponds roughly to a distinction between
whether the antecedent event is viewed as a "doing" or as a mere
"happening." This lexical distinction between "do" and "become"
corroborates, on the one hand, the distinction between Control
and Non-Control verbs, and on the other hand, the distinction
between SET1 (intentional) and SET2 (non-intentional)
interpretations of Fluid verbs.
In the second construction, intentional actions are
expressed in a periphrastic construction with a quoted speech
complement clause and a simple declarative main clause. In this
construction, intentional action is inferred when a plan of
action expressed in quoted speech is grammaticalized as an
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"intent" or "purpose" complement of an action expressed in the
main clause. This construction describes "premeditation," in
which the actor mentally plans, or is in some way conscious of,
the action. However, "premeditation" is distinguished from
"intention-in-action."
Finally, in the third construction, a derivational form of
the verb ca(1)- 'feel, sense, be aware of functions as an
adverbial modifier meaning roughly "consciously" and, by impli
cation, "intentionally" (Manandhar 1986). In its negative form,
it is intepreted roughly as "unconsciously." Examining its
distribution relative to the use of SET1 and SET2 forms, reveals
that some notion of a unique "mental state" is a necessary




Control verbs are defined operationally as those verbs
which may occur with SET1 forms in first person declarative
clauses. Notionally, the kinds of actions described by Control
verbs are those actions which are viewed as prototypically
involving self-initiated action. Control verbs can only occur
with SET2 forms whenever the appropriate evidential operators
are present, indicating that the speaker did not have the
appropriate mental state associated with his/her action.1
For example, recall the use of SET2 forms with the
reported speech evidential M. In the example below, the simple
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clause (without the evidential operator) occurs with SETT
inflection. The verb ton- 'drink, smoke'is a Control verb.
With the evidential operator hO, the SET2 form is obligatory.
(I)	 jI:	 O:pwO	 ton-a
1/ERG alot	 drink--PST/SETT
"I drank too much."
(2) jI:	 O:pwO	 ton-0	 hO
.1/ERG alot	 drink-PERF/SET2 EVD
"It's said that I drank too much."
There is another evidential operator, khOnisa 'appears,
seems', which also indexes a disjunction between the speaker and
his/her direct knowledge of the intentional action. It appears
clause finally and indicates that the event or action is infer-
red via its result, rather than directly. In first person
declarative clauses, the speaker is indicating that his/her own
action is inferred from a result; hence, it entails a lack of
awareness at the time of the action.
Examples (3) and (4) illustrate the normal distribution of
SET1/SET2 forms with the transitive Control verb caohu(t)-
'snap, break (transitive).'
(3) wO:	 ka	 caphut-O
3/ERG thread snap-PERF/SET2
"S/he snapped/broke the thread."
(4) jI:	 ka	 caphun-a
1/ERG thread snap-PST/SET1
"I snapped/broke the thread."
With khOnisa, only the SET2 form is possible. The use of
khOnisa is generally incompatible with the SETT form.
(5) ka	 caphut-O	 khOnisa
3/ERG thread snap-PERF/SET2	 it.appears




ji:	 ka	 caphut-O	 khOnisa
1/ERG thread snap-PERF/SET2	 it.appears
"It appears that I snapped/broke the thread."
(7)*
	
ji:	 ka	 caphun-a	 khOnisa
1/ERG thread	 snap-PST/SET1	 it.appears
The use of khOnisa indicates an inferred result. In
example (5), the speaker is indicating that s/he was not a
direct witness of the action, only its result. With the first
person clause in (6), the interpretation suggests that the
speaker initiated and performed an action, realizing subse-
quently that s/he broke the string. In other words, the speaker
performed an action, but the action being described was not in
accordance with the plan or mental state appropriate for that
action.
In the next pair of examples, with the verb ton- 'drink,
smoke' the SET2 interpretation with khOnisa suggests the absence
of awareness due to intoxication. Notice again that the inter-
pretation assumes that the speaker did drink, and was not forced
to do so. In other words, the actor's self-initiated behavior
is still the proximate causal antecedent for the action. What
is lacking is the appropriate form of a mental plan or self-
awareness.
(8) ji:	 O:pwO	 ton-a
1/ERG alot	 drink-PST/SET1
"I drank too much."
(9) ji:	 O:pwO	 ton-0	 khOnisa
1/ERG alot	 drink-PERF/SET2 it.appears
"It appears that I drank too much."
Again, the SET1 form is generally incompatible with the
use of khOnisa.
(10)*	 ji:	 O:pwO	 ton-a	 khOnisa
1/ERG alot	 drink-PST/SET1	 it.appears
58
Thus, verbs in the Control class occur with SET1 in simple
first person declarative clauses. Control verbs occur with SET2
only when appropriate evidential operators are present. The
evidential operators indicate that the appropriate form of
awareness or mental plan was absent during the performance of
the action being described in the utterance.
Semantic subgroups of the Control type include the
transitive and di-transitive actions listed below:
da(1)-	 'hit'	 sya(t)-	 'kill'
chu(1)-	 'roast'	 tya(t)-	 'mince, dice'
pal-	 'chop, axe'	 dhen-	 'cut, saw'
jon-	 'grab'	 ya(t)-	 'do'
n0(1)-	 'eat'	 ton-	 'drink'
co(1)-	 'write, draw'	 bon-	 'read'
t0(1)-	 'put'	 k0(1)-	 'take'
bi(1)-	 'give'	 chwo(1)-	 'send'
thu(1)-	 'cook'	 sil-	 'wash, rinse'
Other Control verbs include intransitive verbs of motion,
posture, and behavior:
won-	 'go.,	 wo(1)-	 'come'
bwa(t)-	 'run'	 khO lha(t)-	 'talk'
di(t)-	 'stop'	 nhu(1)-	 'step'
dOn-	 'stand'	 den-	 'lie'
con-	 'stay, remain'	 mun-	 'gather(intr)'
kwo-chu(1)-	 'bend, stoop'turn over'mu=pul-
lal=ka(1)-	 'swim'	 ca=hil-	 'walk around'
g0(1)-	 'ascend, mount' 	 mhit(Ol)-	 'play'
lhu(t)-	 'dance'	 hal-	 'shout, sing'
khwo(1)-	 'cry, weep','laugh'nhil-
The majority of verbs indicating bodily functions are
Control verbs. Although some of the actions seem potentially
beyond self-control, they are syntactically transitive, using
transitive Control verbs, like t0(1)- 'put' or pha(t)- 
'separate, let go ':
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cwo pha(t)- 'urinate' khi pha(t)- 'defecate'
i:	 pha(t)- 'spit' khi t0(1)- 'fart'
hiku	 t0(1)- 'hiccup' lho(t)- 'vomit'
dhOkka: t0(1)- 'belch' hachika:	 t0(1)- 'sneeze'
Fluid Verbs
In contrast with Control verbs, which require an evi-
dential operator in order to occur with a SET2 form, Fluid verbs
are defined operationally as those verbs which occur with either
SET1 or SET2 forms without requiring evidential operators.
Furthermore, there is another important difference between
Control and Fluid verbs. With Control verbs, SET1 and SET2
forms are interpreted relative to the evidential criteria. In
other words, Control verbs describe actions that entail that the
actor actually initiated the force dynamic which characterizes
action. The function of inflection is to indicate the speaker's
mental plan, or state of mind with respect to the action.
However, with Fluid verbs, SET1 and SET2 forms are inter-
preted relative to slightly different criteria. SET1 forms are
interpreted as indicating both the actor's mental state and
self-initiated force. SET2 forms indicate that the speaker
neither planned nor initiated the action. Notionally, Fluid
verbs describe actions which are not prototypically viewed as
either "intentional" or "non-intentional."
For example, the verb thi(1)- 'touch' is a Fluid verb
occurring with both SET1 and SET2 forms. The SET1 form indi-
cates a behavior both planned and initiated by the speaker; the
SET2 form indicates an event neither planned nor initiated. No




"I touched the rice (self-initiated)."
(12) ji:	 ja	 thil-O
1/ERG rice touch-PERF/SET2
"I touched the rice (non-initiated)."
The verb thwa(t1- 'kick, bump with foot' is also a Fluid
verb, allowing both intentional and non-intentional interpre-
tations without evidential operators.
(13) ji:	 wo-yatO thwan-a
1/ERG 3-DAT	 kick-PST/SET1
"I kicked him/her." (self-initiated)
(14) ji:	 wo-yatO thwat-O
1/ERG 3-DAT	 kick-PERF/SET2
"I bumped him/her." (non-initiated)
There is significant variation among speakers as to which
verbs are acceptable as Fluid verbs. For example, there is no
non-arbitrary way to assert that actions such as "crying" or
"laughing" are done "intentionally" or "non-intentionally."
Nevertheless, most of the speakers I have consulted do not
generally accept the behavior verbs like nhil- 'laugh' and
khwo(1) 'cry, weep' occurring with the SET2 form unless some
evidential operator is present in the clause. In this sense,
they are distributionlly defined as Control verbs. A few
speakers, however, do find the SET2 form acceptable without an
evidential operator, in which case it elicits a non-intentional









(17) ji	 nhil-O	 h0
1/ABS laugh-PERF/SET2	 EVD
"It's said that I laughed"
More interestingly, most of the speakers I consulted allow
Fluid usage, i.e., both SET1 and SET2 forms, with the verb
ju(1)- 'become, happen' if it occurs with nominal predicates
that plausibly admit intentional interpretations.
Thus, daktOr lu(1)- 'become a doctor' is acceptable with
the SET2 form where the interpretation is comparable to English
"I was made a doctor" or "It came to pass that I was a doctor":
(18) ji	 dOktOr jul-0
1/ABS doctor become-PERF/SET2
"I became a doctor." (non-initiated)
The SET1 form is also acceptable with the interpretation "I
worked to become a doctor."
(19) ji	 dOktOr juy-a
1/ABS doctor become-PST/SET1
"I became a doctor." (self-initiated)
At the same time, speakers found (4010b ju- 'become
surprised' acceptable with SET2:
(20) ji	 g0jOb	 jul-O
1/ABS surprise become-PERF/SET2
"I became surprised."





"I became surprised." (self-initiated)
Also fitting into this class is the verb ca- 'feel, sense,
be aware of.' For example, in combination with a nominal form
like tO 'anger', the SET1 form is strongly preferred over the
SET2 form.




(23)??	 ji	 tO	 cal-0
1/ABS	 anger feel-PERF/SET2
"I felt anger."
In combination with a nominal form like Oju 'surprise', not all
speakers seemed to accept the SET1 form. Some speakers found it
perfectly acceptable; others did not.
(24)	 ji	 Oju	 cal-0
1/ABS	 suprise feel-PERF/SET2
"I felt surprised."
(25)?	 ji	 Oju	 cay-a
1/ABS	 suprise feel-PST/SET1
"I felt surprised."
In a dative subject construction, the SET1 form is completely
unacceptable to all speakers; the SET2 form is required.
(26)	 ji-tO	 sekhO cal-0
1-DAT	 cold feel-PERF/SET2
"I caught a cold."
(27)*	 ji-tO sekhO cay-a
1-DAT cold feel-PST/SET1
Taking these markedness properties and variable judgements
into consideration, it turns out that when we define the Fluid
class as just those verbs which allow both SET1 and SET2 forms
without evidential operators, the class of "true" Fluid verbs is
actually quite small. They are primarily intransitive verbs
with motion components which may or may not be self-initiated
(the "roll" class), transitive verbs with alternations between
telic and non-telic interpretations (the "touch" class), and
perception verbs with active or non-active interpretations. The
list of Fluid verbs I have found is given below:
Roll Type
	 Touch Type




	 napO=la (t) - 'meet'
kha(t)-	 'shake, tremble' ghwa (t) -
	 'elbow, bumb'
dun-	 'submerge, dip' thwa(t)-	 'kick, bumb'
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Other	 Perception Type
ca(1)-	 'feel'	 ta(1)-	 'hear'
ju(1)-	 'become'	 khOn-	 'see'
Non-Control Verbs
The Non-Control verbs make up the largest class for the
simple reason that, whereas Control and Fluid verbs require an
entity that can potentially plan and initiate actions as well as
speak about the actions as first persons, Non-Control verbs have
no such restrictions. Thus, the majority of the Non-Control
verbs have inanimate subjects. In operational terms, Non-
Control verbs are defined as those verbs which take only SET2
inflection in finite clauses.
Unlike Control and Fluid verbs, Non-Control verbs do not






The majority of the Non-Control verbs that take animate







An acceptable alternative for an intentional interpre-
tation would be with the causative suffix -k- and a reflexive
pronoun. The causative suffix inflects like a Control verb. We
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return to the interpretation of reflexive and middle-voice
constructions in Chapter VII.
(32)	 ji:	 (thO:-yatO)	 pya-k-a
1/ABS (self-DAT)	 be.wet-CADS-PST/SET1
"I got (myself) wet."
As the list below indicates, the majority of the Non-
Control verbs are intransitive:
tOn- 'be.lost gya(t)- 'be.afraid'
sya(t)- 'hurt' bu(t)- 'be.defeated'
gOn- 'be.dry' lhwon- 'be.fat'
ga(t)- 'be.sufficient' gu(t)- 'tear'(intrans)
pu(t)- 'be.hot' phu(t)- 'be.used up'
pya(t)- 'be.wet' bu(t)- 'be.cooked'
ja(1)- 'be.full' sa(t)- 'be.tasty'
sul- 'be.hidden' jwo(1)- 'be.sharp'
lu(t)- 'be.found' ben- 'be.loose'
na(1)- 'melt' la(1)- 'recover, heal'
bwo-10n- 'mature' gi(t)- 'be.overripe'
jel- 'wear out' wa(t)- 'spill'
cya(t)- 'ignite, burn' ca(1)- 'open'
then- 'arrive' t0=jya(t)- 'break,	 shatter'
ca-bu(t)- 'snap	 (string)' twO=du(1)- 'snap	 (stick)'
dun- 'collapse' dwOn- 'err'
tya(t)- 'succeed, gain' si(t)- 'die'
kuta won- "fall.go" kuta wo(1)- 'fall.come'
The transitive Non-Control class are mainly cognition
verbs which assign Ergative case:
si(1)- 'know' mhOsi(1)- 'know	 (person)'
thu(1)- 'understand' mhOn- 'dream'
lumOn- 'remember' lwomOn- 'forget'3
Summary of Verb Classes
By using first person declarative clauses as our test
environment, it turns out that the class of Fluid verbs is
actually quite small. The essential lexical opposition is
between two classes of verbs (+/-) Control.
Furthermore, in relation to the verb classes, the
SET1/SET2 opposition is not really productive as a simple index
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of intentionality. That is, the SET1 form is obligatory with
Control verbs unless some evidential operator or interpretation
is invoked. In these cases, it is the evidential operator that
conditions the use of a SET2 form, not the productive applica-
tion of an inflectional opposition whose meaning is that of
"intention/control" vs. "non-intention/non-control." This
suggests the following:
1. Control verbs describe the kinds of actions which
entail as part of their default interpretation that an actor was
aware and initiated some force or motion. SET1 indicates that
the action or force initiated was in accordance with a mental
plan or some state of awareness. SET2 occurs only in those
cases where an evidential operator overrides the default inter-
pretation. The SET2 form with Control verbs does not affect the
default interpretation that some force or motion was initiated.
2. Fluid verbs describe the kinds of actions/events which
do not require, but potentially include, some form of awareness
and self-initiating force or movement. Unlike Control verbs,
Fluid verbs do not have the default interpretation that some
force or motion was initiated by the actor. Consequently, evi-
dential operators are not necessary for the occurrence of SET2
forms. SET1 inflection indicates an action initiated in
accordance with a mental plan. SET2 inflection is interpreted
as indicating that there was no mental plan, and no initiation
of force.
3. Non-Control verbs describe events which do not allow
self-initiated force (and by implication no mental plan of the
action); consequently, SET1 inflection is impossible.
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As it turns out, the SET1/SET2 inflectional opposition is
not the only grammatical environment which recognises a notional
category of intention. Thus, it is important to identify these
other environments and their co-occurence requirements. This is
the goal of the next three sections.
ya(t)- 'do' and iu(1)- 'become' as Verbal Pro-forms
The previous section established the existence of three
verb classes based on the distribution of SET1 and SET2 forms.
Furthermore, the distributional properties suggested that the
opposition between Control and Non-Control verbs was based on
the default (lexically based) interpretation of whether or not
the verb described the type of action which could be self-
initiated in accordance with a mental plan or state of aware-
ness. Since Fluid verbs have no default value one way or
another, the interpretation of intention was a function of
SET1/SET2 opposition.
Further evidence for this analysis comes from the use of
two verbs used as verbal pro-forms. When used as verbal pro-
forms, the two verbs ya(t)- 'do' and 111(1)- 'become' distinguish
between antecedents as "doing" (Control verb) and antecedents as
"happening" (Non-Control verb). Fluid verbs allow alternative
interpretations depending on the use of SET1 or SET2 inflection.
The first set of examples illustrate the non-anaphoric
uses of the two verbs.










In many cases, the opposition between ya(t)- 'do' and
lu(1)- 'become' distinguishes between self-initiated actions and
non-initiated events (Shakya 1990). For example:
(35) ji:	 khi	 yan-a
1/ERG shit	 do-PST/SET1
"I messed up."
(36) wo	 khi jul-O
3/ABS shit become-PERF/SET2
"It got messed up."
The two verbs also function as verbal pro-forms. In
example (37), the verb iu(1)- 'become' functions as a pro-form








ji	 nO Othe he	 jul-0
1/ABS also like EMPH become-PERF/SET2
"And it happened to me too."
In contrast, in example (38) the verb ya(t)- 'do' func-
tions as a pro-form for action predications. The pro-form
construction with lu(1)- 'become' is ungrammatical here.
(38) laxml:	 mOca-yatO hy0e-k01-0
Laxmi/ERG child-DAT content-CAUS-PERF/SET2
"Laxmi consoled the child."
ji:	 nO Othe he	 yan-a
1/ERG also like EMPH do-PST/SET1
"And I did likewise."
In short, the use of the pro-forms provides a diagnostic
for distinguishing between Control (doings) and Non-Control
(happenings) predications independent of the inflectional
opposition.
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Although the verb ya(t)- is a transitive verb assigning
Ergative case to its subject, it may serve as a pro-form for an
intransitive verb, if the verb is a Control verb. In other
words, for va(ti- 'do' to function as a pro-form, the transi-
tivity or case assigning properties of the antecedent verb are
irrelevant, but it must be a Control verb. Notice that the use
of pro-form is independent of inflection, indicating that the
functionally relevant properties of the antecedent action are
related to the semantics of Control rather than the form of the
verb.
(39) syam	 turunt0 dyO	 won-0
Syam/ABS at once lie/PURP go-PERF/SET2
"Syam went at once to lie down/sleep."
jimi pasa:	 nO Othe he yat-O
1/GEN friend/ERG also like EMPH do-PERF/SET2
"And my friend did likewise."
If the verb is a Non-Control verb, then va(t)- 'do' is not
possible and lu(1)- 'become' is required.
(40) ji	 gya-kkO nhy0:1-0	 cal-0
I/ABS fear-ADV sleep-ABL feel-PERF/SET2
"I awoke from sleep frightened."
wo-ya nO Othe he	 jul-O
3-GEN also like EMPH become-PERF/SET2
"And it happened to him too."
wO:	 nO Othe he yat-O
3/ERG also like EMPH do-PERF/SET2
Conversely, although the verb luji)- 'become' is an
intransitive verb assigning Absolutive case to its subject, it
may serve as a pro-form for a transitive, Ergative case assign-
ing verb, if the verb is a Non-Control verb. In other words,
for lu(1)- 'become' to function as a pro-form, the transitivity
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or case assigning properties of the antecedent verb are
irrelevant, but it must be a Non-Control verb.
(41) ji:	 wo-ya-gu khwa lwomOn-O
1/ERG 3-GEN-ATR face forget-PERF/SET2
"I forgot how s/he looks."
wo-ya nO	 Othe he	 jul-0
3-GEN also like EMPH become-PERF/SET2
"And it happened to him/her too."
* wO:	 nO Othe he	 yat-O
3/ERG also like EMPH do-PERF/SET2
Although word order may reflect topicality and information
structure correlates to passivization, Newari has no syntactic
processes corresponding to passivization. However, the opposi-
tion between the two pro-forms is conditioned by the semantic
role of the subject.
(42) laxmi:	 mOca-yatO bwo bil-0
Laxmi/ERG child-DAT scold give-PERF/SET2
"Laxmi scolded the child."
jI:	 nO	 Othe he	 yan-a
1/ERG also like EMPH do-PST/SET1
"And I did likewise."
(43) laxmi:	 mOca-yatO bwo	 bil-O
Laxmi/ERG child-DAT scold give-PERF/SET2
"Laxmi scolded the child."
ji-t0 nO	 Othe he	 jul-O
1-DAT also like EMPH become-PERF/SET2
"And it happened to me too."
Finally, with Fluid verbs, the use of the pro-forms
distinguishes between intentional and non-intentional intepre-
tations; va(tj- 'do' goes with the intentional interpretation.
Recall that napO=la(t)- 'meet' is a Fluid verb.
(44) ji:	 syam-yatO ni-k0	 g011i-e	 nap0=lan-a
1/ERG Syam-DAT two-times alley-L005 meet-PST/SET1
"1 (intentionally) met him twice in the alley."
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jimi pasa:	 nO Othe he yat-O
I/GEN friend/ERG also like EMPH do-PERF/SET2
"And my friend did likewise."
The verb iu(1)- 'become' goes with the non-intentional interpre-
tation. The two pro-forms are not interchangeable with these
interpretations.
(45)	 ji:	 syani-yatO ni-kO 	 g011i-e	 napO=lat-O
1/ERG Syam-DAT two-times alley-LOC meet-PERF/SET2
"I ran into him twice in the alley."
jimi pasa-ya	 nO Othe he	 jul-O
1/GEN friend-GEN also like EMPH become-PERF/SET2
"And it happened to my friend too."
In short, the opposition between the two pro-forms ya-
'do' and lu- 'become', parallels the opposition between Control
and Non-Control verbs. The use of the two proforms corroborates
the distributional evidence from SET1/SET2 inflection. Verbs
can be lexically classed relative to the presence, absence, or
optionality of self-initiated force in the lexical representa-
tion; that is, they are typed according to whether they are
construed as "doings" or "happenings." The pro-forms also
corroborate the function of the SET1/SET2 opposition with Fluid
verbs; that is, they distinguish self-initiated actions from
non-initiated events.
Intentional Action and "Premeditation" 
One common folk-construal of intention, especially in
Western legal systems, involves what we may call "premedita-
tion." The periphrastic expression of "premeditation" in Newari
expresses this relationship between a mental state and an action
as a relationship between a quotation complement and a main
clause. In this section, we examine this periphrastic
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construction, which is used to represent "premeditation" and
other propositional attitudes. The evidence will show that
"premeditation" has many of the same semantic properties as
"intention," but must be distinguished from the construal of
"intention" which is functional in the SET1/SET2 opposition.
Outside of the SET1/SET2 inflectional contrast, expres-
sions of intent or purpose in Newari can be periphrastic. In
one type of periphrastic construction, the plan is represented
as a quote complement with Non-Past SET1 inflection. The main
clause represents the action.
Example (46) below is a simple clause with a Control verb.
Example (47) is a direct quote complement. The complement
clause is inflected with the Non-Past SET1 form. dhOka: is a
causative form of the verb dha(1)- 'say, speak' functioning as a
complementizer.
(46) ji:	 la	 nO-e
1/ERG	 meat eat-NPST/SETI
"I'll eat meat."
(47) ji:	 la	 nO-e	 dhOka: dhOy-a
1/ERG meat eat-NPST/SET1 COMP say-PST/SET1
"I said that I'll eat meat."
The same complementation structure is used with cognition verbs
like bicar va(t)- 'think' (literally 'thought 4. do').
(48) ji:	 la	 nO-e	 dhOka:
1/ERG meat eat-NPST/SETI COMP
bicar	 yan-a
thought	 do-PST/SETS.
"I thought that I'd eat meat."
The periphrastic expression of action with "premeditation"
is represented in the same complement construction, but without 
a main verb of speaking or cognition.
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ji:	 la	 nO-e	 dhOka: nOy-a
1/ERG meat eat-NPST/SET1 COMP 	 eat-PST/SET1
"(saying>intending) to eat meat, I ate."
v.76:	 la	 nO-e	 dhOka: n01-0
3/ERG meat eat-NPST/SET1 COMP 	 eat-PERF/SET2
"(saying/intending) to eat meat, he ate."
ji:	 ya-e	 dhOka: yan-a
1/ERG do-NPST/SET1 COMP do-PST/SET1
"(saying/intending) to do it, I did."
wO:	 ya-e	 dhOka: yat-O
3/ERG do-NPST/SET1 COMP do-PERF/SET2
"(saying/intending) to do it, s/he did."
A number of properties of the construction are worth noting.
First, the "premeditation" or "internal speech" is repre-
sented as the complement of dhOka:. The complement verb occurs
in the SET1 Non-Past form. As in reported speech, SET1 inflec-
tion in the complement clause indicates logophoric reference;
that is, the subjects in the complement and main clauses must be
coreferential. Thus, literally, the complement form is quoted
speech about a future action followed by the action.
Second, the action is represented in the main clause. The
main clause verb inflects for SET1 or SET2 depending on the
person/speech act properties, i.e., Epistemic Source.
Third, the expression of intention is indirect. There is
no utterance or cognition verb in the construction; the comple-
mentation structure is indicated by the complementizer dhOka!.
Thus, in the periphrastic expression, intention is a pragmatic
inference derived via the semantics of the complement clause and
the main clause action.
There is clear evidence for the pragmatic inferential
processes which lead to the interpretation of intention. The
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evidence comes from the fact that different inferences arise in
minimally contrastive constructions.
For example, in (53) below, the two clauses do not have
co-referential subjects. The subject of the complement clause
is an unspecified third person; the subject of the main clause
is first person. As result, the complement clause takes SET2
inflection, the main (action) clause has SETT inflection. The
inferred mental state is "fear of getting beaten" which is the
motivation for fleeing.
(53) ji-t0 da-i	 dhOka: bisyO won-a
1-DAT hit-NPST/SET2 COMP	 flee go-PST/SET1
"(thinking) I would be beaten, I fled."
In example (54) below, the subjects in the two clauses are
not coreferential; hence, the complement verb takes SET2
inflection. Since the subject of the main clause is third
person, the main verb takes SET2 inflection. With non-core-
ferential subjects, there is a strong tendency to include the
subject pronoun in the main clause, although it is not required
in any syntactic sense.
(54) ji:	 da-i	 dhOka:
1/ERG hit-NPST/SET2 COMP
( wo)	 bisy0 won-0
(3/ABS) flee go-PERF/SET2
"(thinking) I would hit himi , he i fled."
When the complement and main clause subjects are core-
ferential but the actions are not the same, the inference leads
to the intepretation as a purpose clause.
(55) wo-yatO bi-e	 dhOka: won-a
3-DAT	 give-NPST/SETI COMP	 go-PST/SET1
"1 went thinking to give (it) to him."
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(56) ji-t0	 bi-e	 dhOka: wol-O
1-DAT	 give-NPST/SET1 COMP 	 come-PERF/SET2
"(thinking) to give (it) to me, he came."
Consider now the case of Fluid verbs. They allow both
SET1 and SET2 forms without the need for evidential operators.
The question is: how do they behave in perpihrastic construc-
tions? First, recall the Fluid pair below.
(57) ji:	 wo-yatO thwan-a
1/ERG 3-DAT	 kick-PST/SET1
"I kicked him/her (intentionally)."
(58) ji:	 wo-yatO thwat-O
1/ERG 3-DAT	 kick-PERF/SET2
"I kicked him/her (unintentionally)."
When the complement stucture indicates "premeditation,"
the SET2 form in the main clause is unacceptable.
(59) ji:	 wo-yatO thwa-e	 dhOka:




"(thinking) I'll kick him/her, I kicked him/her."
ji:	 wo-yatO thwa-e	 dhOka:
1/ERG 3-DAT	 kick-NPST/SET1 COMP
thwat-O
kick-PERF/SET2
However, if the complement structure does not indicate
"premeditation," the SET2 form is acceptable in the main clause,
whereas the SET1 form is not.6
(61) ji:	 wo-yatO thwa-i	 nhi dhOka:
1/ERG 3-DAT	 kick-NPST/SET2 EMPH COMP
thwat-O
kick-PERF/SET2




ji:	 wo-yatO thwa-i	 nhi dhOka:
1/ERG 3-DAT	 kick-NPST/SET2 EMPH COMP
thwan-a
kick-PST/SET1
In short, the appropriate selection of the SET1 or SET2
form in the main clause is triggered by the presence or absence
of "premeditation" expressed in the complement clause.
In conclusion, the periphrastic expression of "premedita-
tion" suggests the following configuration of semantic and
grammatical components.
1. There is an action plan distinguished from the action
itself. The action plan is the complement of the complementizer
dhOka:. The predicate/complement structure of "premeditation"
is isomorphic with the predicate/complement structure of a verb
of speaking. In this case, it is "speaking to oneself," which
can be interpreted as a form of mental awareness or planning.
This can be schematized as follows:
f [ [action plan] COMP] [action] ]
2. The verb in the complement clause is marked with an
irrealis, non-past modality. That is, the plan is by definition
potential with respect to the initiated force which character-
izes the action itself. It is temporally prior to, and hence,
logically independent of the action itself. The temporal
component in the complement clause can be added to schema as
follows:
[ [ [NP [VP-NPST] ] COMP] [NP [VP] ] ]
3. The subject of the complement and main verbs are
coreferential. The complement verb is marked with the
logophoric SET1 form. In short, one can only "intend" with
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respect to one's own behavior. The co-indexing requirements can
be added as follows:
[ ( (Npi [VP-NPAST/SET11 ] COMP] (NP i [VP]	 ]
4. The predicate phrase (VP) of the main clause must be
equivalent to the predicate phrase (VP) in the complement
clause. The action plan and the action itself must be identical
with respect to all referential variables. In other words, to
count as intentional, the actual action performed must have
followed the represented plan of action; that is, it must have
followed directly from the "premeditation."
The complete schematic representation of the periphrastic
construction is represented as follows:
(63) jI:	 la	 nO-e	 dhOka: nOy-a
1/ERG meat eat-NPST/SET1 COMP eat-PST/SET1
"I intentionally ate meat."
"(saying/intending) to eat meat, I ate."
[ [ [NP i [VP1-NPAST/SET1] ] COMP] [NP i [VP j ] ] 1
It is important to add that the claim is not that the
periphrastic notion of premeditation and intentional action are
identical. The crucial test here is negation. The periphrastic
construction can be constructed literally and negated:
(64) ji:	 la	 nO-e	 dhOka: (dhOy-a:)
1/ERG meat eat-NPST/SET1 COMP 	 (say-NF)
tOrO m0-n0y-a
but eat-PST/SET1
"I said I would eat meat,
but didn't."
In other words, the periphrastic expression of "premedi-
tation" allows for a temporal hiatus between the representation
of a plan and the initiation of action; thus, negation is
possible. As we shall see in the next chapter, the concept of
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intentional action we are concerned with involves not premedi-
tation, but "intention-in-action"; that is, the mental plan and
the self-initiated force are co-temporal in the event.
Nevertheless, the periphrastic construction provides some
insight into the conceptual structure of "premeditation," and
potentially "intention." These insights will be relevant in
Chapter IV, where we develop in detail the idea that intentional
action consists of both a mental plan and the inititiation of
force.
Intentional Action and "Awareness" 
This section looks at the representation of intentional
action in adverbial constructions using an adverbial derivation
of the verb ca(1)- 'feel, sense, be aware of.' The co-occurence
requirements of the SET1/SET2 inflectional forms with the
adverbial form will demonstrate that the concept of "awareness"
or "mental plan" is one component of the concept of intentional
action.
The verb ca(l)- can be used with a variety of nominal
forms to create sensation and feeling predicates.
(65) ji-gu lha:	 pu	 cal-0
1-GEN hand	 cold feel-PERF/SET2
"My hand feels cold."
(66) ji-t0	 sekhO	 cal-0
1-DAT	 cold/flu feel-PERF/SET2
"I've a cold/flu."
With nominalized complements, it indicates 'awareness of
or 'realization of the proposition expressed in the complement.
(67) ji	 bhukhae bwo:-gu	 cal-0
1/ABS earth-guake/SET2-COMP feel-PERF/SET2
"I realized/felt the earthquake."
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(68) ji-mi pasa	 liha: m0-wo:-gu	 cal-0
1-GEN friend return NEG-come/SET2-COMP feel-SET2
"(1) realized my friend had not returned."
With the adverbial derivational suffix -k0, the form caekO
is used to indicate actions done "consciously." The emphatic
form, with reduplication and nasalization, strongly implicates
that the action was done 'consciously', hence 'deliberately' or
'intentionally.' Recall that the verb caphu(t)- 'snap, break'
is a Control verb. Evidentials such as the 'like, seem' often
occur when attributing mental states to the third person on the
basis of appearance. Thus:
(69) wo:	 caek0-caek0 ka	 caphut-O	 the
3/ERG consciously thread snap-PERF/SET2 like
"It looks like s/he consciously snapped
the thread."
The negated form yields an adverbial construction meaning
"unconsciously" or "unintentionally."
(70) 146:	 m0-caek0	 ka	 caphut-O	 the
3/ERG un-consciously thread snap-PERF/SET2 like
"It looks like s/he unconsciously snapped
the thread."
Given the adverbial form mO-caekO 'unconsciously', we can
now use it as a diagnostic to see whether it is a semantically
relevant operator with respect to the use of SETT and SET2
forms. In other words, we can see whether it functions like the
evidential operators to trigger SET2 inflection.
With first persons, speakers clearly prefer SET2 forms
with m0-caek0 'unconsciously.' The emphatic particles nhi and
ka bring out the relevant emphatic foci in each sentence.
Although I will not attempt to gloss the particles, in these two
contexts, nhi seems to give more positive emphasis for an event
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in accordance with expectation whereas ka brings out a more
negative sense of counter expectation.
(71) jI:	 caek0-caek0	 ka	 caphun-a	 nhi
1/ERG consciously thread snap-PST/SET1 EMPH
"I deliberately snapped the thread."
(72) jI:	 mO-caekO	 ka	 caphut-O	 ka
1/ERG un-consciously thread snap-PERF/SET2 EMPH
"I unconsciously snapped the rope."
(73)??	 jI:	 m0-caek0	 ka	 caphun-a
1/ERG un-consciously thread snap-PST/SET1
"I carelessly broke the thread."
One speaker who marginally admitted SETT inflection in
(73) above seemed to interpret the construction to mean that the
action is performed with a degree of awareness but without
"attentiveness," assuming the action of snapping the thread was
planned and initiated, but perfomed "in a careless, or inat-
tentive manner." Although not all speakers shared this
intuition, the variation itself is revealing. The distinction
seems to hinge on exactly what aspects of "consciousness" or
"awareness" are thought to be indicated by the lexical item, a
thorny issue to say the least.'
In any case, speakers draw a clear analogy between
examples with m0-caek0 and the examples below with khOnisa 
'it.appears.' That is, khOnisa functions as an evidential
operator of inferred result, taking the entire clause in its
scope; mO-caekO functions as an adverbial modifier whose scope
is the predicate phrase. Both suggest that an action was
performed without the appropriate form of awareness or mental
planning.
(74) ji:	 ka	 caphut-O	 khOnisa
1/ERG thread snap-PERF/SET2 it.appears
"It appears I snapped the rope."
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(75) m0-caek0	 ka	 caphut-0	 ka
1/ERG un-consciously thread snap-PERF/SET2 EMPH
"I unconsciously snapped the rope."
There is a clear distinction between direct causation
examples with m0-caek0 and indirect causation examples as in
(76) below. In example (76), the verb la(t)- 'happen, occur'
suggests more strongly that the actor was only the indirect
cause and lacked control. That is, the speaker may have acci-
dently lost his or her balance or pulled too hard.
( 7 6)	 m0-caek0	 ka	 caphu-e
1/ERG un-consciously thread snap-INF
lat-O
happen-PERF/SET2
"I unconsciously happen to snap the thread."
In fact, in this construction, no evidential operators are
necessary at all. The verb la(t)- 'happen, occur' suggests that
the actor does not bear the ultimate causal responsibility. In
other words, it obviates the causal dynamic in general, rather
than directly obviating the evidential meanings related to a
mental plan or mental state.
(77) jI:	 ka	 caphu-e 'lat-0
1/ERG thread snap-INF happen-PERF/SET2
"1 happen to snap the thread."
Finally, a complete lack of responsibility for any causal
dynamic can be expressed by using the intransitive non-causative




In the case of Fluid verbs, none of the speakers accepted
the SETl forms co-occurring with m0-caek0. Recall that thi-
'touch' is a Fluid verb.
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(79)*	 jl:	 mOtO	 m0-caek0	 thiy-a
1/ERG lamp	 un-consciously touch-PST/SET1
(80)	 jI:	 mOtO	 m0-caek0	 thil-O
1/ERG lamp	 un-consciously touch-PERF/SET2
"I unconsciously touched the lamp."
Based on the distribution of SET1/SET2 forms, the facts are as
follows:
1. SET1 forms occur with Control verbs. SET2 forms do
not occur with Control verbs except with evidential operators.
2. With Control verbs, the co-occurence of m0-caek0 
'unconsiously' and SET1 forms is, for the most part, unac-
ceptable. The co-occurence of SET2 forms with m0-caek0 is
acceptable for all speakers.
3. The occurence of m0-caek0, which indicates the
negation of "consciousness," is inconsistent with the
interpretation that the action involved a particular type of
mental state or plan, indicated by SET1 forms.
4. To the extent that SET2 forms may occur with Control
verbs when m0-caek0 is included in the clause, the function of
m0-caek0 meaning "unconsciousness" is like the evidential
operators, 110 for reported speech and khOnisa for inferred
result. In other words, whatever semantic content is attributed
to the lexical item m0-caek0 'unconscious', it is a functionally
relevant variable that conditions SET2 usage with Control in
first person declarative clauses. In short, the conceptual
account of "intention" must account for some notion of
"consciousness" or "awareness." In the Chapter IV, this is
identified as the representational component of intentional
action.
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5). The semantic domain of m0-caek0 'unconsciously' and
other evidential operators is distinct from the semantic domain
of indirect causation with the verb la(t)- 'occur, happen', and
non-causative intransitive usages. In other words, there are
two ways in which the action may be described as "non-inten-
tional." First, it may have been the result of an action
initiated and performed, but without the appropriate plan,
mental representation, or awareness. In this case, evidential
operators will occur. Second, it may have been an action in
which the antecedent cause is not located with any causal force
initiated by the actor. In this case, the verb la(t)- 'occur,
happen' is more likely to be used. Conversely, for SET1
inflectional use, an intentional action is one which requires
that the actor be both the direct causal antecedent for the
initiation of force, and the force must be directed in
accordance with the appropriate mental state or plan.
Summary
This chapter examined the distribution of SET1/SET2 forms
relative to a diagnostic set of semantic variables:
1. Three categories of verbs, Control, Non-Control, and
Fluid.
2. The evidential operator khOnisa 'it.appears'.
3. The two verbs ya- 'do' and lu- 'become' functioning as
proforms.
4. The periphrastic expression of "premeditation."
5. The adverbial modifier m0-caek0 'unconsciously.'
8 3
What has emerged is an implicit concept of intentional
action and a variety of lexical and morphosyntactic reflexes.
This implicit concept of intentional action appears to consist
of two domains: the action involves a self-initiated force and
the action is in accordance with the appropriate mental state or
plan.
Finally, in distinguishing between verb classes, it became
clear that the concept of self-initiated force was part of the
inherent lexical meaning of Control verbs, but was only
potential with respect to Fluid verbs. It was not possible for
Non-Control verbs to receive an interpretation involving self-
initiated force. In short, the domain of self-initiated force
appears to be part of lexical meaning.
In contrast, the notion that an intentional action
involves some sort of plan or mental state does not seem to be
part of lexical meaning. That is, Control verbs take SET1 forms
in simple clauses, but when the appropriate evidential operators
are present, they take SET2. In these cases, SET2 forms indi-
cate that an action was performed (i.e., a self-initiated force
was present), but not in accordance with an appropriate mental
state. In other words, the notions of plan, mental repre-
sentation, or mental state do not seem to be part of inherent
lexical meaning. It is the goal of Chapter IV to provide a more
explicit account of how the two domains of conceptual structure
relate to the lexical and inflectional realizations.
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Notes 
'In some cases, speakers will accept SET2 forms without
lexically/phonologically present evidential operators. However,
the interpretations are evidential in nature. In other words,
speakers will add that the utterance would only be appropriate
under the conditions specified by the evidential operators. The
important point here is that the same is not true of Fluid
verbs, which do not need evidential operators with SET2
inflection.
2See Dowty (1979) and Lakoff (1970) for observations on the
intentional interpretations with future-statives like 'I'm going
to be a doctor' in English as compared to 'I'm going to be
sick'. The nominal form (4010b is from Nepali.
3The verb lwomOn- 'forget' is an irregular negative of
lumOn- 'remember'.
4Under certain semantic and pragmatic conditions, the
Genitive suffix -ya may occur with subjects/topics. The usages
appears to be conditioned by both lexical semantic and discourse
pragmatic functions. It seems to occur mostly with experiencer
and other stative predicates. It also appears to be conditioned
by certain topicality parameters. It is a curious part of the
grammar that warrants further research.
5The Locative form /g011i-e/ 'in the alley' becomes
[g011i:] by a regular morpho-phonological rule /i-e/ -> [i:].
61 thank Mr. Daya Ratna Shakya for pointing out to me that
adding the Emphatic suffix -nhi draws out the non-intentional
reading. Note also that Manandhar (1986:129) glosses one of the
senses of -nhi as "beware."
'The examples with m0-caek0 also admit interpretations of
the following type with two participants. "Unknown to me,
s/he..." or "Unknown to him, I...". They are contingent
interpretations whose properties don't affect the main point:
m0-caeko indicates lack of a mental plan or awareness. It is
also appropriate here for me to give a special thanks to Manoj
Kanskar, Sunil Nepali, and Daya Ratna Shakya for discussing this
issue with me many times, providing me with their interpretions,
and being patient with me and my questioning.
8The alternation ca=phu- 'snap, break' (transitive) and
ca=bu- 'snap, break' (intransitive) is an historical relic of an
earlier Proto Tibeto-Burman causative prefix *s- (cf. Hale 1973;
Hargreaves and Tamot 1984; Malla 1985). It is no longer
productive in contemporary Kathmandu Newari.
CHAPTER IV
THE CONCEPTUAL STRUCTURE OF INTENTIONAL ACTION
The evidence from Chapter III showed that the concept of
intentional action realized by the inflectional system is
constituted, on the one hand, by a notion of "awareness" or
"mental plan," and, on the other hand, by a notion of "self-
initiated force" or "control." This chapter examines the
conceptual structure of intentional action in more detail. The
goal is to account for how the conceptual structure of
intentional action is realized in the lexicon and SET1/SET2
inflectional opposition.
In the first section, we consider several important
insights from philosophy, cognitive development, language
acquisition, and linguistics. Insights from each area will
support the claim that the concept of "intentional action" is
best viewed as having two components: one involving the mental
representation of an action (plan) and the other involving the
self-initiation of force (i.e., causal) dynamics.' In the
second section, we adopt this view of intention and apply it to
the Newari data.
On Intentional Action
This section considers intentional action from three
points of view: action theory in philosophy, cognitive devel-
opment and language acquisition in psychology, and linguistic
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semantics. The research in each of the three fields leads to
one conclusion: intentional action is best viewed as consisting
of a representational component and a force dynamic. Together,
the two components can be said to form the proximate causal
antecedent to intentional action (Brand 1984).
Philosophical Psychology
Intention is an enigmatic concept by virtue of its rela-
tive inaccessibility to observation and introspection. As
William James notes in his classic Principles of Psychology: 
We know what it is to get out of bed on a freezing morning
in a room without a fire, and how the very vital principle
within us protests against the ordeal. Probably most
persons have lain on certain mornings for an hour at a
time unable to brace themselves to the resolve. We think
how late we shall be, how the duties of the day will
suffer; we say, "I must get up, this is ignominious,"
etc.; but still the warm couch feels too delicious, the
cold outside too cruel, and the resolution faints away and
postpones itself again and again just as it seemed on the
verge of bursting the resistance and passing over into the
decisive act. Now how do we ever get up under such cir-
cumstances? If I may generalize from my own experience,
we more often than not get up without any struggle or
decision at all. We suddenly find that we have got up.
(1890/1950:524).
Within philosophical theories of action, of which
intentional action is a part, there is a long tradition of
wrestling with the problem of intention (cf. Brand 1970 for a
review). One central issue in action theory is to distinguish
between "action" (e.g., I am shaking my leg) and "mere behavior"
(e.g., My leg is shaking). Drawing the distinction requires
reference to some unique type of mental event which is present
in the case of an action and absent in the case of mere behavior
(cf. Davidson 1980; Searle 1983). Distinguishing among
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philosophical theories of action is not our concern here;
instead, we are interested in the notion that there is a unique
mental state: "intention."
As with other propositional attitude predicates, such as
"belief," it is generally argued that "intention" is a two place
predicate, one argument of which is the "subject," the other of
which is the "proposition" or intended action. As semantic
entities, propositional attitude predications, such as
"believe," "want," and "intend," allow us to individuate and
refer to culturally recognisable aspects of our mental life.
The question whether, in fact, the semantic structure of a
folk (philosophical or psychological) model can account for the
actual cognitive organization of "intentional action" is
problematic. Thus, it is important to keep in mind that we are
interested in the model of "intention" which is functional in
the Newari linguistic system. We are not directly interested in
intention as a construct in philosophy or cognitive science.
However, since we are not talking about purely imaginary
notions, such as unicorns, we may assume the objective existence
of some unique mental event(s) or process(s) that accompany
self-initiated behavior. The experience and understanding of
this mental event is part of a shared cultural experience. We
are interested in how the grammar of Newari construes it.
One problem with viewing intention as a mere propositional
attitude is that it doesn't really account for how an "attitude"
can, in fact, initiate an action. As James concedes, we can
desire, imagine, cajol, and premeditate all we want and never
get out of bed. Similarly, the propositional attitude account
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lacks a causal explanation for the relationship between the
mental event and the initiation of a movement, that is, the
execution of an action.
In short, the fundamental issue in a theory of intentional
action is the problem of causation (Brand 1979; 1980; 1984).
Borrowing the key insights from Brand, we will distinguish two
components which together make up what he has termed the
"proximate cause" of action. Generalizing somewhat from his
original formulation, the two components can be termed: repre-
sentational and force dynamic.
The Plan-in-Action
The first component is termed the "cognitive" component by
Brand (1984). I will use the term "representational." It was
already suggested in Chapter III that intentional action
involves some kind of mental representation, a goal or plan
which consciously or unconsciously guides the behavior. 2 This
mental representation is understood, not as a truth functional
proposition, but rather as a plan of action, a "practition" in
the sense of Castafteda (1975) or, as Brand (1984) suggests, as a
"script" in the sense of Schank & Abelson (1977). Note how
similar these notions are to the semantic structure of Newari
"premeditation" complements.
The plan serves to guide the on-going performance of the
action and is said to be the object of "immediate intending"
(Brand 1979; 1984), or "intention-in-action" (Searle 1983).
Note also that in contrast to the concept of "premeditation,"
the plan is realized in action as a self-initiated behavior
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which is structured in accordance with a mental representation.
In other words, we are interested here in the concept of
"intention-in-action" not "intending-to-act." There are two
other important properties of the representation worth noting.
First, viewing intention as a mental "plan-in-action"
captures the intuition that to count as an intentional act, the
action must be carried out by following the specific plan which
was represented. For example, someone may intentionally be
pulling on a string, without intending to break it. If the
string does break, then we would say that the person didn't
intentionally break the strin g; although, we say they inten-
tionally pulled on the string. In the case of the utterance I
broke the string, the utterance describes a self-initiated
behavior which was not in accordance with the plan the actor
had, which was: pull on the string. It is in these situations
that we resort to expressions such as: "I didn't intend to do
it."3
In short, to assert that some instance of behavior was an
intentional action is to assert that:
1. The behavior was self-initiated.
2. The behavior was in accordance with some mental plan.
3. The characterization of the action in the asserted
proposition is the same as what the actor had in mind as part of
the mental representation of action.
To elaborate on the example from Chapter I: "Oedipus
intentionally killed a stranger at the cross-roads," is true
because the utterance correctly characterizes both the event and
the mental representation that guided Oedipus' behavior.
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However, it is false to say that "Oedipus intentionally killed
his father" because although the utterance does correctly
characterize the event itself, it does not correctly charac-
terize the mental representation that guided Oedipus' actions
(Freud not withstanding).
As we saw in Chapter III, with Control verbs, the evi-
dential operators, khOnisa 'it.appears', m0-caek0 ' uncon-
sciously', and h0 'hearsay evidential' all function as lexical
resources for obviating this representational component in first
person clauses, without denying the force dynamics, which are
entailed by the nature of the actions described by Control
verbs.
The mental representation or plan-in-action is necessarly
self-referential (Castaneda 1975). As our everyday intuitions
suggest, we can only have intentions about our own actions.
Consequently, there is an irreducible asymmetry between first
and non-first person statements of intentionality. As was
suggested in Chapter II, it is this property of self-reference
that underlies the first/non-first person asymmetries, evi-
dential constraints, and logophoric properties of SET1/SET2
inflection in Newari.
The Initiative-in-Action
The second component is termed by Brand the "conative" or
motivational component. It is an "impulse" or "impetus" that
constitutes the initiation of a behavior. 4 As such, it captures
the intuition that intention involves self-initiated force, with
no antecedent causal forces outside the self. Thus,
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"initiative-in-action" is one component of our everyday notion
of "animacy," or in Premack's (1990) view, "the [child's] theory
of self-propelled objects." The "initiative-in-action" and the
"plan-in-action" together make up our concept of intentional
action.
There are some wrinkles in this concept of intentional
action as a force dynamic. As Talmy (1976; 1988) notes, the
expression "I dragged myself out of bed" is evidence for a folk-
psychological notion of self-agency in which the self and the
body are split and treated metaphorically in the everyday
language of force and causation. Examples of this type are
structurally identical to sentences such as "He dragged me out
of bed," or "I dragged him out of bed." Thus, intentional action
is expressed metaphorically in these constructions as "mental
self-as-agent" acting on "physical self-as-patient."5
Ricoeur (1966) argues for two alternative views of inten-
tional force. On the one hand, he acknowledges the "objective"
view of intention as force and causation: the body appears to be
moved by an "act of will" (Talmy's "self-agency"), just like any
other object can be moved by exerting force on it.
On the other hand, Ricoeur points out that we do not
usually experience ourselves and our actions as objects of
willing. As James also noted, we rarely (or never) actually
experience ourselves as being dragged (or pushed) around by a
will. We simply act "in-the-world" on the basis of plans and
goals, which presumably guide our behavior. In other words, the
phenomenology of intentional action works against reducing
statements about intentional action to statements about our body
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as "patient" and our will as "agent." From a linguistic
semantic perspective, the concept of "will as agent" has
theoretical value only to the extent that some languages express
the concept in reflexive or middle voice constructions via
expressions such as: "1 finally forced myself to get some
sleep." There is no evidence in the Newari SET1/SET2 inflec-
tional system that intentional action is construed as
"will-agent and body-patient." However, Chapter VI will show
that some middle voice causatives do view intentionality
somewhat in the manner that Talmy suggests.
Hence, Ricoeur's view has the advantage of including both
Talmy's force dynamics and a phenomonological, which we may call
representational, component. This view allows for a more
straightforward account of the asymmetries of Newari SET1/SET2
inflection.
The Child's Concept of Intention
Researchers in social-cognitive development and language
acquisition have reached similar conclusions about the child's
concept of intentional action.
The acquisition of a concept of intention has been an
important issue in understanding social-cognitive development in
children, particularly within the context of the child's
developing abilties in communication, non-egocentric perspective
taking, and moral reasoning (Flavell 1985; Gee & Savasir 1985;
Premack 1990; Shantz 1983; Shatz 1983)). More recently,
researchers have focused on how the emerging concepts of agency
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and intention are realized in the developing linguistic system
of the child (Budwig 1989; 1990).
Budwig (1990) points out that there is an important dis-
tinction between the concept of agency as it is used in
linguistics to account for the prototypical mappings from a
transitive action schema to grammatical structure and the
concept of agency as it is used to account for the child's
emerging sense of Self and Other in developmental psychology.
As noted in Chapter I, the agency prototype has often been
viewed within the context of transitive clause structure, as a
prototypical co-occurence of properties, including animacy,
volition, control, and object affectedness (Hopper and Thompson
1980; Lakoff 1977). In turn, intention (usually called
volition) is treated uncritically as simply one contributing
feature in the agent/transitivty prototype.
In contrast, according to Budwig, developmental psycholo-
gists have come to recognise that the child's initial concept of
agency is somewhat different.
[The child's concept of agency isj related to the under-
standing that animate beings move and behave in a causally
independent manner, while intentionality is taken to be a
developmentally more advanced notion which includes a
consideration of the internal states that guide behavior
[my emphasis DH) (1990:133).
In a longitudinal study of the developing concept of
agency in children, Wolf (1982) identifies three characteristic
stages in the child's concept of the other as agent. In the
first stage, the child views other "agents" instrumentally, as
"agent/instruments" capable of being manipulated to fulfill the
child's needs. In stage two, the child begins to realize that
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the mental life of others is "like oneself," consisting of
mental attributes which distinguish animate from inanimate
beings. In the final stage, the child realizes that other
humans initiate and perform intentional actions in a causally
independent manner, irrespective of the child's own wishes.
Wolfe emphasizes that the child's developing concept of inde-
pendent agency in others emerges out of social interaction, as
part of a larger stage in social-cognitive development: the
growing differentiation of self from other. In other words, the
child comes to realize that others have a unique and inacces-
sible mental life; apparent self-initiated action is one form of
evidence for this mental life.
Poulin-Dubois & Shultz (1988) studied the developmental
sequences in the concept of agency and intention. They
concluded:
[To the child] Intention is an elaboration of agency. [To
the child] Agency explains the fact that a being moves and
behaves on its own. Intention elaborates on the explana-
tion by postulating an internal mental state that guides
and controls the action (1988:120).
Thus, developmentally, intention is not just one of
several factors contributing to an undifferentiated agency or
transitivity prototype; rather, it is a more complex notion in
which the child comes to understand that intentional action in
others is:
1. Causally independent of direct antecedents. In other
words, it involves an apparent "initiative-in-action."
2. Based on a particular type of mental event, In other
words, it involves a "plan-in-action."
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3. Is not directly accessible in others and must be
inferred.
Not surprisingly, children appear to first differentiate
the concepts of agency and intention in linguistic forms when
referring to their own actions. In particular, Budwig (1989)
demonstrates that English speaking children go through a
developmental sequence in which they use the alternate self-
referential pronominal forms (I, my) in subject position to
distinguish differeht perspectives on self-initiated and
represented action. In particular, the possessive form my
tended to be used for situations rated high on a transitivity
prototype scale; the nominative form I was used in situations
rated low on a transitivity scale.
More importantly, Budwig found that the transitivity
parameters which best accounted for the data were, in fact, the
intersection of two domains. In one domain, the tendency to use
my involved a force dynamic and was reflected in canonical
agent/patient utterances like: "my open that." In the second
domain, the tendency to use my involved pragmatic control (wants
& needs) statements, reflected in utterances such as: "my want
the little ones." Thus, the children's linguistic category of
"self-as agent" included both statements about plans or goals
and statements about causal efficacy with objects. Finally, the
children did not make the formal distinction when referring to
actions by others. Thus, Budwig concludes that, "English-
speaking children give special linguistic treatment to a sub-
category of agency, namely, Self as agent" (Budwig 1990:135).
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Intention and Semantic Representations
In early generative theories, intention (or volition) was
not the focus of much research. The seminal treatment of inten-
tional action within the generative tradition follows from
Gruber (1976) and Jackendoff's (1972) discussion of the Agent
thematic role, defined by Jackendoff as follows:'
The Agent NP is identified by a semantic reading which
attributes to the NP will or volition toward the action
expressed in the sentence (32:1972).
The internal structure of intention is not considered. As
a result, despite the substantive differences between the
Gruber-Jackendoff approach and, for example, Fillmore's Case
Grammar (1968), the early generative approaches do not
significantly differ in their treatment of intentional action.
Ross (1972) argued that numerous syntactic properties of
English can be accounted for by positing an underlying semantic
operator of intentionality, which surfaces in English syntax as
the auxiliary 'do.' However, the conceptual structure of
intention is not an issue.
The issue of whether intentional vs. non-intentional
interpretations for certain verbs are merely cases of
indeterminancy or actual lexical ambiguity (or polysemy) is
addressed in Lakoff (1970a) Catlin & Catlin (1972), and
tangentially in Jackendoff (1972). It is this problem that
Bendix (to appear) wishes to avoid in his discussion of the
Newari system.
The problem of representing these ambiguities via a simple
underlying 'DO' operator leads Dowty (1979) to suggest in a
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footnote a distinction between "intentional/non-intentional" and
"controllable/non-controllable," a nascent version of a distinc-
tion between a representational component and a force component.
However, Dowty's suggestion is not followed up in subse-
quent works on predicate decomposition in Role and Reference
Grammar (Foley and Van Valin 1984; Van Valin 1990), where a
semantically primitive 'DO' operator indicating "volitionality"
(i.e., intentionality) is distinguished from other semantic
primitives 'CAUSE' and 'BECOME.' No attempt is made to
distinguish the representational and force components of
intentional action.
Hill (1969) identifies morphological alternations in
Cupeno that function to indicate degree of volitionality.
Klaiman (1981) shows how volitionality is a semantic parameter
in the determination of subject in Bengali. However, since
neither language appears to exhibit person/discourse role
asymmetries in the marking of volitionality, no explicit
distinction is made between representational and force
components of intention. This is also true for Klaiman's (1988)
insightful cross-linguistic analysis of "control and affected-
ness." In other words, as long as the data does not require the
force and representational domains to be distinguished,
"volition/control/intentional action" are viewed as unitary
concepts.
Two notable exceptions in the literature are Pleines
(1976:48) and Talmy (1976:86), both of whom identify the need
for a "scope of intent" in the underlying semantic repre-
sentation of causation. The concept "scope of intent" captures
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the intuition that with intentional behavior, the force dynamic
is initiated in accordance with a plan; thus, the causal
sequence which may be attributed to the agent is that which
falls under the scope of the plan.
Intentional Action in Lexical Representations
In contrast to his earlier studies, Jackendoff (1985)
explicitly identifies the representational component of inten-
tion. He argues that the semantic properties common to the two
readings of the verb 'persuade' as 'cause X to believe Y' or
'cause X to do Y' follow from the shared semantic properties of
"believe" and "intend" (cf. GivOn 1975; Lakoff 1970b). That is,
in Jackendoff's account, "believe" and "intend" both involve a
semantic operator "REP" (representation), which takes proposi-
tions (states, events, or actions) as arguments. Although the
formal properties of the representation are not important here,
the insight is relevant. For example:
(1) John persuaded Bill that dogs can talk.
(x CAUSE (y REPRESENT (dogs can talk))]
(2) John persuaded Bill to talk to the dog.
[x CAUSE (y REPRESENT {y talk to the dog})]
Example (1) above says that John caused Bill to represent
a state of affairs and adopt a belief state toward it. Example
(2) says that John caused Bill to represent a state of affairs,
and initiate an action which realizes the state of affairs.
Jackendoff also points out that in examples such as (2), the
propositional object of REPRESENT must describe a behavior which
is capable of being performed via the initiated force of an
actor.
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Jackendoff (1987) identifies the force dynamic by dis-
tinguishing a Thematic tier from an Action tier in semantic
representations. In essence, the Thematic tier identifies the
spatial and directional characteristics of an abstract event
schema: Source›Goal, The Action tier identifies the charac-
teristics of human involvement in the event schema: Volition-
ality and affectedness. The multi-leveled representations
capture the insight that NPs can assume more than one thematic
role in the conceptual structure underlying a sentence.
Jackendoff (1987; 1990) goes on to argue that lexical
structures are best viewed as multi-leveled predicate/argument
structures in which:
. . thematic relations are to be reduced to structural
configurations in conceptual structure; the names for them
are just convenient mnemonics for particularly prominent
configurations...the terms Theme, Agent, and so on, are
not primitives of semantic theory. Rather, they are
relational notions defined structurally over conceptual.
structure...(1987:378-79).
Jackendoff's approach follows from earlier work on the
structure of lexical representations by Gruber (1965) and, in
particular, Talmy (1975; 1976; 1985). The central principle in
formulating lexical representations is that of "conflation"
(Talmy 1985): components of conceptual structure are
incorporated into, hence, entailed in lexical semantic
representations. As part of lexical semantic structure, they
come to play a functionally relevant role in the morphosyntactic
properties of that verb.
This view of lexical structure isolates individual
components in conceptual structure rather than appealing to
tacit assumptions about thematic role properties. For example,
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the three English motion verbs "dive," "tumble," and "fall" can
be distinguished in terms of which semantic components are
incorporated as part of the lexical representation. Each verb
contains a motion component [MOVE] and minimally takes one
argument, a thing that moves. A simple representation would
capture this information as follows: fx MOVE). Since it is not
relevant for our concerns, the [MANNER] component which
distinguishes the verbs can be ignored.
On the basis of this shared semantic property we typically
say that they all have "Theme" semantic roles. However, we do
not really need the term, except as a mnemonic, since the con-
cept of "thing that moves" is already incoporated into the
lexical representation as an argument of the [MOVE] predicate.
By conventional interpretations, "dive" entails that the
mover initiate the motion; in this sense, it is analogous to a
Control verb. In contrast, "tumble" does not require such an
interpretation. It allows either an intentional or non-
intentional interpretation. In this respect, it is analogous to
a Fluid verb. Finally, "fall" does not plausibly take an
interpretation in which the mover initiates the motion of
falling; it is analogous to the Non-Control verbs.
The information that "dive" entails a self-initiated
behavior is incorporated as part of the lexical representation;
it is part of what we know once we have learned what "dive"
means. Also, the information which says that the action
involves self-initiated force has a different status in the
lexical representation for "dive" than the same information as
applied to "tumble," where it is only "optionally" interpreted.
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Finally, the self-initiated force is not present at all in the
representation of "fall," and is incompatible with its meaning.
This concept of lexical conflation accounts for the
default values of Control, Non-Control, and Fluid verbs. In
combination with a system of basic predicates, it provides a
coherent model of how individual components are structured into
a complex whole--a lexical representation. In the final section
of this chapter, we will adopt this format and show how it quite
naturally accomodates the distinction between the
representational and force dynamics of intentional action.
Intentional Action in a Cognitive 
Grammar Event Model
For our purposes, the most revealing accounts of event
structure are found in cognitive grammar (Croft 1991; Lakoff
1977; 1987, Langacker 1987;, Talmy 1975; 1976; 1988), and, in
particular, DeLancey's (1981a; 1984a; 1984b; 1985a; 1985b;
1985c, 1986; 1990) work on a cognitive model of event structure
for Lhasa Tibetan.
DeLancey's conceptual model of action and event structure
draws on two important insights from Cognitive Grammar:
1. Linguistically relevant conceptual categories are
grounded in experiential-perceptual categories and transferred
to other domains via image-schematic transformations.
2. Conceptual categories are defined relative to
idealized cognitive models (or prototypes), and graded
extensions of the models.
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In addition, DeLancey proposes that clausal morphosyntax
can be described as a function of an attentional focus mechanism
(Viewpoint) which includes or excludes sub-sections of an
idealized event model (DeLancey 1981).
One especially important insight from DeLancey's model is
his observation that describing an action as intentional
attributes a particular, and unique, viewpoint to the inten-
tional actor. Delancey's model also draws an important
distinction between "onset" (or Source) and "result" (or Goal)
viewpoints. Intention is a component of the onset dynamics. In
particular, an intentional action entails that the actor repre-
sents and initiates the action.'
Combining Delancey's event schema with the two domains of
intentional action outlined above yields an onset dynamic for a
first person intentional action schematically represented as
follows:




Temporal	 Onset 	 Process--->Result
Causal	 Onset 	 Process--->Result
[REPRESENT [INITIATE [STAND UP]]]
The schema captures the intuition that an intentional action
involves self-initiated force and a representation of that self-
initiated force. The behavior described by the verb itself is
represented and initiated. The temporal and causal dynamics of
the event proceed from onset/source to result/goal. The event
itself is a change of position from a source position (sit) to a
goal position (stand).
103
In contrast, the first person perspective of a non-inten-
tional event is necessarily limited to the action/event
properties subsequent to the onset. In other words, the causal
dynamics of "falling down" do not have any onset properties
until it actually begins to be experienced by the first person;
in this sense, it has no causal onset. Although there may be
identifiable causal antecedents, they are expressed outside the
core clause. In other words, Source>Goal relations may be
broken down into causation chains, parts of which are included
or excluded from the event representation and the clause.






[ x FALL DOWN]
In DeLancey's view, event models are cognitive representa-
tions of event/action prototypes in which attention is directed
through the spatial/temporal contour of the action/event. For
example, the prototypical first person transitive event schema





Temporal	 Onset 	 Process 	 >Result
Causal	 Onset 	 Process 	 >Result
[REPRESENT [INITIATE [CAUSE [ RESULT ]]]]
The morphosyntactic realization of different phases of the
event in clause structure follows from the inclusion or
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exclusion of segments of the event within the scope of
attention.
The Newari examples below illustrate how the morphosyntax
can vary as a function of the inclusion or exclusion of sections
of the event chain. Note that the causative suffix VERB-k- /
VERB-k01- has irregular morphophonemics but takes the regular
SET1/SET2 forms.
(3) ji:	 khapa	 cae-k-a
1/ERG door/ABS open-CAUSE-PST/SET1
"I (intentionally) opened the door."





"I unconsciously opened the door."
[x i INITIATE [x i CAUSE [ y OPEN ] ] ]
(5) phOs0:	 khapa	 cae-k01-0
wind/INST door/ABS open-CAUSE-PERF/SET2
"The wind opened the door."





Summary: Representing Intentional Action
In retrospect, with the exception of Pleines (1978), Talmy
(1985), Jackendoff (1985;1987), and DeLancey (1981; 1984; 1985a;
1985b; 1985c, 1986; 1990), analyzing the conceptual structure of
intentionality (or volitionality) has not been considered rele-
vant for the problem of accounting for the relationship between
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semantic roles and grammatical relations or case. Since the
languages used as data did not encode distinctions relevant to
the internal structure of intention, there has been no explicit
distinction between a representational component or "plan-in-
action" and a force dynamic or "initiative-in-action."
The insights from the literature in philosophy, social-
cognitive development and language acquisition, and linguistics
suggest that the conceptual structure of intentional action
includes a representational component (or plan-in-action) plus a
force dynamic (or initiative-in-action).
In conclusion, for an individual to say that his or her
action was intentional entails: (a) there was a mental plan in
which the individual represented the action, 	 (b) there was a
force dynamic in which the individual initiated and guided the
behavior in accordance with the mental representation.
Furthermore, the assertion has a particular morpho-
syntactic and semantic structure. To assert that the action was
intentional is to assert that the actor was representing the
action in the same manner as the clause describes; recall the
case of Oedipus. In other words, as we saw with the case of
"premeditation" in Chapter III, the actor's mental representa-
tion must be commensurate with the semantic representation of
the action clause.
As already noted, this definition further entails that,
for non-first persons, intention may only be inferred via
indirect means. To the extent that actions by non-first persons
exhibit a force dynamic which cannot be directly attributed to
some other antecedent cause, intention may be inferred. What is
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inferred is the existence of a unique mental event type con-
sisting of the representation and initiation of an action, which
our own folk-psychology calls intention. It is expected that
languages and cultures will vary with respect to how they
express the distinction between directly accessed and indirectly
attributed intentionality.
The Semantic Representation of Intention in Newari
Intention is represented via a conceptual structure in
which the "plan-in-action" or representation is distinguished
from the "initiative-in-action" or force dynamic. Distinguish-
ing between these two components in the lexical representation
of Newari verbs captures the important differences between the
three classes of verbs. The distinction is captured by making
three assumptions about the relationship between inflection and
the verb stems.
First, as noted above with the English verbs "dive,"
"tumble," and "fall," lexical structure specifies whether a verb
characterizes the type of action which requires, allows, or is
incompatible with the initiation of force. The way the infor-
mation is represented must distinguish between the three classes
of verbs.
Second, SET1 inflection indicates that the action, as it
is characterized in the verb phrase, was initiated in accordance
with an appropriate mental representation by the person of whom
the action is being predicated. We know from the use of evi-
dentials that the concept of self-initiated force is not part of
the inflectional meaning.
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Third, SET2 is the default form, indicating no attested
relationship between the force dynamic as characterized in the
verb phrase and the representation, i.e., what the actor had in
mind. The lack of an appropriate co-indexing between the force
dynamic and an actor's mental representation can be a function
of three distinct processes:
1. There was no initiation of force to begin with. In
other words, the verb is a Non-Control verb, or a Fluid verb
which has a Non-Control interpretation. In this case, since
there is no self-initiated force, it cannot be matched with a
representation.
2. The force dynamic, as characterized by the verb
phrase, was initiated, but the action was not in accordance with
the appropriate representation. In this case, the verb is a
Control verb, but the clause has evidential disclaimers indi-
cating that the force dynamic was not initiated with that plan
in mind. This case also entails that the Epistemic Source has
authority to confirm that the self-initiated action was not in
accordance with the plan.
3. Evidential and epistemic source properties of the
speech event constrain the direct assertion of intentional
action. Evidential principles prevent the direct assertion that
the force dynamic indicated in the verb phrase was, in fact, in
accordance with a particular mental representation by the person
of whom the action is being predicated. In this case, the actor
and the Epistemic Source are not coreferential; hence, the
evidential authority is absent.
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The Lexical Structure of Control Verbs
Recall that Control verbs describe actions requiring self-
initiated force. With first person subjects, they require SET1
inflection, allowing SET2 inflection only in co-occurrence with
evidential operators. The evidential operators indicate an
action was initiated, but not in accordance with the actor's
representation.
In other words, the force dynamic is conflated in the
semantic representation of the action such that it is entailed
by a use of the verb and cannot be negated by the inflectional
alternation. The selection of an inflectional form for a
Control verb indicates whether or not the force dynamic was, in
fact, initiated in accordance with the appropriate representa-
tion. The conflation of the property of self-initiated force
with the lexical meaning of the verb is represented as follows:
[INITIATE+VERB].
For example, with a Control verb like dan- 'stand up', the
lexical representation describes the basic lexical meaning: some
description of "standing," including some notion of fx MOVE]
plus a manner component, and so on. It also conflates the force
dynamic [INITIATE) as part of the representation:
[INITIATE+MOVE). All this means is that the concept of self-
initiated movement is entailed by any use of the verb dan-
'stand up.'
A lexical representation of an inflected SET1 form
indicates that the self-initiated force was in accordance with
an individual's representation. Furthermore, the individual
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must be the Epistemic Source in the speech event, indicated with
curly brackets (ES i i. The representation below simply identi-
fies the relationship among the three properties which vary
independently of one another: (a) an individual initiates a
movement, (b) the individual mentally represents the action







fESO [xi REPRESENT [xi INITIATE+MOVE] ]
Recall that a SET2 form is appropriate with first persons
only in the presence of evidential operators. In other words,
with Control verbs and first person, SET2 indicates that the
initiated behavior was not in accordance with the representa-
tion. However, SET2 inflection does not obviate the fact that
the action itself requires some initiated force. Thus, with
Control verbs, SET2 indicates only the lack of co-indexing for
the representational component, The combination will always
yield an evidential interpretation in which force is initiated
but without awareness, or mental representation. Moreover, this
reading is only possible when the Epistemic Source can validate
the lack of correspondence between the force and representation.
In example (8) below, the evidential operator mO-caekO 
'unconsciously' indicates that the speaker was not aware of
(i.e., not appropriately representing) the action when it was
performed. However, the action was performed and did require
the initiation of force; there were no other antecedent causal
forces. The representation simply indicates that the Epistemic
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Source is the person who initiated action, but did not have the
appropriate representation.
(8) ji	 m0-caek0	 dan-0	 ka
I/ABS	 NEG-consciously	 stand-PERF/SET2 EMPH
"I unconsciously stood up."
{ES I } [x l REPRESENT [xi INITIATE+MOVE] ]
When the actor is not the Epistemic Source, the evidential
constraint makes it impossible to co-index the representation
and the force dynamic. Whether or not the actor did in fact act
in accordance with his/her plan is underdetermined, although the
preferred inference with a Control verb is that the action was




{ESk } [xi/j REPRESENT [x i INITIATE-WOVE] ]
Finally, in contexts of reported speech SET1 forms func-
tion logophorically. In these cases, the internal Epistemic
Source {ES i } is assigned by the reported speech operator, either
the evidential h0 or the verb dh0(1)- 'speak, say' and has scope
over the representational component. The external Epistemic
Source {ES J } is a function of the situated (rather than
reported) speech event.
(10) 14'6:	 ji	 dan-a	 dhOka: dhal-O
3/ABS 1/ABS stand-PST/SET1 COMP	 say-PERF/SET2
"S/he i said, 'I i stood up.'5
(11) dan-a	 hO:
stand-PST/SET1 EVD
"(S/he i said) s/he i stood up."
{ESO (	 [xi REPRESENT (x i INITIATE+MOVE] ] ]
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The Lexical Structure of Fluid Verbs
Recall that Fluid verbs are those which freely take SET1
or SET2 inflection, without requiring that SET2 inflection co-
occur with evidential operators. In addition, the use of SET2
with a Fluid verb indicates that the speaker did not initiate
the action at all. Thus, unlike Control verbs, Fluid verbs do
not have self-initiated force as a default value. With only a
few exceptions, they represent "roll," "touch" or "perception"
type verbs with alternative interpretations for the causal
antecedent of the action.
Unlike Control verbs, the lexical representation of a
Fluid verb like dun- 'submerge, sink' must minimally include
the [x MOVE) component and the fact that self-initiated force
components are "optional." This "optionality" is problematic.
For Control verbs, the SET1/SET2 inflection indicates
whether the force dynamic characterized by the verb phrase is
attributed to some individual. This indexing is independent of
the initiation of force, which is conflated, hence entailed, as
part of the lexical meaning of the verb. This account, however,
cannot work with Fluid verbs since the lexical meaning of a
Fluid verb does not include the force component independent of
inflection. With Fluid verbs, inflection itself indicates both
components of intention: representation and force.
Thus, there is a problem as to where the semantics of the
force dynamic belong. On the one hand, the force dynamic cannot
be a property of SET1 inflection because Control verbs are
interpreted as having a force component independently of
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inflection. This is compelling evidence that the force
component is part of the lexical meaning of the Control verb,
rather than inflection,
On the other hand, the interpretation of SET1/SET2 with
Fluid verbs suggests that both the representational and force
components are indicated by inflection. The presence or absence
of SET1/SET2 inflection correlates directly with the interpre-
tation of the presence or absence of the force dynamic and
representation.
The problem, of course, arises so long as it is desirable
to distinguish the semantic properties of lexical stems from the
semantic properties of inflections, and describe the meaning of
the inflected stem in terms of the meanings of the parts. This
compositionality principle is basic and should not be abandoned
if possible. The most plausible alternative, then, is that the
force dynamic is not represented by SETT, inflection, even with
Fluid verbs.
There is an argument in favor of this approach. Consider
the two examples below with the Fluid verb nap0-1a(t)- 'meet'
and the pro-forms ya(t)- 'do' and iu(1)- 'become.' In example
(12), the pro-form lu(1)- 'become' indicates a non-initiated
event.
(12)	 manoj-O	 syam-yatO ni-k0	 g011i-e
Manoj-ERG Syam-DAT two-times alley-LOC
nap0==lat-0
meet-PERF/SET2
"Manoj ran into Syam twice in the alley."
jimi pasa-ya	 nO Othe he jul-O
1/GEN friend-GEN also like EMPH become-PERF/SET2
"And it happened to my friend too."
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In contrast, the pro-form va(t)- 'do' in example (13)
indicates that the action was self-initiated.
(13)	 manoj-O syam-yatO ni-kO 	 g011i-e
Manoj-ERG Syam-DAT two-times alley-LOC
nap0=lat-0
meet-PERF/SET2
"Manoj met him twice in the alley."
jimi pasts:	 nO Othe he yat-O
1/GEN friend/ERG also like EMPH do-PERF/SET2
"And my friend did likewise."
Note that the contrast with the pro-forms is functionally
independent of SET2 inflection, which occurs in both examples.
In other words, the Fluid verb, napO=la(t)-'meet' admits
alternate interpretations of the self-initiated force based on
lexical, morphological, or contextual cues; inflection appears
to be only one of the possible cues.
The interpretation of the force dynamic with Fluid verbs
can be independent of whether the inflectional form is SET1 or
SET2. In short, with Fluid verbs, the presence of SET1
inflection entails both the representation and the force
components; however, the absence of SET1 entails only the
absence of the representational component. This suggests that
the semantic relationship between the representation and force
components is not bi-directional. Initiation of force does not
entail the appropriate representation; however, when SET1
indicates the appropriate representation, it automatically
entails self-initiated force.
The source of this entailment is the conceptual structure
of intentional action. Asserting the existence of the plan-in-
action with SETT inflection entails the initiative-in-action,
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but not the reverse. In more semantic/syntactic terms, another
way of putting it would be to say that SET1 inflection has two
requirements when it combines with an inflected verb. First,
the verb stem must (potentially) have the property of self-
initiated force; in this sense, SET1 forms subcategorize for a
Control verb. Second, the (subject) NP, which is external to
the verb phrase, must be the Epistemic Source. When SETT
inflection combines with a VP, it attributes the appropriate
representation to the individual referred to by the (subject)
NP, indicating that self-initiated force was in accordance with
a representation.
In the case of Control verbs, the force component is
already conflated as part of the lexical representation of
default values. Hence, the SET1 subcategorization requirements
and the VP are are redundant.
In contrast, Fluid verbs have no such default values.
Lacking any specification, they are still compatible with SET1
inflection; they are simply unspecified. Thus, when SET1 com-
bines with a Fluid verb, it indicates the actor had a repre-
sentation of the action. The action/event schema for inten-
tional action motivates the entailment that the force component
is entailed by any assertion of the representation a force
dynamic. This accounts for the fact the interpretation of
Control and Fluid verbs is identical when the verb is inflected
with a SET1 form. The inflected stem assumes the properties of
both stem and inflection, so long as they are not incompatible.
This process is essentially the "unification" function argued
for in Barlow (1988) and Pollard & Sag (1988).
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At the same time, this view also accounts for the differ-
ence between Control and Fluid verbs with SET2 forms: Control
verbs get an evidential interpretation of SET2 inflection (force
but no representation) and Fluid verbs get a non-initiated force
interpretation with SET2 (no force and no representation).
Moreover, it follows that in contrast with Control verbs,
the use of SET2 forms with Fluid verbs does not require an
evidential operator, and indicates that the speaker did not
represent or initiate the action. In other words, with Fluid
verbs, "optional" means that the use of SET1 to index the
representation component entails the presence of the force
dynamic in the interpretation of the action/event token. SET2
inflection indicates that there was no indexing of the repre-
sentational component; consequently, since there is no force
component entailed by the lexical stem, the force component is
not interpreted.
Fluid verbs with SET1 and SET2 inflection are represented
as follows: brackets ( ) are used to indicate the "optional"
status of the force dyamic. Again the semantics of the verb
dun- 'submerge' are simplified by identifying a basic motion
component [x MOVE].
(14) ji	 10kh0-e	 dun-a
1/ABS	 water-LOC submerge-PST/SET1
"I deliberately submerged in the water."
{ E S i } [xi REPRESENT [x i (INITIATE+)MOVE]]
(15) ji	 lOkhO-e	 dun-0
1/ABS	 water-LOC submerge-PERF/SET2
"I sank in the water."
{ES i } [x j REPRESENT [x i ( )MOVE]]
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The Lexical Structure of Non-Control Verbs
Finally, recall that Non-Control verbs are those which
admit only SET2 inflection. They are semantically incompatible
with the notion of self-initiated force and SET1 inflection.
Thus, for a Non-Control verb like then- 'arrive', the concept of
self-initiated cannot be part of lexical structure; hence, there





{ES i } [x l REPRESENT [x i MOVE]]
Summary: Verb Types and Inflection
The interpretation of SET1/SET2 inflection with Control
verbs versus Fluid verbs reveals an important distinction in
their lexical representations; also, it provides additional
evidence for the distinction between the representational and
force domains. It also reveals the functional differentation of
stems and inflection.
Control verbs describe actions which require the self-
initiation of force. The meaning described by the lexical stem
is conflated with the property of self-initiation. In these
cases, inflection indexes the presence or absence of the
representational component; the force component is already
entailed by the lexical item.
In contrast, Fluid verbs describe actions which can be
viewed from alternate perspectives, without or without a force
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dynamic. Inflection indicates the presence or absence of the
representational component. Indexing of the representational
component with SETI entails the presence of the force dynamic.
Consequently, the full interpretation of intentionality with
Fluid verbs will vary as a function of inflection.
Finally, Non-Control verbs describe events in which no
initiation of force is possible. In these cases, SET2
inflection indicates that no appropriate representation is
possible since there is no force dynamic.
The structure of the bare and inflected verbs is sum-
marized below using the contrast among the three verb types in a
first person clause.
Lexical stems: MOVE-
A) Control	 [x INITIATE+MOVE]
B) Fluid	 [x (INITIATE)+MOVE]
B)	 Fluid	 [x	 )+MOVE]
C) Non-Control	 fx MOVE]
SET1 inflection: MOVE-a 
A) Control	 {ESi} (x i REPRESENT [x i INITIATE+MOVE]}
B) Fluid	 {ESi} (xi REPRESENT [x i (INITIATE+)MOVE]]
SET2 inflection: MOVE-0
A) Control	 {ESi} [xj REPRESENT [x i INITIATE+MOVE]]
B) Fluid	 fESil fx j REPRESENT fxi (	 ) MOVE]]
C) Non-Control (ES i } [x j REPRESENT fxi MOVE]]
This chapter has established a conceptual model of inten-
tional action, and argued for a form of lexical representation
that accounts for the interaction of the three verb classes with
SET1/SET2 inflection. The lexical meaning for a given verb
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includes, along with other semantic properties, the information
which identifies whether it conflates self-initiated force as
part of the meaning.
In contrast, the lexical information for SET1 inflectional
forms includes, along with a tense/aspect value, an agreement
value (+REPRESENTATION], much like any other type of subject
agreement morphology (cf. Barlow 1988; Barlow and Fletcher 1988;
Pollard and Sag 1988). In more canonical agreement systems,
subject agreement morphology coindexes a VP with a subject NP,
where a specific set of semantic properties (e.g., person,
number, gender) of the subject NP co-varies with semantic values
indexed by verb morphology.
Although the parameters of the Newari SET1 form are some-
what different, the functional role of Newari inflection is
similar to agreement morphology:
In the morphosyntax, it coindexes a VP and a (subject/
actor) NP, which is external to the VP. In the semantic/
pragmatic domain, it indexes certain semantic properties of the
(subject/actor) NP. That is, the individual referred to by the
(subject/actor) NP has the appropriate representation of self-
initiated force and is in the discourse role of epistemic
source.
Thus, the schematic structure is mapped onto the
morphosyntax as follows:
{ES i } [xi REPRESENT [x i INITIATE [ xi MOVE ] ] ]
[ {ES} [ [ INITIATE+MOVE ] vp -REPRESENT ] flifi 1,





'The term "force dynamics" comes from Talmy (1988) where
he argues persuasively for the subsumption of "causality" under
the larger conceptual domain of force dynamics. Talmy's concept
of force dynamics includes self-agentive (self-initiated) motion
as well as more complex notions like "let" and "prevent." I use
the term "mental representation" as a cover term for the unique
mental state that represents and accompanies a self-initiated
behavior (cf. Brand 1981).
'As we already saw in Chapter III, the issue of whether the
relevant concept in Newari requires some notion of "conscious"
vs. "unconscious" is problematic; how do we define the
opposition in the first place?
3Note here that the issue of (moral) responsibility is
distinct from intention. That is, it is possible that the
person did not intentionally break the string, but by inten-
tionally pulling on it is responsible for breaking the string.
In the actual realization of the Newari SET1/SET2 system in the
on-going construction of social/cultural life, the degree to
which the attribution of responsibility is conflated with the
attribution of intention is unclear. The importance of this
conflation should not be discounted, but the ethnographic data
required to study it is far beyond the scope of the work here.
4The term "initiative" is not used here to mean wants,
desires, or ambitions of the actor but rather the motivating or
animating force itself. As with the term "plan-in-action", the
term "initiative-in-action" means that the force is constitutive
of the intentional action.
5There are two other problems, orthogonal to our own
concerns:
First, there must be a causal account for how a mental
event or component of "mind" can causally affect the "body" and
initiate the performance of action. In other words, as
typically conceived, propositional attitudes lack the
appropriate causal properties for explaining behavior,
especially "intentional action".
Second, even if we assume some causal property attributed
to the mental event, is the mental event itself to be given a
causal explanation? In other words, if some specialized mental
act like "willing" or "volition" causes "action", then what
causes "willing" or "volition"? If mental events themselves have
no causal explanation, then we have simply pushed the causation
question back one step. It we say that the mental events are
themselves caused by some prior mental event, then we are in
danger of falling into an infinite regress. For an argument
which undermines the problem of infinite regress or "intentional
intending," see Brand (1970).
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6Note here that volition is "attributed" to the Agent. For
a semanticist as insightful as Jackendoff, this is clearly a
hedge. As we have seen, "attribution" is a term applicable for
non-first person statements, but not for first person state-
ments, in which intention is directly accessible. Thus, the use
of the term "attribution" suggests that Jackendoff is only
considering the non-first person view.
'Note that Vendler's aspectual categories (Vendler 1967;
Dowty 1979; Van Valin 1990) "state", "activity", "accomplish-
ment," and "achievment" are all defined relative to an event's
duration and result, to the exclusion of onset properties. For
this reason alone, they are not likely to be able to accommodate
the more complex notion of intentional action.
'What I have identifed as the two components of intentional
action is termed "act of volition" by DeLancey (1990:302).
9This example is extremely awkward and is intended merely
to illustrate the full periphrase with the verb dhO(11- 'say,
speak'.
100n the formal machinery for characterizing belief states




As we noted in Chapter I, the concept of intentional
action is part of the agent thematic role in the canonical
transitive clause. If this is indeed the case for Newari, then
it follows that the distinction among Control, Non-Control, and
Fluid verbs will have parallel morphosyntactic reflexes speci-
fically related to the mapping between thematic roles and the
morphosyntax of grammatical relations or case. This chapter
examines the distribution of case marking in relation to the
lexical properties of Newari verbs.
The data show that the mapping relations between the
conceptual structure of intentional action and the inflectional
system do not directly interact with the mappings between
thematic roles and case marking. Instead, the case assigning
properties are a function of mappings between a conceptual
Source>Trajector>Goal schema and argument structures, inde-
pendent of the grammaticalized force dynamics of intentional
action and SET1/SET2 inflection. This raises important ques-
tions about the functional architecture of the semantics/syntax
mappings. To see why this non-interaction between inflection
and case is important, it may be useful to review briefly the
claims thus far.
Chapters III and IV argued that the conceptual structure
of intentional action consists of two domains: a
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representational domain and a force dynamic. The notion of a
self-initiated force is incorporated as part of the lexical
structure of Control verbs; it is unspecified for Fluid verbs
and incompatible with the meaning of Non-Control verbs.
In semantic terms, the occurrence of SET1 inflection
expresses the fact that the force dynamic was in accordance with
the actor's representation or plan. In other words, the SETT
form indicates that the action was intentional. In syntactic
terms, SET1/SET2 inflection is a function which co-indexes a
predicate phrase (the verb phrase) and an NP external to the
predicate phrase (subject). As part of the discourse function
of finite inflection, SET1 indexes the tense/aspect grounding as
well as the evidential constrainsts in the speech event.
Central to the characterization thus far is the idea that
the force dynamic has a different status in the lexical struc-
ture of each of the three verb types. The distribution of
inflectional forms relative to the verb stems is determined, in
part, by the three way lexical categorization: Control, Fluid,
Non-Control. The three way distribution is semantically moti-
vated, but grammaticalized. For example, verbs like nhil-
'laugh' and khwo(1)- 'cry, weep' might easily be given non-
intentional interpretations and be considered Fluid or even Non-
Control verbs. Yet, they are regularly treated as Control
verbs. Similarly, there is no inherent reason why Non-Control
verbs such then- 'arrive' and Nra- 'win, succeed' couldn't
potentially admit intentional interpretations, and act like
Fluid verbs. Instead, as shown in Chapters III and IV, there
are three distributional patterns which must be represented as
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part of lexical information for stems and inflections. This
lexical information must be represented in such a way as to
account for the distribution and markedness properties of finite
inflection.
The conceptual structure for intentional action, including
the evidential properties, underlies the behavior of verbs and
inflections in the grammar. This schema integrates information
from the lexical properties of verb classes and finite inflec-
tional forms, combined with the speech act and evidential role
of the referents in a discourse interaction. The schema con-
structs notions like "intentional action" and "epistemic
source"; however, the actual distribution of lexical and
inflectional tokens must be a function of the relevant infor-
mation represented in lexical items. In other words, to be
functional in a morphosyntactic system, the conceptual
properties must be grammaticalized.
As noted in the introduction in Chapter I, our ability to
talk about events includes more than just an ability to distin-
guish between self-initiated or non-initiated force dynamics.
Other important properties of events are distinguished and
expressed in the grammatical behavior of verbs and their
arguments.
For example, the inherent meaning of a verb also includes
a schema for characterizing the roles of participants in the
events and the syntactically relevant distinctions among these
roles. This would include distinctions which are relevant
whenever the verb appears as the lexical head in a clausal
syntactic environment. These distinctions determine, in part,
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the morphological shape of the noun phrases that appear in argu-
ment positions specified by the verbs inherent meaning. In
other words, these conceptual and syntactic properties underlie
the assignment of case roles to NPs.
A strict iconicity or structure preservation approach to
the mapping between conceptual structure and the morphosyntax
would predict that: (a) since the concept of intentional action
is subsumed within the larger concept of an agent, and (b) the
agent role is subsumed with the transitive mapping schema for
thematic roles and case, (c) the SET1/SET2 inflection reflexes
of intentional action should also be subsumed within the domain
of thematic roles and case.
This chapter examines whether this is, in fact, true. In
other words, this chapter investigates whether the conceptual
structure of intentional action and the lexical structures
underlying the three verb types are in any way related to the
mappings between thematic roles and the morphosyntax of case in
simple clauses.
Newari	 Marking
In Newari, case is realized morphologically via nominal
suffixes. In addition to the zero marked Absolutive case, the
morphologically marked cases are: Ergative -n0, Dative -(va)tO,
Associative, or Animate Locative -(va)ke, Inanimate Locative -er
Ablative/Instrumental -n0 and Genitive -va. The full range of
distributions for case forms has been outlined in several
excellent studies, especially Ktilver (1976) and Hale and
Manandhar (1980). The goal here is to examine the co-occurence
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relationship between the three verb classes and the distribution
of case forms.
Core Case and the Source>Goal Schema
Case syncretism in Newari provides evidence for a con-
ceptual schema which underlies the core cases of Ergative,
Absolutive, and Dative (Hale and Manandhar 1980; KOlver 1976).
The case suffix -110 marks an abstract Source category, including
locative source, causal sources such as instrumentals, transi-
tive agents, and causal subordinate clauses. In contrast, the
suffix -(ya)tO marks an abstract Goal category, including such
traditional Dative functions as recipients, benefactives,
animate patients, and experiencers, as well as purpose infini-
tive clauses. The unmarked (Absolutive) form occurs with
canonical themes or inanimate patients. Prototypically, they
are objects or individuals which undergo motion or change of
state relative to some Source/Goal trajectory. I will use the
term "trajector" when referring to the conceptual schema; I will
use the term "theme" as a simple mnemonic along the same lines
as agent, recipient, etc.
The Abstract Category of Source: -nO
In example (1), the suffix -110 marks directional Source,
or Ablative; the Absolutive stem is hiti 'water tap' (nasali-
zation plus vowel lengthening occurs as a regular allomorph).
(1)
	 10	 hitl:	 pihd=wo1-0
water/ABS tap/ABL out=come-PERF/SET2
"Water came out of/from the tap."
The suffix -n0 can mark Instrumental functions.
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(2) lhat-O	 nO-e	 jiu	 la
hands-INST eat-INF good/IMPERF/SET2 Q
"Is it OK to eat with (my) hands?"
(3) cups:	 ya-e	 jiu	 la
knife/INST do-INF good/IMPERF/SET2 	 Q
"Is it OK to do it with a knife?"
The suffix also marks transitive agents with Ergative case; the
first person Absolutive form of the pronoun is ji.
(4) ji:	 wo-yatO	 dheba	 biy-a
1/ERG 3-DAT	 money/ABS give-PERF/SET2
"I gave him/her money."
The suffix also marks transitive cognizers with Ergative case, a
problematic category of Non-Control verbs assigning Ergative




Finally, it marks Causal subordinate clauses (cf. Genetti
1986; to appear; Hargreaves 1984). In the example below,
nasalization marks the causal interpretation for the
subordinator -cull.
(6) bhukhae bwo:-gull:	 ji	 piha-won-a
earthquake-SUBORD/CAUS 1/ABS out-go-PST/SET1
"Because of the earthquake, I went outside."
The Abstract Category of Goal: -(ya)tO
The suffix -(yaltO marks a variety of Goal functions. The
Goal category includes Recipients of transfer verbs:
(7) laxml:	 ji-tO dheba	 bil-O
Laxmi/ERG 1-DAT money/ABS give-PERF/SET2
"Laxmi gave me money."
and Benefactives:
(8) ji:	 laxmi-yatO ja	 thuy-a
1/ERG Laxmi-DAT rice/ABS cook-PST/SET1
"I cooked rice for Laxmi."
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Experiencers are also marked as Goal. The Goal function can be
overt as in the example with the verb wo(1)-  'come' below:
(10) ji-tO	 jor	 wol-O
1-DAT	 fever/ABS come-PERF/SET2




Or implicit in the case of sensory verbs:
(12) ji-tO	 sekO	 cal-0
1-DAT	 cold/ABS	 feel-PERF/SET2




Finally, Purpose clauses are marked as Goal:
(14) Oela	 ka-e-t0
liquor/ABS get-INF-DAT
"To make eila (liquor),
mi	 du-e	 ma:
fire/ABS burn-INF need/IMPERF/SET2
you have to distill (it)."
(15) ja	 nO-e-tO	 won-a
rice/ABS eat-INF-DAT go-PST/SET1
"(I) went in order to eat."
Summary: Source: -n0 and Goal: -(va)tO
Newari case marking syncretism manifests a Source/Goal
schema. Spatial and causal dynamics are represented as pro-
ceeding from Source (Agents, Cognizers, Instruments, Ablatives)
to Goal (Recipients, Benefactives, Patients, Experiencers).
Causal antecedent events are marked as Source and purposeful
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Causal Subordinate 	 Purpose Subordinate
Given this case syncretism, consider again the canonical
transfer schema for a verb such as bi(1)- 'give.' Clauses with
the three argument verb maximally differentiate the three core
argument roles. In the canonical mapping, the Theme/Trajector
(object which undergoes motion or change) is marked with the
zero Absolutive form. It moves from Ergative/Source to the
Dative/Goal.
As noted in Chapter IV, the notion of Theme here is simply
a convenient mnemonic for argument positions in lexical
decomposition (Jackendoff 1983; 1990):2
[Theme MOVE]
[Theme BECOME]
Agent is prototypically found in two argument predicates like:
[Agent, [ Event ] CAUSE ]
[Agent, [ Event ] DO ]
Dative/Goal is typically the argument of a complex predicate
with some kind of directional meaning:
[ [Goal TO], Theme MOVE ]
This is informally illustrated below:
(16)	 jI:	 laxmi-yatO	 dheba	 biy-a
1/ERG Laxmi-DAT	 money/ABS give-PST/SET1





Source 	 >Trajector 	 >Goal
(x)Agent---->(y)Theme 	 >(z)Recipient
LEXICAL STRUCTURE
t x	 [ [ z	 TO ] y	 movE] CAUSE]
[ Agent [ [ Goal	 ] Theme GIVE ] ]
CASE ASSIGNMENT
(x)ERG (z)DAT (y)ABS GIVE
The idea here is simply that generalizations about
predicate types identify the prototypical roles that event
participants assume relative to one another in a Source/Goal
schema. Generalizations about predicate types allow the use of
mnemonics such as agent, theme, recipient, etc. In the mapping
relations between the schematic structures and the case system,
we are interested in three formally marked categories for core
arguments: Ergative, Absolutive, and Dative. These three.
formally marked categories correspond in the canonical ditran-
sitive clause to Source, Trajector, and Goal, respectively. For
now, it is possible to assume that the mappings are isomorphic,
i.e., structure preserving. That is, distinctions at the
schematic level (Source>Trajector>Goal) are directly preserved
in the morphosyntactic distinctions in case forms (Ergative,
Absolutive, Dative). There will be reasons to question this
below.3
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Case, Valency, and Verb Types 
Single Argument Verbs
















"I unintentionally rolled over."
Single argument Non-Control verbs also assign Absolutive:
[ABS] [VERB]






Case assignment with single argument verbs shows that the
concept of a self-initiating force, while morphosyntatically
relevant for the determination of SET1/SET2 inflection, is not
morphosyntactically relevant for the assignment of Absolutive
case. The case system does not realize any "active/stative" or
"split-S" distribution, although the "active/stative" pattern is
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covert in the semantics of the force dynamic and the distinction
between Control and Non-Control verbs.
However, there is another type of split distribution for
intransitive case marking. There is a set of verbs which assign
the Dative case to their single argument. Consistent with the
idea that the Dative case marks an abstract Goal category,









The contrast between Absolutive and Dative intransitives
reveals two predicate types within the Non-Control class. That
is, there is one type of Non-Control verb which assigns the
single argument Absolutive case; the other type of Non-Control
verb assigns the single argument Dative case.
In conceptual terms, all of the single argument verbs
which take a Dative argument involve internal subjective
experiences in which the individual experiences some internal
sensation or emotional state. In other words, there is some
feature of conceptual structure common to all Dative intran-
sitives verbs which identifies the subjective experience as an
instance of the abstract Goal category, distinct from the
unmarked Theme/Absolutive category. The transparency of the
directional metaphor can be seen in the example below, repeated
from (10) above.
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(25) ji-t0	 jor	 wo1-0
1-DAT	 fever come-PERF/SET2
"I've got a fever."
For mnemonic purposes, we can call this the "experiencer"
feature of conceptual structure. Note also that this semantic
feature is, in part, lexically specific; all Dative intran-
sitives involve "experiencers," but not all "experiencers" are
Dative intransitives.
There is a small class of two verbs which take zero
morphology on both nominals. This class includes the equative
verb khO(t)- 'be/be.true' and the inchoative verb lu(1)- 
'become.' Both verbs share the same morphosyntactic property of
taking predicate-like nominals which are not assigned case.
[ABS] [-O] [VERB]
(26) ji	 sl:kO:mi khO:
1/ABS	 carpenter be/IMPERF/SET2
"1 am a carpenter."
Whereas the equative verb kh0(t)- 'be/be.true' is strictly
a Non-Control verb, the verb lu(1)- 'become' can take SET1 or
SET2 marking depending on the interpretation of intention.
Lacking any motion or body position semantics that typically go
with Newari Fluid verbs, it is an unusual Fluid verb.
[ABS] [-O] [(	 )+VERB]
(27) ji	 dOktO jul-O
1/ABS doctor become-PERF/SET2
"I became a doctor."
[ABS) [-0] f(INITIATE)+VERB]
(28) ji	 dOktOr juy-a
1/ABS doctor become-PST/SET1
"I (intentionally) became a doctor."
It is noteworthy that this class of verbs does have a
Fluid member; the evidence clearly shows that the interpretation
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of intentional action cannot be a function of the relationship
between thematic roles and case marking.
Two Argument Dative Verbs
There is also a class of two argument verbs which assign
Dative and Absolutive marking. These also involve the experi-
encer property seen with the Dative intransitives. In these
cases, however, there is an unmarked Absolutive argument. As
noted above, these examples reveal the transparency of the
directional metaphor: the experience of a sensation or internal
mental state is the endpoint or locative goal of a directional
schema.
(DAT) [ABS] [VERB]
(29) ji-t0	 g h0	 cal-0
1-DAT	 disgust	 feel-PERF/SET2
"I felt disgusted/repulsed."
(30) ji-t0	 musya	 yO:
1-DAT	 soy beans be.pleasant/IMPERF/SET2
"I like (fried) soybeans."
Ergative Case and Control Verbs
There are a few two argument verbs in which Absolutive and
Ergative case marking vary relative to the pragmatics of agent
focus. They are Control verbs and the Absolutive/Ergative
alternation occurs independently of inflection.5
(31) ji(-)	 pyakhO	 lhuy-a
1/ABS(ERG)	 dance/drama	 dance-PST/SET1
"I danced."
(32) ji(-)	 me	 hal-a
1/ABS(ERG)	 song sing-PST/SET1
"I sang a song/songs."
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The canonical transitive clause has an Ergative subject
and is a Control verb.
[ERG] JABS] [INITIATE+VERB]
(33) ji:	 la	 tyan-a
1/ERG meat	 mince-PST/SET1
"I minced the meat."
In a few cases, Control intransitive verbs can become
transitive. The Locative role is marked with the Absolutive
case rather than the Locative case. The alternations between an
oblique and core grammatical role affect the occurrence of
Ergative case, but are irrelevant for determining SET1/SET2
inflection.
(34) ji	 sima-e	 gOy-a
1/ABS tree-LOC climb-PST/SET1
"I climbed into the tree."
(35) ji:	 sima	 gOy-a
1/ERG tree/ABS climb-PST/SET1




(37) ji	 p0:khal-e	 tin=nhuy-a
1/ABS wall-LOC	 jump-PST/SETT
"I jumped onto the wall."
(38) ji:	 pO:kha:	 tin=nhuy-a
1/ERG wall/ABS jump-PST/SET1
"I jumped the wall."
In canonical transitive clauses, inanimate Theme/Patients
are marked Absolutive.
(39) jI:	 jya	 yan-a
1/ERG work/ABS do-PST/SET1
"I did (some) work"
(40) ji:	 sOphu:	 bon-a
1/ERG book/ABS read-PST/SETS.
"I read a book."
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With certain verbs taking inanimate Patients, either
Absolutive or Locative marking is possible. Again, the case
marking alternation does not affect SET1/SET2 inflection (cf.
Hale & Manandhar 1980; Langacker 1986).
(41) ch0: cae lasa	 day-a-gu
2/ERG why mattress/ABS beat-PST/SET1-NOM
"Why did you beat the mattress?"
(42) chO: cae lasa-e	 day-a-gu
2/ERG why mattress-LOC beat-PST/SET1-NOM
"Why did you beat on the mattress?"
In two argument clauses with an Ergative argument and a
Control verb, an animate Theme/Patient can be marked with the
Absolutive or Dative. Dative marking has a variety of semantic
and pragmatic nuances; typically Dative marking indicates
greater affectedness and/or discourse saliency of the Patient.
[ERG] [DAT] [INITIATE+VERB]
(43) jI:	 kha	 jon-a
1/ERG chicken/ABS	 grab-PST/SET1
"I picked up/held the chicken."
(44) jI:	 kha-yatO	 jon-a
1/ERG chicken-DAT	 grab/hold-PST/SET1
"I seized/grabbed the chicken."
(45) ji:	 pasa	 swoy-a
1/ERG friend/ABS	 watch-PST/SET1
"I watched (my) friend."
(46) ji:	 pasa-yatO	 swoy-a
1/ERG friend-DAT	 watch-PST/SET1
"I watched/observed (my) friend."
(47) j1:	 s010	 (40y-a
1/ERG horse/ABS climb-PST/SETT.
"I mounted the horse."
(48) jI:	 s010-yatO gOy-a
1/ERG horse-DAT climb/ride-PST/SETT
"I rode the horse."
A few verbs which entail a high degree of affectedness
require Dative marking when the Theme/Patient is animate.
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(49)	 chO: cae mOca-yatO day-a-gu
2/ERG why child-DAT beat-PST/SET1-NOM
"Why did you hit the child?"
(50)??	 chO: cae mOca	 day-a-gu
2/ERG why child/ABS beat-PST/SET1-NOM
To the extent that intentional action and the SET1/SET2
alternation are not involved with case marking, the case
alternations between Absolutive and Dative marking on Patients
is not of primary concern here. The principles which govern the
Dative/Absolutive alternation are consistent with the principles
of object affectedness and referential saliency in the tran-
sitive prototype (Hopper & Thompson 1980; Lakoff 1977).
Recall that it is in the maximally differentiated event
frames that the canonical values for the case forms are evident
relative to the Source/Goal schema. The ditransitive frame is
given below:
[ERG] [DAT] [ABS] [INITIATES-VERB]
(51)	 jI:	 tara-yatO bona=pOu	 ken-a
1/ERG Tara-DAT invitation/ABS show-PST/SET1
"I showed the invitation to Tara."
Ergative Case with Fluid and
Non-Control Verbs
Despite the canonical alignment of causal Source
(Ergative) and self-initiated force (with SET1 inflection), the
concept of self-initiated force is not morphosyntactically
relevant for the determination of Ergative case in Newari. The
most obvious evidence comes from transitive Fluid verbs allowing
either SET1 or SET2 inflection. They do not show adjustments in
case marking relative to the Fluid interpretations.
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[ERG] [ABS] [(INITIATE)+VERB]
(52) ji:	 ja	 thiy-a
1/ERG rice/ABS	 touch-PST/SET1
"I (intentionally) touched the rice."
[ERG] [ABS] [(	 )+VERB]
(53) ji:	 ja	 thil-O
1/ERG rice/ABS	 touch-PERF/SET2
"I (unintentionally) touched the rice."
As with other transitive verbs assigning Ergative case,
animate Patients can just as well be construed as Goals and take
Dative marking.
[ERG) [DAT] [(INITIATE)+VERB]
(54) jI:	 wo-yatO	 thwan-a
I/ERG 3-DAT	 bump w/foot-PST/SET1
"I (intentionally) kicked him/her."
[ERG] [DAT] [(	 )+VERB]
(55) ji:	 wo-yatO	 thwat-O
1/ERG 3-DAT	 bump w/foot-PERF/SET2
"I (unintentionally) bumped him/her."
In other words, in simple clauses, the semantic notion of
causal source and the syntactic notion of transitive valency are
the two primary determinants of Ergative case in Newari, not the
notion of self-initiated force. In contrast, the notion of
self-initiated force underlies the Control, Non-Control, Fluid
distinction. Varying independently of one another, the systems
do not interact.
Further evidence comes from a class of transitive Non-
Control verbs which subcategorize for Ergative case marking.
They categorially take SET2 inflection and Ergative case. The
verbs are primarily psych/cognition verbs, e.g., si(1)- 'know',
thu(1)- 'realize, understand', mhOn- 'dream', lumOn-
'remember'and lwOmOn- 'forget.' The Ergative Non-Control verbs
138
all refer to some type of mental activity (in contrast to both
physical activity and physical sensation) and hence will be
referred to as the class of cognition verbs.
As an example, the verb thu(1)- 'realize, understand'
requires both Ergative and SET2 inflection, allowing no other
combination of case and inflection.
[ERG] [ABS] [VERB]
(56)	 jI:	 wo-ya-gu	 khO	 thul-0
1/ERG 3-GEN-ATR matter understand-PERF/SET2
"I understand his point."
jI:	 wo-ya-gu khO	 thuy-a
1/ERG 3-GEN-ATR matter understand-PST/SET1
ji	 wo-ya-gu khO	 thul-0
1/ABS 3-GEN-ATR matter understand-PERF/SET2
jii-t0 wo-ya--gu khO 	 thul-0
1-DAT 3-GEN-ATR matter understand-PERF/SET2
Summary: Conceptual Structure 
and the Morphosyntax 
In Chapter I, it was noted that both cognitive-functional
and formal theories propose some structure-preserving principle
for the mapping between the conceptual structure of an event and
the argument structure of the verb which expresses that event.
Thus far, the data show that the lexical structure of the
Newari verb has two distinct systems for mapping between con-
ceptual structure and the morphosyntax. In one system, the
conceptual structure of intentional action, specifically the
force dynamic, underlies the distinction between Control, Fluid,
and Non-Control verbs, and the distributional possibilities of
SET1/SET2 inflection with verb stems. In another system, the
Source>Trajector>Goal schema and argument structure determine
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the distribution of case forms, (Ergative, Absolutive, Dative)
in simple clauses.
The two systems do not appear to interact, except in one
sense: Goal and self-initiated force are incompatible. Both
Ergative/Source and Absolutive/Trajector occur with all three
classes of verbs: Control, Non-Control, and Fluid. Hence, the
semantics of self-initiated force can not be functionally
relevant for determining case roles. However, all Dative/Goal
(intransitive or transitive) verbs are Non-Control verbs.
Indeed, it is hard to imagine otherwise. This suggests that at
some level of conceptual structure, the concept of Goal and the
concept of self-initiated force are notionally incompatible.
Control Verbs
Although Source and self-initiated force do not directly
interact, with a protypical ditransitive Control verb such as
bi- 'give', the Agent, Source, and self-initiated force are
aligned.
Represent->Initiate->Cause->Move 	 >Be At
Source 	 >Trajector 	 >Goal
Agent 	 >Theme 	 >Recipient
[ERG) [DAT) [ABS) 	 [INITIATE4-VERB]
With the protypical transitive Control verb such as
tya(t)- 'cut, mince' or da(1)- 'hit', the Agent, Source, and
self-initiated force are aligned. Animacy, affectedness, and
discourse saliency function to determine whether the non-Agent
is coded as Absolutive or Dative. Since the distinction between
Trajector and Goal is collapsed into a single argument position,
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With the protypical intransitive Control verb such as won-
'go' or dan- 'stand', the Trajector and self-initiated force are
aligned. With Control intransitives, the Source/Trajector dis-
tinction is collapsed in much the same way the Goal/Trajector
distinction is collapsed in canonical transitive clauses. As
DeLancey points out, in Lhasa Tibetan, active volitional motion
verbs admit Ergative marking (1985a: 1985b; 1985c). In Newari,







The semantic structure of Non-Control Verbs is not com-
patible with self-initiated force. Relative to case assigning
properties, there are four major classes of Non-Control verbs:
The distinction between Dative and Absolutive Non-Control
verbs is the most distinct. With Absolutive Non-Control verbs
such as then- 'arrive' or kutci wo(1)- 'fall come', self-initi-
ated force and Trajector are not aligned. In fact, self-
initiated force is not present in the schema.6
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With Absolutive Non-Control verbs such as bu(t)- 'lose,
fail' or pya(t)- 'be.wet', self-initiated force is not present
in the schema; the Trajector changes state rather than location.
Become 	
Trajector 	 >
Theme 	  - >
[ABS]	 [VERB]
Finally, there are two types of Dative Non-Control verbs:
one and two argument verbs. In both cases, the Dative argument
is an experiencer of some type. With single argument verbs such
as nOe-pitya ..(t)- 'be.hungry' or ciku(1L- 'be.cold', there is no
Trajector, only a change of state. What distinguishes Dative
Non-Control verbs from Absolutive Non-Control verbs is the fact





With the two argument verbs such as ye(l)- 'be.pleasing
to' or bra woR)- 'fever come' the Trajector/Absolutive role
assumes (metaphorical) motion while the Experiencer aligns with
the Goal/Dative (cf. Lakoff and Johnson 1980).




Most problematic are the cognition verbs, which are Non-
In other words, the Source/Control verbs taking Ergative case.
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rgative role does not co-occur with self-initiated force. It is
unclear just what semantic properties account for the Ergative/
ource marking. Since cognition verbs such as thu(1)- 'realize,
understand' and lumon- 'remember' are such a problematic class
they are provisionally diagrammed as follows and examined in
more detail in Chapter VI:
Source 	 >Trajector
Cognizer 	 >Object of cognition
[ERG] [ABS]	 [VERB]
The Problem of Ergative Non-Control Verbs
This chapter has argued that the Source>Trajector>Goal
conceptual schema underlies the assignment of case forms:
Ergative, Absolutive, Dative. The example of the canonical
transfer verb bi(1)- 'give' suggested iconic mappings between
the conceptual schema Source>Trajector>Goal and the case forms
Ergative, Absolutive, Dative.
The assumption in this chapter has been that formal case
syncretism entails a semantic unity among all of the argument
roles which take a certain form, either source or goal. Making
a hypothesis about semantic structure on the basis of shared
case assigning properties in simple clauses entails that all
transitive verbs assigning Ergative case should share properties
with respect to the concept of Source, which underlies the
assignment of Ergative case. From this assumption comes a
prediction that Ergative verbs should all share a common lexical
semantic property which maps Source and Ergative case.
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This structure preservation principle makes other pre-
dictions. It predicts that the Ergative non-Control verbs,
which identify "cognizers" as a sub-type of Source, should have
no similarity with Dative Non-Control verbs, which identify
"experience" as proceeding to a Goal, i.e., the "experiencer."
Although both cognition and experiencer verbs belong to the
class of Non-Control verbs, the case assigning properties
suggest that there should be no grammatically relevant simi-
larites between Ergative cognition verbs and the Dative
experiencer verbs. The only similarity between the two appears
to be that both types lack self-initiated force. Since it is a
property they have in common with all other Non-Control verbs,
as well as Fluid verbs with Non-Control interpretations, this
similarity is not significant for cognition and experiencer
verbs alone. The set of Ergative and Dative verbs is contrasted
below:



















In summary, the structure preservation principle for
mappings between conceptual structure and case marking makes two
predictions about the cognition verbs, i.e., Non-Control verbs
assigning Ergative case. First, it predicts that they should
have lexical structures like all the other transitive verbs
assigning Ergative case, both Control and Fluid. Second, it
predicts no structural similarity between the cognition verbs
(Ergative, Non-Control) and the experiencer verbs (Dative, Non-
Control). In fact, both of these predictions turn out to be
false.
There is an important set of facts which show that cogni-
tion verbs have a different lexical structure than other tran-
sitive verbs; moreover, they share this lexical property with
the experiencer/sensation verbs. More interestingly, it is a
lexical property which is not reducible to the fact that cog-
nition and experiencer verbs are both Non-Control verbs. To see
why this is so, it is necessary to look at the formation of
causative structures. This is the topic of Chapter VI.
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Notes 
'Since the complications are not relevant for the
discussion, I am putting aside the description of the animate,




laxmi:	 ji-ke dheba	 kal-O
Laxmi/ERG 1-SRC money/ABS take-PERF/SET2
"Laxmi took the money from me."
2The ordering of arguments is not relevant here.
3The status of grammatical relations and "subjecthood" in
Newari is problematic. hale and Watters (1973) suggest that
"subjecthood" per se is not relevant for characterizing Newari
clause structure. Without agreement, passivization, or clause-
bound reflexives, arguments for subjecthood in Newari are
naturally equivocal. Since nothing in my paper is dependent on
arguments for or against the status of subjecthood in Newari, I
will continue to use the term in an informal sense.
4There is one intransitive verb that I know of that assigns
Ergative case: ul- "bark" Waver 1976). I have no explanation
for this, although it may have had origins as an utterance verb
which was transitive.
5Since the semantic and syntactic status of the "cognate
object" is not the main issue here, we will not puruse arguments
concerning the status of the direct object with these verbs.
The point is that the Absolutive/Ergative alternation is
governed by factors independent of intentional action.
6Minimal contrasts between a Control verb such as wo(1)-
'come' and a Non-Control such as kutD wo(1)- 'fall come/hither'
demonstrate that the distinction between Control and Non-control
intransitives is not an aspectual distinction as Van Valin
(1990) has argued for some split intransitive oppositions.
Although aspectual contrasts such as wo(1)- 'come' vs. then-
'arrive' are typical of Control/Non-Control contrasts, the
minimal contrast between Control and Non-control verbs is only
fully accountable on the basis of onset dynamics, i.e., self-
initiated force.
CHAPTER VI
CAUSATIVES AND LEXICAL STRUCTURE
The distribution and interpretation of the productive
causative suffix -k-/-k01- reveals another important aspect of
lexical structure. In the canonical causative process, the
causative suffix adds a causative agent role to the event schema
of a simple non-causative verb. With a causative suffix, the
event schema describes a causative agent acting to bring about
the simple caused event. I will refer to these type of
causatives as "effective" causatives.
However, there is a class of verbs, primarily cognition
(Ergative Non-Control) verbs and experiencer (Dative intran-
sitive and transitive) verbs, which behave differently from the
rest of the verbs. With these verbs, the causative suffix does
not add a new participant to the event schema; instead, it
creates an interpretation where non-initiated events of cogni-
tion and experience become self-initiated events. I will refer
to these type of causatives as "affective" causatives; they are
interpreted like middle-voice constructions (cf. Klaiman 1988).1
Reflexes of the PTB Causative Prefix *s-
Before examining the productive causatives, it is impor-
tant to note a set of non-productive causative pairs. Non-
productive causatives involve a restricted set of intransitive
verbs and their transitive counterparts. The simple/causative
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alternation, a reflex of the Proto Tibeto-Burman causative
prefix *s-, is realized via a voiced/voiceless aspirated
allomorphy for stem initial consonants (Hale 1973; Hargreaves &
Tamot 1987; Malla 1984).
With the causative form, the causer is marked with the
Ergative case. Animate causees are marked with the Dative;
inanimate causees are Absolutive. Simple forms can be Control,
Fluid, or Non-Control. The causative form is always a Control
verb. Some examples are given below:




(2) ji:	 wo-yatO	 then-a
1/ERG	 3-DAT	 lay-PST/SETT.
"I laid him/her down"
(3) wO:	 ji-t0	 then-0
3/ERG	 1-DAT	 lay-PERF/SET2
"S/he laid me down"
Fluid: dun- 'submerge' (intrans)/ thun- rsubmerge'{trans)
(4) ji	 lOkhO-e	 dun-a
1/ABS	 water-LOC	 submerge-PST/SET1
"I dipped into the water."
(5) ji	 lOkhO-e	 dun-0
1/ABS	 water-LOC	 submerge-PERF/SET2
"I unintentionally sank into the water."
(6) ji:	 wo-yatO lOkhO-e	 thun-a
1/ERG 3-DAT water-LOC 	 submerge-PST/SET1
"I dipped him/her into the water."
(7)*	 ji:	 wo-yatO	 lOkhO-e	 thun-O
1/ABS 3-DAT	 water-LOC submerge-PERF/SET2
(8)	 wO:	 ji-t0	 lOkhO-e	 thun-O
3/ERG 1-DAT	 water-LOC submerge-PERF/SET2
"He/she dipped me into the water."





(10) ji:	 wo-yatO	 khyan-a
1/ERG 3-DAT	 frighten-PST/SET1
"I frightened him/her."
(11) w15:	 ji-t0	 khyat-O
3/ERG 1-DAT	 frighten-PERF/SET2
"S/he frightened me."
The Causative Suffix -k01-/-k-
Most important for our puposes is the productive causa-
tive. As with the non-productive causative, an animate causee
is marked with the Dative case; an inanimate causee is marked
Absolutive. The causative agent is marked Ergative. Although
it is irregular in its stem morphophonemics, the causative stem
inflects like a Control verb.
Effective Causatives
Effective causatives form the canonical causative con-
struction. There are minimally two referentially distinct
participants; the causer and the causee. With most single
argument Non-Control verbs, the causative construction adds an
argument; inanimate causees are marked Absolutive and animate




"(the) shoes got wet."
(13) lakes	 pya-k-a
1/ERG	 shoes/ABS be.wet-CAUS-PST/SETI





(15) ji:	 wo-yatO	 pya-k-a
1/ERG	 3-DAT	 be.wet-CADS-PST/SET1
"1 got him/her wet."
(16) wa:	 ji-t0	 pya-k01-0
3/ERG	 1-DAT	 be.wet-CAUS-PERF/SET2
"S/he got me wet."
(17) thwo cithi	 libakk0	 then-0
this letter/ABS late	 arrive-PERF/SET2
"The letter arrived late."
(18) wO:	 cithi	 libakk0	 the-k01-0
3/ERG letter/ABS late	 arrive-CAUSE-PERF/SET2
"S/he caused the letter to arrive late."
(19) ji	 libakk0	 then-0
1/ABS	 late	 arrive-PERF/SET2
"I arrived late."
(20) wO:	 ji-t0	 libakk0	 the-k01-0
3/ERG 1-DAT	 late	 arrive--CAUS-PERF/SET2
"S/he caused me to arrive late."
(21) ja	 but-0
rice/ABS be.cooked-PERF/SET2
"The rice is/has become cooked."
(22) wO:	 ja	 bui-k01-0
3/ERG	 rice/ABS be.cooked-CAUS-PERF/SET2
"S/he cooked the rice."





(24) ji:	 wo-yatO	 khwoe-k-a
1/ERG	 3-DAT	 cry-CAUS-PST/SET1
"I made him/her cry."
(25) wO:	 ji-t0	 khwoe-k01-0
3/ERG	 1-DAT	 cry-CAUS-PERF/SET2
"S/he made me cry."
(26) ji	 chOkwolO: din-a
1/ABS	 at once	 stop-PST/SETT
"I stopped at once."
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(27) ji:	 wo-yatO	 di-k-a
1/ERG	 3-DAT	 stop-CAUS-PST/SET1
"I made him/her stop."
(28) 140:	 ji-t0	 di-k01-0
3/ERG	 1-DAT	 cry-CADS-PERF/SET2
"S/he made me stop."
Or, the causative form may be derived from a Fluid verb.
The intentional/non-intentional distinction is neutralized for
the simple stem; the causative suffix carries the same semantic
entailments as a Control verb.
(29) ji	 gwara-tul-a
1/ABS	 roll-PST/SET1
"I intentionally rolled over."
(30) ji	 gwara---tul-0
1/ABS	 roll-PERF/SET2
"I unintentionally rolled over."
(31) ji:	 wo-yatO	 gwara-tui-k-a
1/ERG	 3-DAT	 roll-CADS-PST/SETI
"I made him/her roll over."
(32) wO:	 ji-t0	 gwara=tui-k01-0
3/ERG	 1-DAT	 roll-CADS-PERF/SET2
"S/he made me roll over."
Control, Non-Control, and Fluid intransitives become two
argument verbs with the addition of the causative suffix; tran-
sitive Control and Fluid verbs become three argument verbs with
the causative suffix. With transitive Control verbs, the
animate causee is marked Dative:
(33) jI:	 ja	 nOy-a
1/ERG	 rice/ABS eat-PST/SET1
"I ate rice."
(34) jI:	 wo-yatO	 ja	 nO-k-a
1/ERG	 3-DAT	 rice eat-CADS-PST/SET1
"I fed him/her rice."
(35) wO:	 ji-t0	 ja	 nO-k01-0
3/ERG	 1-DAT	 rice eat-CAUS-PERF/SET2
"S/he fed me rice."
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(36) ji:	 mOca	 buy-a
1/ERG child/ABS	 carry-PST/SET1
"I carried the child."
(37) ji:	 wo-yatO	 mOca	 bui-k-a
1/ERG 3-DAT	 child/ABS carry-CAUS-PST/SET1
"I made him/her carry the child."
(38) wO:	 ji-t0	 mOca	 bui-k01-0
3/ERG 1-DAT	 child/ABS carry-CAUS-PERF/SET2
"S/he made me carry the child."
In causative constructions, transitive Fluid verbs behave
exactly like transitive Control verbs.
(39) ji:	 ja	 thiy-a
1/ERG rice/ABS	 touch-PST/SET1
"I (intentionally) touched the rice."
(40) ji:	 ja	 thil-O
1/ERG rice/ABS	 touch-PERF/SET2
"I (unintentionally) touched the rice."
(41) ji:	 wo-yatO	 ja	 thi:-k-a
1/ERG 3-DAT	 rice/ABS touch-CAUS-PST/SET1
"I made him/her touch the rice."
(42) wO:	 ji-t0	 ja	 thi:-k01-0
3/ERG 1-DAT	 rice	 touch-CAUS-PERF/SET2
"S/he made me touch the rice."
Affective Causatives
In contrast to the canonical effective causative, there is
a set of Non-Control verbs which do not require an additional
argument in causative constructions. As a whole, the class will
be referred to as "affective" verbs. Semantically, the verbs
all refer to various cognitive events (cognition verbs) or
sensory/emotional experiences (experiencer verbs).
As the term "affective" causative suggests, they receive
middle voice or reflexive-like interpretations. The addition of
the causative suffix does not instantiate the canonical distinc-
tion between a causer and causee; instead, the causative stem is
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interpreted as indicating mental or sensory activity, the active
counterpart to the mental or sensory event described by the non-
causative stem.
For example, causative intepretations with Dative intran-
sitives are different from other intransitives. In syntactic
terms, the causative stem does not require an added argument.
Instead, the causative stem can be interpreted as a Control
intransitive verb. In semantic terms, the simple Non-Control
verb becomes a Control verb with a middle voice interpretation.
It suggests that the participant is both the Source and Goal in
the event being described.
(43) wo-ya(-t0) cikul-0	 (the )
3-GEN(-DAT) be.cold-PERF/SET2 	 (like)
"(It looks like) S/he's cold."
(44) we:	 cikui-k01-0
3/ERG	 be.celd-CAUS-PST/SET1
"S/he shivered/shook with cold."
Affective causative interpretations are not strictly
limited to Dative intransitives. The verb dwOn- 'to err, make a
mistake' is a Non-Control intransitive, assigns Absolutive (not
Dative) case, and allows an affective causative interpretation.
Note also that the causative formation does not even allow for
an added causer argument in the clause, although an antecedent
cause may be expressed outside the clause. This issue is








(47)	 ji:	 yan-a:	 w6:	 dwOn-k01-0
1/ERG do-NF	 [ 3/ERG err-CAUS-PERF/SET2
"Because of my doing, [ he made a mistake ]."
(48)*	 ji:	 wo-yatO	 dwOn-k-a
1/ERG 3-DAT	 err-CAUS-PST/SET1
(49)	 w6:	 yan-a:	 ji:	 dwOn-k-a
3/ERG do-NF	 1/ERG err-CAUS-PST/SET1 ]
"Because of his doing, [ I made a mistake ]."
(50)*	 w6:	 ji-t0	 dwOn-k01-0
3/ERG 1-DAT	 err-CAUS--PERF/SET2
One crucial semantic variable distinguishing effective
causatives from affective causatives is the referential identity
of the causee. With effective causatives, the canonical inter-
pretation is that the causee is not co-referential with the the
causative agent. In contrast, with affective causatives, the
interpretation is that the causative agent and the causee are
co-referential.
Two argument Non-Control verbs that assign Dative case
behave like affective causatives. The causative stem does not
require an added argument; instead, like the Dative intransi-
tives above, the causative stem receives a middle-voice and
Control verb interpretation.
(51) syam-yatO	 laxmi	 yO:
Syam-DAT	 Laxmi/ABS be.pleasing/IMPERF/SET2
"Syam likes Laxmi."
(52) syam-O:	 laxmi	 ye:-k01-0
syam/ERG Laxmi/ABS be.pleasing-CAUS-PERE/SET2
"Syam has come to like Laxmi.", or
"Syam has chosen Laxmi."
(53) ji-t0	 laxmi	 yO:
1-DAT	 Laxmi/ABS be.pleasing/IMPERF/SET2
"I like Laxmi."
(54) ji:	 laxmi	 ye:-k-a
1/ERG Laxmi/ABS be.pleasing-CAUS-PST/SET1
"I've come to like Laxmi.", or
"I've chosen Laxmi."
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Finally, with Ergative Non-Control (cognition) verbs, the
causative stem is interpreted as a Control transitive verb with
a middle voice interpretation.
(55) ji:	 khO	 lumOn-O
1/ERG matter remember-PERF/SET2
"I remembered the matter."
(56) ji:	 khO	 lum0-k-a
1/ERG matter remember-CADS-PST/SET1
"I recalled the matter."
The verb iwomOn- 'forget' also forms affective causatives
as illustrated in the contrast below between the common prohibi-




(58) ka	 j1:	 lwomOn-0
EMPH 1/ERG forget-PERF/SET2
"Oh, I forgot!."
Other cognition verbs exhibit the same causative
formation:
(59) j1:	 khO	 sil-O
1/ERG matter know-PERF/SET2
"I (just) learned this matter."
(60) ji:	 khO	 si:-k-a
1/ERG matter know-CAUS-PST/SET1
"I discovered this matter."
In conclusion, unlike effective causatives, affective
causatives are causative stems which do not add a referentially
distinct causee argument. Instead, they form a middle-voice
interpretation for predicates of sensory/emotional experience or
cognition.
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The Argument Structure of Causatives 
The canonical effective causative adds an argument, a
causal agent, to the event schema. In the effective causative
event schema, the causal agent acts with self-initiated force on
a referentially distinct patient and thereby the event or action
described by the simple non-causative verb stem occurs. Unlike
the causative agent, the causee is a participant in the event
frame described by the non-causative verb stem. This can be





[ y OPEN ]
	
(62)	 1415:	 khapa	 cae-k01-0
3/ERG	 door/ABS open-CAUS-PERF/SET2
"S/he opened the door."
[ x [ y OPEN ] CAUSE ]
When the causee is animate, the causative stem assigns
Ergative case to source/agent and Dative case to the causee.
	
(63)	 wO:	 jya	 yat-O
3/ERG	 work/ABS do-PERF/SET2
"He did the work."
[ y	 [ z DO ] ]
	
(64)	 w(5:	 ji-tO jya	 ya-k01-0
3/ERG	 1-DAT work/ABS do-CAUS-PERF/SET2
"He had me do the work."
[ x [ y [ z DO ] ] CAUSE ]
In contrast, the affective causative does not necessarily
require an added argument: the source/agent acts with self-
initiated causal force and thereby the event described by the
non-causative stem occurs. However, unlike effective
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causatives, the source/agent is also a participant in the scope
of the event structure described by the non-causative stem.







"S/he made a mistake."
[ x, [ xi ERR ] CAUSE ]
(67)	 wO:	 khO	 thul-O
3/ERG matter understand-PERF/SET2
"S/he (just) understood the matter."
[ x [ y UNDERSTAND ] ]
(68)	 wO:	 khc5	 thui:-k01-0
3/ERG matter understand-CAUS-PERF/SET2
"S/he figured out the matter."
[ xi [ x i [ y UNDERSTAND ] ] CAUSE ]
By including the same participant in both the antecedent
cause and the consequent event, affective causatives resemble
reflexive constructions, which also include the same participant
as causal source and event goal. The canonical reflexive clause







"He hit the dog."
[ x	 [ y HIT ] ]
(70)	 w15:	 th0:-yatO	 dal-0
3/ERG self-DAT	 hit-PERF/SET2
"He hit himself."
[ x i [ yi HIT ] ]
The simplified event structures for effective and affec-
tive causatives, and reflexives are summarized below:
157
Simple Intransitive	 [ x [Vintrans] ]
Simple Transitive	 [ x ( y Vtrans ] ]
Reflexive	 [ xi [ y i Vtrans	 ]
Effective Causative	 x [ y Vintrans ] CAUSE ]
Effective Causative	 [x[y[zVtrans ]	 CAUSE ]
Affective Causative	 [ xi [ x i Vintrans ] CAUSE ]
Affective Causative	 [ xi [ x, [ y Vtrans ] ] CAUSE I
Although affective causative constructions may be said to
have "reflexive-like" event structure, it is important to
distinguish the affective causatives as a lexical process from
reflexive constructions as a clause level anaphoric process.
There are several arguments for not analyzing affective
causatives as simply effective causatives with zero anaphor
reflexive pronouns.
First, whereas reflexivization is not lexically restricted
and may apply to any transitive structure, the affective
causative process is lexically restricted. All affective
causatives involve experiencer or cognition predicates. In
other words, the distinction between effective and affective
causatives is a function of the event type as realized in the
lexical structure of the verb. In contrast, reflexivization is
a fully productive process which applies to any transitive event
structure, as long as the referential criteria are met.
In terms of the generative/interpretive semantics litera-
ture, affective causatives are "pre-cyclic," reflexives are not
(Newmeyer 1976; see also Shibatani 1976 for a review). More to
the point, affective causatives arise via a lexical process in
which the simple verb stem and the causative suffix combine to
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form a causative stem. The syntactic properties and middle
voice interpretation for the affective causatives arise as a
function of the combinatorial semantics/syntax of the simple
verb stem and the causative suffix. In contrast, reflexivi-
zation is not a lexical process. The lexical structures of
transitive verbs are unspecified for the referential identities
of their arguments; reflexivization occurs only when the agent
and patient are coreferential.
To understand why affective causatives can not be analyzed
as reflexives, consider the transitive Control verb sva(t)- 
'kill' and the transitive Non-Control verb lumOn- 'remember.'
The verb lumOn- 'remember'is a cognition verb which forms affec-
tive causatives. The verb sva(t) - 'kill' is a simple transitive
verb which forms effective causatives. In terms of surface
morphosyntax, both verbs require two arguments and assign
Ergative case. The simple and reflexive clauses for both verbs
are given below:
(71) we:	 kha	 syat-O
3/ERG chicken/ABS	 kill-PERF/SET2
"He killed the chicken."
(72) w15:	 th0:-yatO syat-O
3/ERG self-DAT kill-PERF/SET2
"S/he killed her/himself."
xi [ y i KILL I
(73) wO:	 khO	 lumOn-0
3/ERG matter remember-PERF/SET2
"S/he remembered the matter."
(74) we:	 th0:-yatO	 lumOn-0
3/ERG self-DAT	 remember-PERF/SET2
"S/he remembered her/himself."
[ xi [ yi REMEMBER ) )
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There is an argument that the affective causative is a
reflexive in the following sense: the middle voice interpre-
tation is simply the result of anaphoric deletion of the
reflexive morpheme. The structure can be paraphrased as: 'cause
self to remember.' Recall the interpretation of volition by
Talmy (1985) discussed in Chapter IV, where he suggested voli-
tion is metaphorically represented in sentences such as: "I
dragged myself out of bed."
In the two causatives given below, example (76) is the
hypothetical reflexive structure for the affective causative
stem lum0-kg1-0 'recalled.'
(75) wO:	 ji-t0	 kha	 sya-k01-0
3/ERG 1-DAT	 chicken	 kill-CAUSE-PERF/SET2
"S/he got me to kill the chicken."
[x	 [ y [ z KILL ] ] CAUSE ]
(76) w15:	 ( 0 )	 khO	 lum0-k01-0
3/ERG (self)	 matter remember-PERF/SET2
"S/he got herself to remember the matter."
[ xi [ selfi [ z REMEMBER ] ) CAUSE ]
However, this interpretation does not accord with the
intuitions of the speakers I consulted. For example, the actual
overt presence of the reflexive pronoun thO: 'self' does not
lead to an interpretation in which the self is viewed as the
causee. In other words, the overt reflexive form is not
synonymous with the reading: 'cause self to remember.'
Instead, there is a possible benefactive reading:
'recalled for his/her own benefit.' The benefactive interpre-
tation is typically expressed with a benefactive form using the




"He recalled (it) for his own benefit."
Also, the Dative form of the reflexive leads to an
interpretation something to the effect: 'recall self.' For
example: "He recalls/thinks of himself when people owe him money
(but conveniently forgets when he owes them money)."
(78) w15:	 th0:-yatO ti	 lum0-k01-0
3/ERG self-DAT EMPH remember-CAUSE-PERF/SET2
"He recalls himself."
In any event, the overt reflexive pronoun does not lead to
the interpretation of self as causee, as in the diagram for (76)
above. Instead, the overt reflexive structure is interpreted as
follows:
[ xi j f selfi REMEMBER ] ] CAUSE ]
There are several other arguments which show that the
affective causative cannot be analyzed as a simple reflexive.
With an Ergative transitive Control verb such as sya(t)- 'kill',
the Ergative (agent) argument in the simple clause becomes the
Dative (causee) in the causative structure; the causative agent
is marked Ergative. In contrast, the lexical structure of
lumOn- 'remember' and other affective verbs has the causative
agent role appear without increasing valency and creating a
Dative marked causee. This raises questions about the lexical
structure of the simple non-causative stem.
The fact that these verbs assign Ergative case but are
Non-Control verbs already makes them suspicious in this regard.
As noted in Chapter V, the Ergative marking assigned to cogni-
tion verbs in simple clauses is not associated with a canonical
source/agent position, which would normally align with
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self-initiated force. In these simple clauses, Ergative case
assignment is problematically associated with an argument that
can not co-occur with self-initiated force.
The distribution of auxiliary verbs with affective causa-
tives suggests that affective causatives arise via unaccusative
lexical structures. For example, recall that with single argu-
ment Dative verbs, the affective causative does not appear to
add an extra argument position to the surface morphosyntax.
(79) syam-ya(-t0)	 cikul-O	 (khOnisa)
Syam-GEN(-DAT) be.cold-PERF/SET2 	 (it.appears)




In fact, the causative stem automatically fills the agent
role without creating a causee argument. In order to introduce
a distinct causee argument, it is necessary to add the verb
bi(1)- 'give' in a verb-auxiliary construction (see Chapter II):
(81) syam-O:	 ji-tO cikui-k-a	 bil-O
Syam-ERG 1-DAT be.cold-CAUS--CM 	 give-PERF/SET2
"Syam caused me to get cold."
Moreover, without the verb-auxiliary construction and the
verb bi(1)- 'give', the causative stem behaves like an intran-
sitive Control verb which cannot take a second argument. It
behaves as if its argument structure is saturated. In the
causative process, the simple verb stem accepts a causal agent





Cognition verbs typically exhibit the same type of morpho-
syntactic behavior. The addition of a causee argument is not
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acceptable without the presence of the verb bi(1)- 'give' in a
verb-auxiliary construction:
(83)*	 jl:	 wo-yatO lum0-k-a
1/ERG 3-DAT remember-CAUS-PST/SET1
"I got him/her to remember (it)."
(84) ji:	 wo-yatO lum0-k-a	 biy-a
1/ERG 3-DAT remember-CADS-CM give-PST/SET1
"1 got him/her to remember (it)."
The causative stem with Control transitives such as
sya(t)- 'kill' automatically adds a causee argument without
requiring the verb-auxiliary construction.
(85) jl:	 wo-yatO	 kha	 sya-k-a
1/ERG 3-DAT	 chicken	 kill-CAUSE-PST/SET1
"I got him to kill the chicken."
The morphosyntactic behavior of cognition and experiencer
verbs in affective causatives suggests a schematic structure for
the simple stem which contains an unfilled argument position
which may be filled by the causative agent. Once this argument
position is filled, however, the lexical structure is saturated;
hence, the auxiliary form with bi(1)- 'give' must be used to add
a new argument position. In fact, the causative source/agent
must fill the position within the simple event structure; no new
arguments are introduced.
The conclusion, then, is that affective causatives are not
simple reflexive constructions; they are "reflexive" only in the
sense that they involve actions in which the participant is both
the Source and Goal of the sensory/emotion or cognitive event
described by the causative stem. The affective causative con-
struction, however, is a function of the event schema and the
lexical representations. It is not reflexive in the sense of a
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clausal structure productively co-indexing coreferential
arguments.
The distinction between effective and affective causatives
results from the combination of the lexical structure of the
causative morpheme -k-/-k01- with two distinct lexical struc-
tures associated with the simple verb stems. At issue, then, is
how to characterize the lexical structures of cognition and
experiencer verbs which admit affective causatives and dis-
tinguish them from those verbs that form effective causatives.
The evidence suggests that verbs that form affective causatives
lack an argument position in lexical structure which may be
filled by the morphologically marked causative agent role.
The Semantic Basis for Affective
Causative Structure 
In contrast to the other verb types, experiencer and
cognition verbs allow affective causative constructions.
However, despite their similar behavior in causatives, there is
a distinction between Dative and Ergative case assigning
predicates. That is, within the class of affective verbs, case
assignment functions to mark the distinctive semantic properties
of cognition and experiencer predicates. Ergative marking tends
to occur with cognitive events such as 'understand', 'know', and
'remember.' Dative marking tends to occur with sensory/emotive
experiences such as 'be.hungry', 'be.cold', 'be.hurt', or
'be.pleasing to.' This is problematic.
Consider first the Dative verbs. The affective causative
construction can be accounted for if the Goal argument position
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is, in fact, an internal argument position in an unaccusative
lexical structure that contains an unfilled external (subject)
argument position (cf. Belletti & Rizzi 1988; Davies 1986;
Grimshaw 1990; Perlmutter 1978; 1982).
The affective causative formation follows directly if the
predicates which allow the affective causative construction are
viewed as having unaccusative lexical structures. This would
account for their behavior in causative formation, where the
causative agent fills the unfilled argument slot and the verb is
interpreted as an affective causative. However, a non-arbitrary
account must link the argument structure with a conceptual
schema for unaccusative grammaticalization (DeLancey 1985a;
Klaiman 1981).
As noted in Chapter V, in a canonical ditransitive clause,
the source/agent transfers a trajector/theme to the goal/
recipient. The canonical case marking function assigns Ergative
case to the source/agent, Absolutive to the trajector/theme, and
Dative to the goal/recipient. The causal source/agent role
fills the canonical subject (external) argument position; the
theme and recipient fill the direct and indirect object
(internal) roles in argument structure. The schematic and
lexical representations are given below:
bi(1)- 'give'
SCHEMATIC REPRESENTATION
Source	 Trajector 	 >Goal
(x)Agent----(y)Theme 	 >(z)Recipient
LEXICAL STRUCTURE
[ x [ [ z To ] y Move ] Cause ]
x [ [ z	 y bi- ) ]
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CASE	 (x)ERG (z)DAT (y)ABS bi(1)- 
The experiencer schema does not represent externalized,
perceptually salient causal or directional dynamics. Experience
is the endpoint of some unspecified process. The event schema
does not include a causal source within its frame.
Ve(1)- 'be.pleasing to'
SCHEMATIC REPRESENTATION
( ) 	 Trajector 	 >Goal
( ) 	 Theme 	 >Experiencer
LEXICAL STRUCTURE
[( ) [ [ z To ] y Be.pleasing
[(	 ) [ [ z	 y	 	 	 ] ]
CASE	 (z)DAT (y)ABS ve(1)- 
When this lexical structure is combined with the causative
suffix to create a causative stem, the resultant structure takes
the form of an affective causative, or middle-voice:
ye-k- 'be.pleasing to - CAUS'
SCHEMATIC REPRESENTATION
Sources--(--Trajector--->Goal i ]
Agent;---[--Theme 	 >Experienceri ]
LEXICAL STRUCTURE
[Xi [	 Oi To ] z Be.pleasing ] Cause ]
[x i	[ [	 z	 ]	 -k-	 ]
CASE	 (x)ERG (z)ABS ye-k-
Single argument Dative verbs are similar, lacking only the
trajector. The experiencer is the endpoint of a change whose







() [ t y To	 Be.cold ] ]
I 0	 [ Y	 ] ciku-	 3
CASE	 (y)DAT ciku(1)-
The causative formation and affective interpretation
follows directly from the lexical structure.
cikui-k- 'be.cold - CAUS'
SCHEMATIC REPRESENTATION  
>Goali




[ xi 	[ [ () i To ] Be.cold ] Cause ]
I xi	[ O i	 ciku	 ] -k-	 ]
CASE	 (x)ERG cikui-k-
The lexical structure of cognition verbs is more prob-
lematic. Whereas experiencer arguments can readily be identi-
fied as Goal on the basis of both the behavior in affective
causatives and the Goal/Dative case marking, cognition verbs
assign Ergative case in simple clauses and are thus problematic.
Although the behavior in affective causatives suggests an
unfilled agent argument role, the Ergative case makes it
problematic to claim that the argument role is aligned with
Goal.
The paradox is the following: The structure preservation
principle motivates treating the transitive, Ergative subject of
simple cognition verbs as an agent/source, not as an experi-




affective causatives like experiencer verbs motivates treating
the argument role the same way, as a goal/experiencer. From a
descriptive point of view, the issue is straightforward: The
lexical property which is functionally relevant for causative
formation is distinct from case assignment. The evidence from
causatives shows that the agent argument position is unrealized
in lexical structure. At the same time, case assignment indi-
cates source marking, suggesting that with the non-causative
stem, the Ergative marked argument must be a non-agent source
(cf. DeLancey I985a).
The entire class of affective predicates is distinguished
by a schematic representation which grammaticalizes an unfilled
source/external argument position. However, within the class of
affective verbs, cognition and experiencer predicates are con-
trastive with respect to the source/goal schema of internal
experience. In simple clauses, experiencer predicates construe
the internal event as arrival at an endpoint; in contrast, cog-
nition is construed proceeding from a source. The case marking
facts suggest that the schema for the affective verb class has
its own internal structure, distinguishing source and goal.
A syntactic account would have the cognizer argument
"promoted/moved" to a "subject/external" position before it
receives the Ergative case. The insight behind this approach is
that it allows for the generalization that Ergative case is
automatically assigned to the external (subject) argument in any
transitive clause. This strategy is characteristic of both
relational grammar and government-binding accounts of unac-
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cusativity (cf. Belletti & Rizzi 1988; Perlmutter 1983;
Perlmutter & Rosen 1984).
Since the data at hand can not resolve this issue, I will
not pursue the details here except to note that any synchronic
approach must account for how cognition verbs with two arguments
receive Ergative case and experiencer verbs with two arguments
receive Dative case marking. At the same time, it must account
for how it is that both cognition and experiencer verbs form
affective causatives, to the exclusion of other two argument
verbs. The main point is that, on the one hand, affective verbs
as a class have unfilled argument structures distinct from other
verbs. On the other hand, the affective verbs are themselves
sub-typed by the two different case assigning properties.
The intuition that "cognition" is more active than
"experience," but neither one is active with respect to canoni-
cal transitive agency suggests a semantic account. We also want
to keep the semantic intuition that cognition verbs are Non-
Control verbs because they are incompatible with self-initiated
force.
Typologically, cognition and mental state verbs are
problematic boundary cases for case marking and grammatical
relations (cf. Croft 1991; Grimshaw 1990). It is not surprising
that the class is problematic. Thus, rather than motivate an
explanation which would be, in any event, severely underdeter-
mined by the data, the schematic and lexical representations can
be given relative to the specific morphosyntactic mappings which
occur. That is, with the grammatical process of case assignment
in simple clauses, the cognizer is a Source in a transitive
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structure, although it is not aligned with self-initiated force.
In contrast, when the grammatical process is causative form-
ation, the cognizer is a goal argument in an unaccusative





Case Assignment in Simple Clauses
(x) Source----> (y) Trajector/Goal




[	 [ [ x ] y Remember	 ]
[ x i [ [ 0 1 ] y Remember ] ] Cause ]
(x)ERG (y)ABS lumOn-k-
Approaching the problem this way predicts that non-uniform
mappings are likely to produce variation among speakers and
lexical items. This is indeed true.
For example, a couple of speakers have suggested to me
that the causative form with the verb thu(1)- 'realize, under-
stand' (thui-k-a) is ambiguous. They have suggested that the
contrast between an affective interpretation, e.g., 'figure out'
and an effective causative interpretation, e.g., 'cause him/her
to understand' is not expressed by an affective causative form-





(a)	 "S/he figured (it) out",
(b)?	 "S/he got (someone) to understand (it)
(87) wa:	 thui-k-a	 k01-0
3/ERG understand-CAUS-CM take-PERF/SET2
"S/he figured (it) out."
(88) w(5:	 wo-yatO thui-k-a	 bil-O
3/ERG 3-DAT understand-CAUS-CM	 give-PERF/SET2
"S/he explained (it) to him."
All of the speakers whom I've consulted agreed that the
verb-auxiliary forms were acceptable and unambiguous. Moreover,
all seemed to accept the affective interpretation with thui-k01- 
0, as in (86a) above. However, only a few speakers accepted an
effective causative interpretation with thui-kOl-O, as in (86b).
There is some variation with other verbs. For example,
Hale and Manandhar (1980:82) include the causative form of
si(l)- 'know', si:-k- , as an effective causative: 'cause
someone else to know.' Some speakers whom I've consulted did
not find si:-k- an acceptable form for an effective causative;
others found it acceptable. All of the speakers I consulted had
no problem accepting si:-k- as an affective causative:
'discover.'
This type of variation should not be surprising and does
not affect the basic argument. The primary contrast is between
verbs which automatically form effective causatives and verbs
which admit affective causatives. The variable interpretations
suggest incipient reanalysis of the underlying lexical struc-
tures on the basis of the surface morphosyntax. That is, when
speakers allow cognition, Ergative Non-Control verbs to form
effective causatives, it suggests that the verbs are becoming
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reanalyzed as more canonical Ergative agentive, transitive
verbs. To my knowledge, there is no evidence that Ergative
cognition verbs are being reanalyzed as Control verbs, which
would allow them to take SET1 inflection; hence, their unique
status is still transparent.
Distinguishing Fluid Verbs
from Affective Verbs 
There is an important functional similarity between the
Fluid verb alternation and the affective causative alternation.
In both cases, there is a morphological contrast distinguishing
an intentional self-initiated action from a non-intentional,
non-initiated event. Consider the semantic alternations below
with the Fluid verb gwara tul- 'roll over' and the Non-Control
verb dwOn- 'err.' The simple forms with SET2 inflection
indicate non-initiated events undergone by the individual.
(89) ji	 gwara=tul-0
1/ABS	 roll-PERF/SET2




In contrast, the SET1 form of the Fluid verb and the causative




"I rolled over (self-initiated)."
(92) ji:	 dwO-k-a
1/ERG	 err-CAUSE-PST/SET1
"I made a mistake (self-initiated)."
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The functional and conceptual similarity suggests some
kind of deeper affinity. Both Fluid verbs and affective verbs
involve events which can be described from two perspectives:
self-initiated and non-initiated. However, the differences
between SET1/SET2 inflection and the causative morpheme -k-/- 
kol- suggest other important differences. For example, the
lexical structure of the Fluid verb does not appear to have an
unfilled causal source. Unlike dwOn- 'err', the Fluid verb
gwara=tul- 'roll over' forms an effective causative. The
affective interpretation is impossible.
(93)	 j1:	 wo-yatO	 gwara=tui-k-a
1/ERGroll-CAUS-PST/SET13-DAT





"I rolled over (self-initiated)."
Thus, one important difference between Fluid verbs and
affective verbs is in their argument structures. Because the
lexical structure of affective verbs has an unfilled argument
position, the causative stem forms an affective causative. In
contrast, Fluid verbs always form effective causatives. As
Chapters IV and V showed, self-initiated force is a semantic
feature conflated with the verbs semantics, but does not inter-
act with argument structures. In contrast, in order to derive a
self-initiated action from a simple affective verb, the causa-
tive stem must add a causal agent argument role.
There is a second important distinction. The Fluid SET1
interpretations are subject to evidential and discourse role
constraints; in contrast, the formation of the affective causa-
tive stem is not subject to these constraints.' For example,
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the Fluid interpretations and SET1/SET2 distributions with the
verb thi(1)- 'touch' are subject to evidential discourse role
constraints. The formation of affective causatives with the
verb si(1)- 'understand' are not.
(95) jt:	 ja	 thil-0
1/ERG rice/ABS	 touch-PERF/SET2
"I touched the rice (non-initiated)."
(96) jt:	 khO	 sil-O
1/ERG	 matter know-PERF/SET2
"1 (just) learned this matter (non-initiated)."
(97) jt:	 ja	 thiy-a
1/ERG rice/ABS	 touch-PST/SET1
"I touched the rice (self-initiated)."
(98) jI:	 khO	 si:-k-a
1/ERG matter know-CAUS-PST/SET1
"I discovered this matter (self-initiated)."
(99) wO:	 ja	 thil-0
3/ERG rice/ABS	 touch-PERF/SET2
"S/he touched the rice."
(100) w6:	 khO	 sil-O
3/ERG matter know-PERF/SET2
"S/he (just) learned this matter."
(101)*	 146:	 ja	 thiy-a
3/ERG rice/ABS	 touch-PST/SET1
(102)	 1415:	 khO	 si:-k01-0
3/ERG matter know-CAUS-PERF/SET2
"S/he discovered this matter (self-initiated)."
In conclusion, both the Fluid alternation and the affec-
tive causative alternation manifest a distinction between self-
initiated and non-initiated events. However, the two construc-
tions manifest the distinction in different morphosyntactic
systems.
Notes 
'The terms "Effective" and "Affective" are discussed in
Kleiman (1988). Another term is "deponent middle-voice."
2The structure does admit the rather implausible reading:
"Syam shivered for me."
3This sentence does admit the interpretation "I recalled
him," but not "I got him to remember."
'This is not entirely true as we shall see in Chapter VII.
However, the exceptions do not invalidate the generalization
that SET1/SET2 inflection with Fluid verbs is obligatoriy





Chapters III and IV argued that the conceptual structure
of intentional action has two domains: (a) self-initiated
force, (b) in accordance with a mental representation. They
have distinct realizations in Newari grammar: (a) the concept of
self-initiated force is incorporated in lexical structure and
accounts for the three classes of verbs, and (b) the attribution
of a mental representation to an individual is expressed via
inflection, where inflection indexes a self-initiated behavior
in accordance with a representation only under the appropriate
evidential conditions in discourse.
Chapter V showed that this concept of intentional action
is realized independently of thematic roles and case. More
specifically, the lexical property of self-initiated force was
independent of the parameters of a Source>Trajector>Goal
schema which determined case assignment. Instead, the
Source>Trajector>Goal schema was mapped onto argument structures
resulting in Ergative/Absolutive/Dative case assignments.
Chapter VI showed that there are two types of verbs which
admit alternate interpretations between self-initiated and non-
initiated events: Fluid type and affective causative type.
Despite this apparent semantic similarity, the Fluid alternation
and affective causative alternation are functionally and struc-
turally independent of one another. The distinction between
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self-initiated and non-initiated events which is functionally
relevant for the three verb classes is not the same lexical
property which distinguishes effective and affective causative
verbs. The distinction between effective and affective causa-
tive verbs is a function of unaccusative lexical structures,
i.e., grammaticalized event frames with an unfilled causal
source argument position. In contrast, the distinction among
Control, Non-Control, and Fluid verbs is a function of the
incorporated lexical feature: self-initiated force.
Apparently, the mapping of intentional action onto gram-
matical structure does not interact with other core mapping
domains: specifically, thematic roles, argument structure, and
case. What, then, is the status of the concept 'intentional
action'? Is the functional domain confined to the inflectional
paradigm? If not, what is its status in mapping between con-
ceptual structure and grammatical organization? This Chapter
addresses these questions.
This chapter shows that the conceptual structure and
discourse principles which account for SET1/SET2 asymmetries can
account for other distributions outside of the SET1/SET2 inflec-
tional contrast. This supports the argument that the functional
domain of the notion 'intentional action' is not confined to
inflection and hence exists as an autonomous conceptual struc-
ture/discourse function. While properties of the conceptual
structure are mapped into the grammar via lexical conflation and
the SET1/SET2 opposition, the conceptual structure also under-
lies other function/form alternations.
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The evidence comes from the distribution of three
aspect/modality verbs taking infinitive complements: ten- 'get
ready/be ready,' te(1)- 'time to/obliged to,' and dhun 
'finish/be.finished.' Each of the verbs has a different set of
semantic, subcategorizing, and inflectional properties. Yet, in
their different properties, each exhibits the exact same func-
tional distribution as the SET1/SET2 opposition, even though it
is not the inflectional contrast itself which expresses the
contrast.
The evidence shows that the conceptual structure under-
lying intentional action is manifested in these domains
independent of inflection. In other words, the conceptual
structures and discourse functions which underlie the inflec-
tional system govern distributions outside of the inflectional
system. Thus, the notion of 'intentional action' in Newari has:
1. A formal realization in SET1/SET2 inflection inde-
pendent of thematic roles, argument structure, and case.
2. A functional realization in domains other than
inflection.
In short, the functional domain of the concept "inten-
tional action" can neither be subsumed within the mappings of
thematic roles and argument structures nor reduced to a merely
morphological, i.e., inflectional domain.
Modal/Aspectual Verbs 
Temporal dynamics in simple clauses are a function of the
inherent aspect of the verb and the tense/aspect value of the
inflectional suffix. In addition to the inflection marking,
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there are several infinitive complement constructions in which
aspect/modality verbs modify properties of the simple clause.
Each of the aspect/modality verbs interacts with the inflection
system in different ways.
As noted in Chapter II infinitive complements are marked
with the invariant form VERB-e. 1 The arguments for and against
different syntactic accounts of infinitive complements in Newari
are complicated and beyond the scope of this study (cf. Giv6n
1985). Examples with all three infinitive complements verbs are
given below.
ji	 /jI:	 jya ya-e	 ten-a
JABS /ERG	 work do-INF	 ready-PAST/SET1
"I get/am getting ready to work."
ji	 /ji:	 jya ya-e
	 tel-O
lABS /ERG	 work do-INF
	
time.to-PERF/SET2
"It's time for me to work."
(3)	 ji	 /jI:	 jya ya-e	 dhun-0
lABS /ERG	 work do-INF	 finish-PERF/SET2
"I'm already finished working."
Case marking with transitive complements shows that the
"subject" nominal does not have to receive case from the
complement verb. Thus, the Ergative case marking, normally
obligatory in simple transitive clauses, marks a pragmatically
marked agent focus in complement constructions. Although
nothing crucial hinges on the assumption, for expository
purposes, I will assume: (a) the Absolutive form is the default
form, and (b) the corresponding clausal embeddings:
ten- 'get ready/be ready' [ NP i ei [ VP-INF ] ] ten ]
te(1)-	 'time to/obliged to' [ NEI [ ei [ VP-INF ] to
dhun- 'finish/be.finished' [ NPi [ ei [ VP-INF ] dhun)
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ten- 'get ready/be ready'
With ten- 'get ready/be ready,' the infinitive comple-
ments may be Control, Non-Control, or Fluid verbs. Inflection
appears on the main verb and is a function of: (a) the type of
complement verb, (b) epistemic source, (c) a Fluid interpre-
tation of the verb ten-. For example, SETI occurs with Control
verb complements under the appropriate discourse conditions.
(4) ji	 won-e	 ten-a-gu
1/ABS	 go-INF	 ready-PST/SETI-NOM
"I am getting ready to go..."2
(5) gOn0	 won-e	 ten-a-gu
where	 go-INF	 ready-PST/SET1-NOM
"Where are (you) getting ready to go..."
With Control verb complements, SET2 inflection occurs in
all other environments which lack the appropriate discourse
conditions.
(6) ji	 won-e	 ten-a-b010e
1/ABS go-INF	 ready-PST/SETI-time
"As I was getting ready to go..."
(7) chO won-e	 ty0:-b010e
2/ABS go-INF	 ready/IMPERF/SET2-time
"As you were getting ready to go..."
(8) wo	 won-e	 tyO: -bOlOe
3/ABS go-INF	 ready/IMPERF/SET2-time
"As s/he was getting ready to go..."
SET2 inflection will always occur with Non-Control
complement verbs.
(9) ji	 then-e	 ty0:-b010e
1/ABS	 arrive-INF	 ready/IMPERF/SET2-time




In addition to the above distributions, with Control verb
complements, ten- has Fluid properties. For example, with
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first person declarative clauses and a Control verb complement,
a SET2 form is possible with evidential qualifiers. The con-
trast in the two examples below is roughly paraphrasable as "get
ready" vs. "be ready." These examples illustrate that the verb
ten- meets the distributional criteria for a Fluid verb.
(11) ji	 bwO	 wone-e	 ten-a-bOlOe
1/ABS study/PURP go-INF	 ready-PST/SET1-time
"As I got ready to go study..."
(12) ji	 bw5	 wone-e	 ty0:-b010e
1/ABS study/PURP go-INF	 ready-IMPERF/SET2-time
"When I was ready to go study..."
In summary, ten- takes infinitive complements and mani-
fests the SET1/SET2 opposition with a Fluid distribution. In
this sense, ten- has the lexical structure of a Fluid verb, in
addition to its complement subcategorization. SET1 occurs
whenever: (a) the complement verb is a Control verb, (b) the
Fluid interpretation of ten- includes self-initiated force,
(c) the self-initiated action is in accordance with a repre-
sentation, (d) the discourse role of epistemic source is
coreferential with the actor. The co-occurence of the
parameters can be schematized as follows:
{ES i } [ xi REP [ x i [ xi	INITIATE+VERB ] (INITIATE)ten ] ]
Since each one of these parameters varies independently,
SET2 will occur whenever any one of the parameters is absent.
For example, when the complement verb is a Control verb but the
Fluid interpretation of ten- does not include self-initiated
force, SET2 occurs. By implication, in these cases, there can
be no attribution of force in accordance with a representation;
the interpretation is paraphrased as "be ready to":
{ES i } I xj REP f xi ( xi	INITIATE+VERB ] (	 )ten	 I
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SET2 inflection occurs with Control verb complements when-
ever the Epistemic Source {ES} and the actor are not core-
ferential. The Fluid interpretation of ten- is neutralized:
{ES 1 } ( xi REP [ xi ( xi INITIATE+VERB ](INITIATE)ten ] 1
When the complement verb is a Non-Control verb, there can
be no coindexing between self-initiated force and the represent-
ation; hence, only SET2 is possible. By implication, the Fluid
interpretation of ten- is limited to the non-initiated event
interpretation:
(ES,}	 x) REP [ x i [ xi VERB 1( )ten
te(1)- 'time to/obliged to'
In addition to ten- 'get ready/be ready,' there is another
aspect/modality verb, teal- 'time to/obliged to,' which also
takes infinite complements. However, unlike ten-, the verb
te(1)- 'time to/obliged to' is a Non-Control verb allowing only
SET2 inflection. The contrast between the two is illustrated
below.3
(13) ji	 won--e	 ten-a
1/ABS	 go-INF	 ready-PST/SET1
"I'm ready/about to go."
(14) ji	 won-e	 tel-O
1/ABS	 go-INF	 time.to-PERF/SET2
"It's time for me to go."
Although te(l). - is a Non-Control verb, it only takes
Control verbs as complements. Recall that then- 'to arrive' and
butt)- 'to lose (in a contest)' are both Non-Control verbs.
(15)*	 ji	 then-e	 tel-O
1/ABS	 arrive-INF	 time.to-PERF/SET2
(16) *	 ji	 bu-e	 tel-O
1/ABS	 lose-INF time.to-PERF/SET2
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Because it is a Non-Control verb, te(1)- allows only SET2
inflection. However, there are distributional restrictions on
te(1)- which parallel the SETT/SET2 contrast with ten- and other
Control verbs.
For example, whenever speakers use te(1)- in environments
that would otherwise take SETT inflection, the verb is given an
epistemic reading. That is, the first person declarative inter-
pretation is roughly paraphrased in English as: 'I'd better' or
'It's time to.' The speaker is reporting that the time has
arrived for him/her to initiate a plan or fulfill some prior
obligation to act. In invoking some unspecified responsibility,
it is often used to politely indicate the need to leave. To the
extent that the judgement about the appropriate time to initiate
an action or fufill a particular obligation is a mental event
unique to individual mental states, I will use the term epi-
stemic to characterize this interpretation of the verb.
In contrast, in SET2 environments with Control verb
complements, the verb te(1)- is given a deontic interpretation.
For example, the first person interrogative interpretation is
roughly paraphrased in English as: 'Is it time for me to.' The
speaker is inquiring whether the time has arrived for him/her to
fulfill an obligation to act. In this case, the speaker attri-
butes to the addressee the authority to judge the appropriate
time for the speaker to fulfill a particular, presupposed obli-
gation. In this sense, I will use the term deontic to charac-
terize the interpretation.
Similar asymmetrical modality interpretations are apparent
in the prescriptive tradition with will and shall in English
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(Boyd and Boyd 1980). Other examples include the English modal
may. The first person declarative clause is strongly biased
towards an epistemic interpretation as: 'self-determined possi-
bility.' The judgement is attributed to the Epistemic Source,
who is coreferential with the actor.
(17) I may play the guitar tonight.
In contrast, the first person interrogative interpetation is
strongly biased towards a deontic intepretation as: 'permission
to play.' The judgement of possibility is attributed to the
Epistemic source, the addressee, who is not coreferential with
the actor.
(18) May I play the guitar tonight.
This English alternation is functionally analagous to the
contrast with tell)- in Newari, suggesting that the conceptual
structures and functional principles underlying the Newari
SET1/SET2 inflection are not mere ad hoc explanations, but
involve more fundamental conceptual and discourse principles.
The epistemic sense of te(1)- is judged unacceptable
whenever the complement verb is a Control verb and the actor/
subject is not the epistemic source. In these contexts, the use
of the verb te(1)- is acceptable only with a deontic intepre-
tation: 'obliged to.' In other words, the judgement is not
attributed to the participant referred to in the clause.
Instead, it indexes a judgement external to the clausal
actor/subject.
For example, speakers accept the epistemic sense of te(1)-
in first person declarative clauses with a Control verb, but
find it unfelicitous in second and third person clauses.
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(19) ji won-e tel-O
1/ABS go-INF time.to-PERF/SET2
"It's time for me to go."	 (epistemic)
(20) ch0 won-e tel-O
2/ABS go-INF time.to-PERF/SET2
"Its time that you go!"	 (? or deontic sense only)
(21) wo won-e tel-O
3/ABS go-INF time.to-PERF/SET2
"Its time that s/he got"	 (? or deontic sense only)
Although the deontic sense in second and third persons is
acceptable to most speakers I consulted, several speakers found
the deontic interpretations odd and suggested that the verb
te(1)- was anomolous outside epistemic contexts. In my own
observations in conversational interaction, the epistemic usages
occurred almost exclusively. Whether the deontic interpretation
was accepted or not, all speakers drew a clear distinction
between the acceptable epistemic contexts (parallel with SET1
contexts) and the default contexts (parallel with SET2
contexts).
In interrogative clauses, only second person actor/
subjects are acceptable with the epistemic sense of the verb
te(1)-. Again, the deontic sense for non-second persons is
acceptable to some speakers.
(22) ji	 won-e	 te1-0	 la
1/ABS	 go-INF	 time.to-PERF/SET2 Q
"Is it time for me to go?" (? deontic sense only)
(23) chO	 won-e	 tel-O	 la
2/ABS	 go-INF	 time.to-PERF/SET2
"Is it time for you to go?" (epistemic sense)
(24) wo	 won-e	 tel-0	 la
3/ABS	 go-INF	 time.to-PERF/SET2
"Is it time that s/he go?" (? deontic sense only)
Finally, logophoric contexts with the reported speech
particle 110 create epistemic interpretations.
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(25) wo	 won-e	 tea.-0 	 ILO
3/ABS	 go-INF	 time.to-PERF/SET2	 EVD
"Hei said it's time for himi to go" (epistemic)
Two factors account for the distribution and interpreta-
tion of the verb te(1)-:
First, although the verb itself is a Non-Control verb, it
subcategorizes for Control verbs only. The actions must be
potentially those that are self-initiated according to a plan.
Second, the alternative epistemic vs. deontic interpreta-
tions are a function of the same discourse role/evidential
prinicples which underlie the SET1/SET2 opposition.
Consider first the subcategorization principles for
te(1)-. The subcategorization for Control verbs is not unique
to the verb te(I)-; there is a small set of complement taking
verbs which subcategorize for Control verbs complements only
For example, the verb swo(1)- 'watch, look' functions as a
modality verb meaning 'try to.' As a complement taking verb, it
subcategorizes for Control verbs only. The infinitive comple-
ment may optionally take Dative marking.
(26) w6;	 pyakhO	 swot-0
3/ERG	 theatre	 look-PERF/SET2






"S/he tried to eat."
Non-Control verbs do not occur as infinitive complements of
swo-.
(28)*	 145:	 lumOn-e-(t0)	 swol-O
3/ERG	 remember-INF-DAT	 look/try-PERF/SET2
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In the case of lumOn- 'remember,' the affective causative
form may be used as a complement since the causative suffix




"S/he tried to recall (it)."
In addition, the verb bi_ .(1)- 'give' occcurs with infini-
tive complements meaning 'let, allow'; it subcategorizes for
Control verbs only.
(30) w6:	 ji-tO	 won-e	 mO-biu
3/ERG	 1-DAT	 go-INF	 NEG-give/IMPERF/SET2
"S/he didn't let me go."
(31)*	 wO:	 ji-tO then-e	 m0-biu
3/ERG 1-DAT arrive-INF	 NEG-give/IMPERF/SET2
In short, there is nothing odd about saying that the verb
te(1)- 'time to/obliged to' takes only Control verb complements.
In fact, it follows directly from the semantics of the verb
itself. For Newari, the meaning of the verb te(1)- 'time to/
obliged to' entails an obligation for self-initiated action.
One cannot, for example, be obliged to catch a cold. Note,
however, that in English it is possible to interpret 'time for'
with non-volitional sentences such as: "It's time for Bozo."
This is not the case with Newari te(1)- 	 suggesting a more
basic modality sense 'be obliged' rather than the aspectual
sense 'time to.'
The semantics of a negative imperative form of the verb
supports the the modality interpretation. Jorgenson (1931;
1941) and Manandhar (1986:97) note the polysemy of te(1)- 'time
to/obliged to,' and the prohibitive construction mO-te 'do not.'
The prohibitive construction is constructed out of the negative
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imperative form of the verb te(1)- 'time to/obliged to.' 4 Since
prohibition entails potential self-initiated action, the pro-







"Do not eat (it)!"
(34)*	 then-e	 mO-te
arrive-INF	 NEG-obliged
The affective causative form allows some Non-Control verbs




Thus, the subcategorization requirements of the verb
te(1)- can be explained if the semantics are assumed to be
primarily based on modality rather then temporality. In perfec-
tive affirmative clauses, the verb has the basic meaning: 'to
become obligated to initiate an action based on a self-judgement
(epistemic interpretation) or other-judgement (deontic interpre-
tation).' The prohibitive construction is a negative imperative
form meaning 'obligated not to act." The semantics of 'obli-
gation' entail potential intentional action; hence, the verb may
only occur with Control verb complements.
In affirmative clauses, the verb te(1)- has two potential
interpretations: epistemic and deontic.	 The interpretations
follow from the principles of discourse role and epistemic
source.
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First, recall the two domains in the conceptual structure
of intentional action: mental representation and self-initiated
force. The meaning of te(1)- entails potential self-initiated
force for the complement clause. The epistemic interpretations
occur only when the actor in the clause is coreferential with
the epistemic source discourse role.
In these cases, the individual who is attributed or
assumes the discourse role of epistemic source is the only
person who has authority to judge: 'the time has arrived.' In
this sense, the epistemic interpretation, like SET1 inflection
follows from evidential/logophoric principle of privileged
access to mental states.
In contrast, the deontic interpretation occurs whenever
the actor and epistemic source are not coreferential. In making
an assertion about obligation, the judgement will always be
located with the epistemic source. By implication, if the epi-
stemic source is not the actor, the obligation to act will be
attributed to the actor by the epistemic source, giving a
deontic interpretation of the utterance.
The verb te(1)- represents the concept 'time to/obliged
to'; schematically, the concept of obligation entails two
things:
1. There is a potential for self-initiated action by an
individual.
2. An individual makes a judgement (based on individual,
social, or moral criteria) that a self-initiated action has
become necessary.
[ Judge [ Obligation [ Initiate [ Event ] ] ] ]
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The mapping from schematic structure onto the grammar is
diagrammed below:
If the epistemic source and the actor are co-referential,
there is an epistemic interpretation:
[ xi Judge [ Obligation [x i Initiate [ Event ] ) ] )
fES i l [ xi [ xi INITIATE+VERB ] te ]
If the epistemic source and the actor are not co-
referential, there is a deontic interpretation:
[ x j Judge [ Obligation [x i Initiate [ Event	 ] ] ]
fES 1 1 [ xi [ xi INITIATE+VERB ] te ]
In summary, te(1)- 'time to/obliged to' takes infinitive
Control verb complements and SET2 inflection. In this sense,
its subcategorizing and lexical semantic properties are distinct
from ten- 'get ready/be ready.' Despite this clear difference,
both verbs exhibit distributional asymmetries which are a
function of the same conceptual and discourse principles under-
lying inflection in simple clauses. With te(1)-, the epistemic
interpretation occurs whenever: (a) the complement verb is a
Control verb, (b) the discourse role of epistemic source is
coreferential with the actor.
Since the verb te(1)- requires Control verb complements,
the deontic interpretation occurs in all other contexts where
the actor and Epistemic Source are not coreferential. In short,
the discourse evidential principle by which actor and Epistemic




Chapter VI described the distribution and interpretation
of the causative suffix -k01-/-k- and identified two types
of causatives: effective and affective. In addition to these
two types, there is an exceptional use of the causative
suffix with the aspectual verb dhun- 'finish/be.finished.' As
with te(1)- 'time to/obliged to,' the distribution of dhun-
'finish/be.finished' shows that the conceptual and discourse
principles can be distinguished from the formal realization in
SET1/SET2 inflection.
The verb dhun- takes infinitive complements and, like
te(1)- 'time to/obliged to,' categorially takes SET2 inflection.
In a first person declarative clause with a Control verb comple-
ment, the simple form of the verb occurs with SET2 inflection.
(36) ji	 won-e	 dhun-O
1/ABS	 go-INF	 finish-PERF/SET2
"I already went."
However, in declarative clauses with second and third
persons, the causative SET2 form is obligatory. Both the simple
form and the causative SET1 form are ungrammatical. For
example:
(37) ch0	 won-e	 dhun-k01-0
2/ABS	 go-INF	 finish-CAUS-PERF/SET2
"You already went."
(38)*	 ch0	 won-e	 dhun-O
2/ABS	 go-INF	 finish-PERF/SET2
(39)*	 ch0	 won-e	 dhun-k-a
2/ABS	 go-INF	 finish-CAUSE-PST/SET1




In fact, the distribution of causative and simple forms of
the verb dhun- exactly parallels the SETT/SET2 inflectional
distribution. For example, second person questions require the
simple form.
(41) chO	 won-e	 dhun-O	 la
2/ABS	 go-INF	 finish-PERF	 Q
"Have you already gone?"
Third person questions require the causative form.
(42) wo	 won-e	 dhun-k01-0	 la
3/ABS	 go-INF	 finish-CAUS-PERF/SET2
"Has he already gone?"
Logophoric contexts take the simple form.
(43) wO:	 nO-e	 dhun-O	 110
3/ERG eat-INF	 finish-PERF/SET2	 EVIJ
"S/he i said s/he has already eaten."
Unlike te(1)- 'time to/obliged to,' dhun- allows both
Control and Non-Control verb complements. When the complement
verb is a Non-Control verb, the SET2 causative form must be
used. The form dhun-O is unacceptable in these cases.
(44) ji-t0	 tyanu-e	 dhun-k01-0
1-DAT	 be.tired	 finish-CAUS-PERF/SET2
"I'm already tired."
(45)*	 ji-t0	 tyanu-e	 dJun-O
I-DAT	 be.tired	 finish-PERF/SET2
The simple vs. causative alternation parallels the
SET1/SET2 opposition with the verb ten- 'get ready/be ready' and
the epistemic/deontic opposition with te(1)- 'time to/obliged
to.'
In summary, dhun- takes infinitive complements and only
allows SET2 inflection. It inflects with the simple SET2 form
whenever: (a) the complement verb is a Control verb, (b) the
self-initiated action is in accordance with a representation,
192
(c) the discourse role of epistemic source is coreferential with
the actor.
The SET2 causative form occurs in all other contexts.
There are other important facts to note about dhun-.
Although the actual distribution of simple and causative forms
with dhun- is distinct from the affective causative verbs, in
one sense, dhun- is like an affective causative verb (see
Chapter VI). More specifically, in forming the causative, the
suffix -k01- does not required an added argument; there is no
increase in valency. Independent of the other parameters of
self-initiated force in the complement clauses and Epistemic
Source, the lexical structure of the simple vs. causative form
parallels the affective causative verbs.
dhun- [ 0	 [ x [ VP-INF I ] dhun ]
dhun-CAUSE-	 [ x	 [	 [ VP-INF ] I dhun-CAUSE ]
Clearly, however, the causative morpheme in this construc-
tion has exceptional properties. For example, as noted above,
the causative suffix with dhun- does not require an Ergative
marked nominal. Thus, despite the presence of the causative
morpheme, Ergative case marking is impossible.
(46) wo	 /* w15: 	 won-e	 dhun-k01-0
3ABS /* ERG	 go-INF	 finish-CADS-PERF/SET2
"S/he already went."
(47) ji /* ji; bura ju-e	 dhun-k01-0
1ABS/* ERG old become-INF finish-CAUS-PERF/SET2
"I'm already old."
Finally, and most important for our purposes, unlike the
affective verbs, the distribution of the simple vs. causative
alternation is a function of the same conceptual and discourse
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principle affecting the SET1/SET2 alternation, In fact, this is
somewhat puzzling.
I can not, at this time, adequately explain the develop-
ment of this exceptional occurrence of the causative form with
dhun-, though the evidence suggests an extension of the causa-
tive meaning into evidential domains. For example, there is




"I'd like to go."
masti wol-O
desire come-PERF/SET2
Several of my consultants suggested that it was odd or inappro-
priate to use this verb in non-epistemic source contexts, unless
there are appropriate evidential qualifications. Thus:
(49)?? wo-ya(t0)	 won-e	 masti wol-O
3-GEN(DAT)	 go-INF	 desire come-PERF/SET2
(50) wo-ya(t0)	 won-e	 mast! wo1-0	 110
1-GEN(DAT)	 go-INF	 desire come-PERF/SET2 EVD
"S/he, said s/he, would like to go."
Among the speakers who felt that the simple clause with
masti wo(1)- was odd or inappropriate in non-epistemic source
contexts, some suggested an affective causative construction
would be appropriate. In this case, however, the causative is
interpreted as: 'apparent to observation.'
(51) wO:	 won-e	 masti woe-k01-0
3-ERG go-INF	 desire come-CAUSE-PERF/SET2
"(S/he has indicated) s/he would like to go."
The interpretation of the affective causative as 'apparent to
observation' occurs with certain Dative affective verbs. For
example, the causative form of the verb 'be.cold' ciku- / cikui-
k- is interpreted as 'shiver or shake with cold.' This suggests
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a pathway for extension of the affective causative meaning into
an evidential function.
For example, assuming that the cannonical effective causa-
tive is basic, the cannonical animate causative schema has a
referentially distinct source/agent and goal/patient as follows:
[xRepresent[xInitiate[xCause[yBecome ]11]
In the affective causative schema the source/agent and
goal/patient roles are not referentially distinct. Thus, the
affective causative is interpreted as a type of self-initiated
mental or sensory/emotional event:
[ x Represent [ x Initiate [ x Cause [ x Become ] 	 ] 1
To the extent that these experiencer events are not acces-
sible to others, they may only be inferred via behavior. As was
the case with the affective causative ciku- 'be.cold'/ cikui-k-
'shiver/shake with cold,' the internal state and the observable
behavior are linked by an affective derivation.
If we follow this reasoning, then the evidential function
of the causative with dhun- 'finish/be.finished' follows from
several further assumptions:
1. In one sense, 'finish/complete' describes an internal
mental event inaccessible to observation by others. As opposed
to a concept like 'stop,' the concept 'finish/complete' entails
a mental plan of the event that enables a judgement to be made
when the event has reached its complete realization. With self-
initiated actions, this plan presumably has the same status as
the representation with 'intentional action.' It is inacces-
sible to other minds and subject to evidential restrictions.
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1. Since the representation is inaccessible to other
minds, in non-epistemic source contexts, the judgement x's
action is finished must follow from inference based on
observable behavior.
3. The observable behavior is caused behavior. There-
fore, the assertion x's action is finished in non-epistemic
source contexts requires the attribution of causation. This is
in contrast, for example, to assertions about "stopping," where
observation is sufficient. It is in this sense that dhun-
'finish/be.finished' is analogous to ciku(l)- 'be.cold.' The
affective causative form signifies observable behavior
attributed to an internal state.'
More problematically, in environments with Non-Control
verbs, the causastive form is also required. No satisfying non
ad hoc account has occurred to me and currently I have identi-
fied no clear historical pattern which would suggest a path of
development. More important to my argument, however, is the
fact that the Non-Control verb environment has the same formal
(causative) realization as non-epistemic source contexts. The
distribution of the simple vs. causative forms of dhun- is
formally distinct but functionally parallel with the SET1/SET2
opposition.
Summary: Formal Distinctions 
and Function Parallels 
Formal Distinctions
The distributional properties of the verbs can be
distinguished in terms of (a) inflectional properties, and (b)
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subcategorization properties. As with simple verbs, the inflec-
tional properties of each verb are determined, in part, by
whether or not the feature [INITIATE] is part of the lexical
meaning. The subcategorization properties of the three verbs
are a function of the aspect/modality semantics which determine
which complement types are compatible with their meaning. The
distinctions are summarized below:
The verb ten- 'be ready/get ready' inflects exactly like a
Fluid verb and has no restrictions on its complement types:
ten-	 [ x [ x INITIATE+VERB ] (INITIATE)ten ]
[ x	 x INITIATE+VERB	 ( )ten ]
[x [xVERB ] ( )ten ]
The verb te(1)- 'time to/obliged to' inflects exactly like
a Non-Control verb and allows only Control complement types:
te(l)-	 [ x [ x INITIATE+VERB ] to ]
The verb dhun- 'finish/be.finished' is more problematic.
In contexts which require the simple, non-causative form, the
verb inflects as a Non-Control verb. In the contrast between
simple and causative, it inflects like an affective causative,
adding no new arguments to the causative form. Since the
causative form occurs in exactly those environments where SET2
is used with Control verbs, the causative stem will always occur
with SET2 inflection. It has no restrictions on complement
types:
dhun-	 [( )[ x INITIATE+VERB ] dhun
dhun-CAUSE-	 [ x [	 [ x VERB ] dhun-CAUSE ]
dhun-CAUSE-	 [ x [	 [ x INITIATE+VERB ] dhun-CAUSE ]
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Functional Parallels
Although the three verbs have different formal properties,
there is a functional parallel among the three complement taking
aspect/modality verbs. The distribution of SET1 with ten-
'get ready/be ready,' the epistemic interpretation with te(1)-
'time to/obliged to,' and the simple SET2 form with dhun-
'finish/be,finished' all exhibit the same necessary conditions:
(a) the complement verb has self-initiated force as part of its
(obligatory or potential) lexical structure, (b) the discourse
role of epistemic source is coreferential with the actor,




'The infinitive form -e is homophonous with the SET1 Non-
Past form.
2The suffix L-ga functions as a nominalizer, occurring in
conversational contexts to indicate a variety of pragmatic
functions including presupposition, background, low assertive-
ness, and politeness. The temporal subordinating suffix -bOlOe
'when' triggers the same inflectional distribution as the
complmentizer -qu. That is, the SET2 Perfective/Imperfective
opposition is neutralized; the SET1/SET2 opposition becomes
orthogonal to a Past/Non-Past opposition (see Chapter II).
3Hargreaves & Tamot (1985) show how the two verbs ten- 'get
ready/be ready' and te(1)- 'time to/obliged to' parallel other
stem final contrasts, e.g., won- 'go' and wo(1)- 'come',
suggesting an earlier morphological role for the stem final -n.
4Genetti (1990:170) states that the verb te- which
historically formed the prohibitive auxiliary m0-te "is rare or
has been lost" in modern Kathmandu Newari, implying that the
Modern Kathmandu prohibitive construction m0-te 'do not' and the
modal verb te- 'time to/obliged to' are not cognate. The modal
verb te- 'time to/obliged to' and the prohibitive construction
m0-te- 'do not' are both well attested in Late Classical texts
and modern colloquial speech. All evidence suggests they are
one in the same.
'The restriction is not really syntactic since there are
constructions with some Non-Control verbs such as: qya-e m0-te 
'don't be afraid'. Even though (Iva- 'be.afraid' is a Non-
Control verb, the construction implies a type of control. Note
also that the imperative qva! 'be afraid!' is anomalous. The
lack of complete concord between prohibitives and imperatives
with respect to intentional action and control can be accounted
for in terms of the model proposed in Chapter Four. A prohibi-
tion implies some potential event. Although the event itself may
be the type which does not admit self-initiated force, it may be
subordinated to a plan of action which does admit self-initiated
force. Thus, 'don't be afraid' implies that the event 'be
afraid' is placed within the scope of a plan 'prevent onself
from being afraid'.
60n the problem of negative scope for main and complement
clauses see Horn (1989). Tuladhar (1990) provides a
comprehensive analysis of negation in Newari.
'Several speakers have suggested to me that, in fact, some
of the affective causative alternations do have evidential
interpretations, though I have not been able to document this
with any consistency. It remains the task of future research.
Moreover, the tendency to use the genitive subject with 3rd
person subjects and Dative experiencer verbs suggests some





This study described the relationship between the concept
of intentional action, the grammatical organization of the
clause, and the dynamics of evidentiality in Kathmandu Newari.
In particular, the study focused on the conceptual structure of
"intentional action," along with the lexical, morphological, and
syntactic reflexes of this notion in situated speech. The study
has attempted to:
1. Describe how the concepts of intentionality, agency,
and causation in conceptual structure are mapped onto
grammatical organization.
2. Describe the interaction or non-interaction among
these concepts when they are mapped onto the grammar.
Chapter II examined the distribution of SET1/SET2
inflectional forms and asked the following question:
How do the lexical semantic and the discourse pragmatic
domains interact to determine the distribution of
inflectional forms and express the distinction between
intentional and non-intentional actions?
The distribution of SET1/SET2 inflection results from the
interaction of two domains: (a) verb semantics and the
interpretation of intentional action, and (b) the speech act
participant roles which assume or are attributed the epistemic
authority in the discourse interaction.
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Chapter II concluded that the distribution of inflectional
forms must be described in terms of the interaction between the
two lexical semantic and discourse pragmatic principles.
In Chapter III we examined a set of distributional and
semantic "tests" to determine which conceptual properties were
functionally relevant for determining SET1/SET2 inflection,
asking the question:
What properties or features of the concept "intentional
action" are functionally relevant in Newari morphosyntax?
More generally, what is the conceptual structure by which
intentional action is construed in the grammar of
Kathmandu Newari?
The distribution of SET1/SET2 inflection with the
evidential forms such as h05. 'it's.said,' khOnisa 'it.appears,'
and mOcaekO 'unconsciously' showed that one part of the
definition of intentional action involved some form of mental
representation or awareness. Morever, it showed that this
domain could be obviated by evidential operators independently
of the concept of self-initiated force.
In contrast, the distributional evidence for three classes
of verbs (Control, Fluid, Non-Control) and the evidence from the
use of the pro-forms va(t)- 'do' and iu(1)- 'become' showed that
the second domain of intentional action involved an underlying
distinction between self-initiated events and other non-
initiated events, "doings" vs. "happenings." Finally, the
periphrastic construction for expressing "premeditation"
revealed underlying semantic and pragmatic principles for
attributing intentional action.
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Chapter IV showed that approaches to intentional action in
both action theory and cognitive development were consistent
with the idea that intentional action can be conceived as:
(a) self-initiated force, (b) in accordance with a unique mental
state or plan. Given this distinction between the two parts of
conceptual structure, Chapter IV addressed the following
question:
When an utterance in discourse indexes an opposition
between intentional and non-intentional action, what are
the contributions of the lexical (i.e., verb), morpho-
logical (i.e., inflection), and pragmatic (i.e.,
discourse/evidential) information. In other words, what
parts of the conceptual structure are mapped onto what
parts of the grammar and how do they interact?
Chapter IV argued that the concept of self-initiated force
was represented as part of the inherent lexical meaning of
Control verbs, was potentially part of the meaning of Fluid
verbs, and incompatible with the meaning of Non-Control verbs.
Furthermore, the lexical incorporation of the concept 'self-
initiated force' was distinguished from the function of SET1
inflectional forms. Although SET1 forms indicate that inten-
tional action is predicated of an individual, it was argued that
the occurrence of SETT inflection entails the force dynamic and
indicates that the force was initiated in accordance with the
appropriate mental state. Finally, part of the conceptual
structure of intentional action included the discourse/
vidential principle in which mental representations are
inaccessible to other minds; hence, the direct attribution of
intentional action with SET1 inflection is determined by the
discourse determination of Epistemic Source. In this way, the
lexical, inflectional, and discourse pragmatic principles
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interact to determine the distribution and interpretation of
SET1/SET2 inflectional forms.
Chapter V examined the lexical-semantic properties which
underlie the argument structure of verbs and their case
assigning properties, posing the following research question:
If intentionality and control are prototypical source/
gent properties central to the hierarchical assignment of
thematic roles to argument positions, what is the rela-
tionship between the concept of intentional action
realized by the inflectional opposition and the concepts
of source/agent as thematic role concepts? Alternatively,
how does the system of inflectional oppositions correlate
with other morphosyntactic reflections of argument
structure, e.g., case assignment.
Chapter V argued that case assigning properties
are a function of a mapping between an underlying
Source>Trajector>Goal schema and argument structure, independent
of the opposition between intentional and non-intentional
action. When mapping conceptual structure onto morphosyntactic
structure, the thematic role concept of source/agent is
independent of the concept "intentional action." The concept of
intentional action was neither a necessary nor sufficient
property for determining case assignment in Newari.
The examination of causative structures in Chapter VI
revealed a problematic class of non-canonical causatives, the
affective causatives. Affective causative formation was
restricted to experiencer and cognition verbs and did not
increase the valency in the clause; instead, affective causa-
tives were interpreted as active, middle-voice counterparts to
the simple non-active experiencer or cognition verbs. In
examining these constructions, Chapter VI posed the following
question:
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What is the relationship in Newari between the syntax and
semantics of causatives and the morphosyntactic reflexes
of intentional action. More specifically, if causatives
do indeed provide evidence for unaccusative lexical struc-
tures in Newari, what is the relationship between the
concept of intentional action and unaccusative syntax in
Newari?
Chapter VI concluded that although affective causatives
and Fluid verb alternations both indicate a semantic opposition
between self-initiated and non-initiated events, they represent
two distinct mapping relations from conceptual structure to the
morphosyntax. In short, the concept of self-initiated force
which underlies the distinction among the three verb classes
(Control, Fluid, Non-Control} is not relevant for the determin-
ation of unaccusative grammaticalization in Newari.
In Chapter VII we turned to the domain of aspect/modality,
evidentiality, and discourse roles. The distribution of a set
of aspect/modality verbs showed that the functional principles
underlying the distribution of inflectional forms have realiza-
tions in grammatical contexts other than the SET1/SET2 inflec-
tional contrast itself. This raised the following question:
What is the relationship between the concept of inten-
tional action and the expression of aspect/modality
distinctions in the clause? More specifically, what is the
functional organization which underlies the same distribu-
tional asymmetries for the inflectional contrast and a set
of aspect/modality verbs?
The form/function asymmetries with the verbs ten- 'get
ready/be ready,' te(1)- 'time to/obliged to,' and dhun-
'finish/be finished' showed that these asymmetries exactly
parallel the distribution of SET1/SET2 inflection. Accounting
for the underlying conceptual structure of intentional action
and the functional principles which determine the SET1/SET2
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contrast turned out to account for the form/function asymmetries
with modality verbs as well. In short, Chapter VII established
independent grounds for the validity of the conceptual
structures and functional principles which underlie the




One fundamental issue in linguistic theory is the rela-
tionship between the conceptual structure of events and the
morphosyntactic organization of the clause. Another fundamental
issue is the relationship between discourse functions and
morphosyntactic organization. The Newari data suggest a re-
examination of central concepts in each domain: the event
structure concept of "agency" and discourse functional category
of "person."
The concept of agency has been identified as having a
prominent role in the mapping between semantics and clause level
grammar. Fundamental to the concept of agency is the concept of
intentional action. However, the Newari data show that the
concept of intentional action (or volition) cannot simply be
subsumed as a "feature" or "primitive predicate" which charac-
terizes the agent thematic role. In short, the conventional
notion of a semantic primitive predicate or feature "volition"
associated with the thematic role of agent is inadequate for
describing Newari inflection, case, and causativization.
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I have suggested that the primary reason why the com-
plexities of "intentional action" have not been looked at in
more detail is the lack of data on languages which have surface
morphosyntax reflecting a complicated conceptual structure for
intentional action. In this respect, the Newari data present an
important challenge for any linguistic model which attempts to
account for the mapping relations between event structures,
thematic roles, and syntax.
For example, as we noted in Chapter IV there has been
almost no discussion in the linguistic literature connecting
"intention" as a force dynamic concept with "intention" as a
propositional attitude concept. With the exception of some
suggestive analyses of English (and German) phenomena in the
work of Pleines (1976), Jackendoff (1985; 1990), and Talmy
(1976), the only explicit analysis I am aware of is DeLancey's
analysis of Lhasa Tibetan (1986).
Even cognitive/functional approaches to event structure
and clause organization have not seriously investigated the
conceptual structure of intentional action. For example,
functional models, such as Role and Reference grammar (Foley and
Van Valin 1984; Van Valin 1990), do not attempt to analyze the
conceptual structure of intentional action, relying instead on
the semantic primitive "volition" in predicate decomposition.
As we have seen, a simple primitive "volition" is not adequate
for describing both domains of intentional action: the force
dynamic and evidential logophoric properties of the SET1/SET2
distribution in Newari. It is also not clear how such a theory
would handle the related but distinct and non-interacting
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conceptual structures which underlie SET1/SET2 inflection, case,
and causatives. Role & Reference Grammar is not alone in this
respect. Although this has been primarily a descriptive study,
the Newari data appear problematic for virtually all current
models of thematic roles. What is needed, of course, is a more
complete model of the parameters for mapping the concept of
intentional action onto grammatical organization,
Even in work as recent as Croft (1991), we find statements
such as the following, which suggest the model of volitionality
in which the "mind" drags the "body" out of bed:
The theory of volitional action appears to be quite-
simple...the commonsense model requires a mind-body
distinction...a relation between a volitional entity and
that entity's body (or part thereof). The VOL[itional]
link translates will (intention) into physical force
(1991:171).
In every other respect, Croft's analysis of the relation-
ship between the conceptual structure of events and the gram-
matical organization of clauses is comprehensive and insightful.
Virtually all of the conceptual modeling in his book is com-
patible with this study, drawing on the same insights from the
cognitive/functionalist tradition. However, the Newari data
reveal a complex concept "intentional action" which maps onto
different parts of the grammar. A simple feature of "volition"
is insufficient to account for the various mapping relations.
In challenging simplistic notions of "intention/volition,"
the Newari data also reveal the important connection between
agency, intentional action, and logophoricity. For example,
work on long-distance reflexives in languages such as Icelandic,
Japanese, Korean, and Mandarin suggest that the concept of
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intentional action can be a semantic parameter underlying
potential long-distance antecedent/anaphor relations (cf. Kuno
1987; Maling and Zaenen 1990; Sells 1987; Zubin, Chun, & Li
1990). The data from these languages suggest that where some
notion of intentional action is necessary to capture some of the
logophoric properties of long-distance reflexives, the Newari
data provide a useful model for how this might by conceived.
Finally, the Newari data suggest that the discourse role
of "epistemic source" may play a more important part in mapping
between discourse structures and the grammar than has been pre-
viously noted. Although there has been some previous discussion
of the evidential and pragmatic similarities of first person
declarative and second person interrogative clauses, the Newari
data reveal that as a function of face to face interaction and
information exchange, epistemic source can become a grammatical-
ized category. In this sense, the Newari data reveal an unusal
manifestation of the more familiar discourse functional cate-
gories of "person" and "agreement" (cf. Ebert 1987; DeLancey
1989: Silverstein 1976b; Thompson & Mulac to appear). The
degree to which the "Newari-type" inflectional paradigm is typo-
logically unique remains to be seen.
In conclusion, the Newari data do not admit a primitive
predicate or feature approach to volition/intention. Instead,
the Newari data require that we recognize a complex conceptual
structure for "intentional action." On the one hand, the
concept of self-initiated action is part of force dynamics,
agency and causation. On the other hand, the concept of inten-
tional action is part of the domain of propositional attitudes,
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evidentiality, and discourse interaction. A complete account of
Newari SET1/SET2 inflections also entails the constraint the
mental representation of a plan-in-action can only be directly
attributed to individuals in certain contexts of situated
speech. In other words, in mapping between conceptual structure
and the grammar, the notion of intentional action must be
considered in its social/cognitive dimension as well as its
perceptual/cognitive dimension. The Newari data show that we
must seek integrative models of the mapping relations between
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